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ABSTRACT
The decision to establish a mental health court in Utah’s First District was largely a political
one prompted by the growing popularity of problem-solving courts throughout the country.
Because this motivation was policy-driven and not needs-driven, the court was established without
an ongoing data collection schedule. As a result, barring anecdotal evidence from program
participants, the current impact of the court on two key goals— reducing recidivism and increasing
community-based treatment contact—is entirely unknown. The current study aims to provide a
summative program evaluation of the first sixty-eight months of specialty court operation by (1)
estimating basic demographic and clinical information about program referrals, participants, and
graduates; and (2) measuring program effectiveness by examining between-group differences in
key outcome measures (e.g., new charges, use of therapeutic services, time to rearrest, etc.) for
those referrals who are accepted into the program as participants versus those referrals who are
rejected from the program and sentenced to treatment-as-usual. Ideally, the current study will not
only provide an evidence-based assessment of local practices at the current study site but will also
empirically inform the greater community of mental health practitioners, researchers, and
policymakers who are operating in smaller, more rural districts.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Specialty Courts in the United States
In recent decades, the United States has seen a shift away from purely punitive prison
practices toward a more specialty-based approach. Specialty courts in general began to appear in
select jurisdictions in the 1980s and have come to encompass a wide range of specific criminal
behaviors (i.e., domestic violence, driving while intoxicated, sex offenses, etc.) or specific
populations that are at a greater risk of criminal involvement (i.e., veterans, teenagers, the mentally
ill, etc.) (Porter, Rempel, and Mansky 2010). Although there is a wide range of courts that fall
under the umbrella term “specialty,” some of the most popular have adopted a “problem-solving”
approach that looks beyond just criminal culpability and focuses on therapeutic rehabilitation
(Castellano and Anderson 2013). More specifically, these courts operate under the assumption
that criminal activity is significantly affected by pathologies compromised by other risk factors
like substance abuse or mental illness (or both). Problem-solving courts differ markedly from
traditional criminal courts in that they move beyond the customary case processing and sentencing
model to incorporate a multi-institutional partnership between judicial, legal, and treatment teams.
This coordinated effort attempts to divert individuals away from the criminal justice system and
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into community-based treatment programs in order address the issues that are causing the ongoing
criminal behavior.
The first drug court opened in Miami-Dade County, Florida, in 1989 and, as it involved the
first collaboration between justice and public health systems, it is widely regarded as the beginning
of the “problem-solving” court movement in the United States (Goldkamp and Irons-Guynn 2000).
The key goals of “problem-solving” drug courts are not only to reduce drug-fueled recidivism, but
also to concentrate expertise about drug cases into a single courtroom, to address clinical needs
and increase ongoing treatment contacts, and to free courtroom resources to adjudicate non-drug
cases (Belenko 1998). In order to meet all of these goals, the drug court model usually entails
timely identification of defendants in need of treatment, ongoing judicial supervision of structured
community-based treatment, graduated sanctions or rewards in an attempt to increase defendant
accountability, and mandatory periodic drug testing. Based upon the initial successes of the Dade
County court1, drug-themed specialty courts have increased significantly in popularity in the past
twenty-five years and now exist in every state and Washington, D.C.2.
The first dedicated judicial response to mental health began in Marion County, Indiana, in
1996 with the Psychiatric Assertive Identification Referral/Response (PAIR) program in
Indianapolis (Feinblatt, Berman, and Sviridoff 1998). Considered by many to be the nation’s first
mental health court, PAIR was a comprehensive initiative that included a pre-trial and postbooking diversion system expressly for mentally ill offenders (Feinblatt et al. 1998). Similar to
the drug court model, the PAIR program relied heavily upon a court workgroup that was staffed
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The National Institute of Justice (1993) found that defendants in the Miami drug court had fewer arrests than a
comparable control group.
2
As of December 31, 2013 there are 2,907 drug courts operating in the United States and its Territories (National
Drug Court Resource Center 2014).
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by local legal and social service professionals who are experts on the target population and the
related criminal justice issues, and the program was aimed at both reducing reoffending and
increasing treatment contacts (Feinblatt et al. 1998). In addition, the court used ongoing judicial
monitoring, case management, graduated rewards, and supportive services like housing and
employment assistance to help integrate defendants back into the community (Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law 2004). A year later, another similarly specialized mental health court was
opened in Broward County, Florida, which was then followed by three more in 1998—one in
Anchorage, Alaska, and two in California. (Ferguson et al. 2008; Goldkamp and Irons-Guynn
2000; Poythress et al. 2002). Since that time, the popularity of mental health courts in the United
States has grown significantly, as there are now 343 different mental health-themed adult courts
spread out over forty-three different states3 (Adult Mental Health Treatment Courts Database
2013).
According to Redlich et al. (2006), there are six different characteristics that define mental
health courts and make them distinct from other problem solving courts in the criminal justice
system. First, mental health courts are exclusive to individuals with serious and persistent
diagnosable mental illnesses. Second, mental health courts have a twofold goal of initially
diverting citizens with mental illnesses away from the criminal justice system and toward
community mental health treatment, and thus lessening future offending and recidivism as a result.
Third, mental health courts mandate community health treatment in lieu of incarceration, typically
in accordance with taking prescribed medications and adhering to other requirements such as
consistent employment or community service. Fourth, mental health courts require ongoing

3

Every state in the United States has at least one mental health court save for Arkansas, Connecticut, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wyoming (Adult Mental Health Treatment Courts Database 2013).
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judicial status review hearings conducted by the sentencing court in order to maintain a continued
dialogue between the court, community supervisor, and defendant. Fifth, mental health courts
operate under the model of “therapeutic jurisprudence” (Wexler and Winick 1996) where praise
and encouragement is offered for compliance and sanctions (i.e., potential incarceration) are
imposed for violations. Finally, mental health courts run on voluntary enrollments that are reliant
upon administrative referrals and participant consent. In contrast to drug courts, mental health
courts are typically more wary of using sanctions like incarceration in order to maintain program
compliance, given the legal and ethical issues tied to legal coercion and defendant competency
(O’Keefe 2006).
One of the issues that arise as a result of mental health courts being a coordinated effort
between the criminal justice system and the public mental health services system is determining
program efficacy. According to Redlich (2013), the ultimate goal is to “reduce the repeated
cycling of offenders with mental illness through the criminal justice system” (p. 148). While it
would appear natural to assume that, from a purely criminal justice perspective, the greatest
measure of success would be a lack of (or severe reduction in) recidivism, focusing solely on rates
of reoffending does not capture the total aim of the alternative sentencing program. More
specifically, this process is unique as a rehabilitative mechanism because it stresses that the current
charges will only be adjourned due to successful engagement with treatment services designed to
decrease criminality and to improve health and psychosocial functioning (Edgely 2014). Given the
factors that make mental health courts distinct from traditional criminal processing and even other
specialty courts, any evaluation should be aimed at not only assessing the effects of current
practices on traditional criminal justice-related goals but also mental health-specific goals.
Because future incarceration is one of a range of potential outcomes, many evaluations have

4

attempted to not only gauge the impact that problem solving courts have had on future law
enforcement contacts and jail-time, but also the amount of sustained contact participants maintain
with the community-based mental health treatment facilities after having successfully completed
the alternative sentence.
Prior research predicts that program participation will result in a series of positive, prosocial effects. Successful mental health court treatment completion is associated with fewer postprogram bookings and greater post-program treatment episodes when compared with pre-program
measures (Boothroyd et al. 2003; Christy et al. 2005; Eckberg et al. 2006; Herinckx et al. 2005;
Morin 2004; O’Keefe 2006; Teller et al. 2004; Trupin et al. 2001; Trupin and Richards 2003), and
with fewer post-program charges/arrests and longer intervals between charges when compared
with control groups of equivalent mentally ill felons (Bess Associates 2004; Christy et al. 2005;
Eckberg et al. 2006; McNeil and Binder 2007; Moore and Hiday 2006; Morin 2004; Neiswender
2005; Teller et al. 2004). In addition, when compared with a control group, program participants
see significant increases in the frequency of post-program treatment services (Boothroyd et al.
2003; Boothroyd et al. 2005; Cosden et al. 2005; Trupin and Richards 2003) and a significant
decrease in the number of post-program days in jail (Bess Associates 2004; Cosden et al. 2005;
Teller et al. 2004; Trupin and Richards 2003). The average graduation rate in a cross-national
sample of 447 participants in four different programs participants was over forty-seven percent,
with one jurisdiction even going as high as nearly eighty-one percent (Redlich et al. 2010).
Overall, the mental health court movement appears to be meeting the dual goals of reduced
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criminal justice contact and increased engagement in community treatment 4, meaning that these
types of courts appear to be meeting their program goals.
Although some high profile specialty courts have been assessed for effectiveness, what we
know about the majority of programs is rather limited (Castellano and Anderson 2012). Since the
first courts opened in the late nineties, there have been a limited number of evaluations conducted
and reported in journal articles, technical reports, doctoral dissertations, or master’s theses (see
Table 1). Within those fifty-two studies, only forty-five different sites have been sampled, with a
strong overrepresentation of courts that were founded early in the mental health court movement
and courts that have been established in larger cities with higher populations. This heightened
focus on only a handful of key sites may lead to a potential issue of external validity, as many of
the operational constraints or concerns that affect specialty courts in cities like Brooklyn, Miami,
San Francisco, and Seattle may not be applicable to smaller or more rural jurisdictions (see
Mateyoke-Scrivner et al. 2004 for a related discussion of how location affects drug courts
effectiveness). In addition, some of these studies are limited to a one-year period of data collection
(see Table 1) so the research may not be able testify to the long-term longitudinal successes of
those jurisdictions.
Table 1. Prior Mental Health Court Evaluations
Author(s)
Type of
Publication
Baranek (2008)
Thesis
Behnken (2008)
Dissertation
Bell et al. (2010)
Technical Report
Bess Associates (2004)
Technical Report
Boothroyd et al. (2003)
Journal Article
Boothroyd et al. (2005)
Journal Article
Boulden et al. (2011)
Technical Report
4

Court Location
7 sites
Santa Clara County (Juvenile), CA
Baltimore, MD
Butte County, CA
Broward County, FL
Broward County, FL
Jackson County, MO

Collection
Dates
2003-2004
2001
Unknown
2000
1999-2001
1999-2001
2010

In order to qualify the statement that these courts are overwhelming successful, it must be noted that in two metaanalyses of prior mental health court research, the effect on criminal outcomes was small-to-moderate and the effect
on mental health outcomes was non-significant (Cross 2011; Sarteschi 2009), although both studies suffered from a
notable lack of research adequately measuring treatment results.
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Table 1 (Continued). Prior Mental Health Court Evaluations
Author(s)
Type of
Court Location
Publication
Burke et al. (2012)
Journal Article
Davidson County, TN
Burns et al. (2013)
Journal Article
Hall County, GA
Callahan et al. (2013)
Journal Article
4 sites
Camarena (2008)
Technical Report Norfolk, VA
Canada and Watson (2013)
Journal Article
2 unspecified sites
Case et al. (2009)
Journal Article
14 unspecified sites
Christy et al. (2005)
Journal Article
Broward County, FL
Cosden et al. (2003)
Journal Article
Santa Barbara County, CA
Cosden, et al. (2005)
Journal Article
Santa Barbara County, CA
Dirks-Linhorst/Linhorst (2012)
Journal Article
St. Louis County, MO
Eckberg et al. (2006)
Technical Report Hennepin County, MN
Ferguson et al. (2008)
Technical Report Anchorage, AK
Frailing (2010)
Journal Article
Washoe County, NV
Herinckx et al. (2005)
Journal Article
Clark County, OR
Hiday and Ray (2010)
Journal Article
Unspecified, NC
Hiday et al. (2013)
Journal Article
Washington, DC
Hughes et al. (2012)
Journal Article
Travis County, TX
Keator et al. (2013)
Journal Article
3 sites
Kopelovich et al. (2013)
Journal Article
4 sites, NY
Kubiak et al. (2012)
Technical Report 8 sites, MI
Kubiak et al. (2014)
Technical Report Wayne County, MI
Liedtke et al. (2011)
Technical Report Jackson County, MO
Makany-Rivera et al. (2013)
Technical Report 4 sites (Juvenile), TX
McNiel and Binder (2007)
Journal Article
San Francisco, CA
Moore and Hiday (2006)
Journal Article
Unspecified, NC
Morin (2004)
Dissertation
Hennepin County, MN
Neiswender (2005)
Dissertation
King County, WA
O’Keefe (2006)
Technical Report Brooklyn, NY
Palermo (2010)
Journal Article
2 sites, NV
Poythress et al. (2002)
Journal Article
Broward County, FL
Pratt et al. (2013)
Journal Article
4 sites, NY
Ray et al. (2011)
Journal Article
Unspecified, NC
Redlich et al. (2010)
Journal Article
4 sites
Redlich et al. (2012)
Journal Article
4 sites
Ridgely (2007)
Technical Report Allegheny County, PA
Rossman et al. (2012)
Technical Report 2 sites, NY
Sneed et al. (2006)
Journal Article
Unspecified
Steadman et al. (2011)
Journal Article
4 sites
Teller et al (2004)
Technical Report Akron, OH
Trupin et al. (2000)
Technical Report King County, WA
Trupin et al. (2001)
Technical Report Seattle, WA
Trupin and Richards (2003)
Journal Article
2 sites, WA
Van Vleet et al. (2008)
Technical Report Salt Lake County, UT
Wicklund et al. (2013)
Technical Report Chittenden County, VT

Collection
Dates
Unknown
2004-2010
2005-2008
2006-2007
Unknown
2003-2007
1999-2001
Unknown
Unknown
2001-2007
2004-2005
2003-2006
2006-2009
2000-2003
2005
2007-2009
2006-2007
2005-2007
2009-2010
2009-2011
2009-2013
2002-2011
2008
2003-2004
2001-2002
2002-2003
Unknown
2002-2004
2001-2009
1999-2001
2009-2010
2009-2010
2005-2008
2005-2008
2001-2004
2002-2006
2003-2006
2005-2008
2001-2004
1999-2000
2000
1999-2000
2004-2008
2003-2012

Finally, one of the largest issues that exists when attempting to compile all pre-existing
evaluations into a definitive verdict on all mental health courts in the United States is that no two
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courts are identical; a common perspective among those that evaluate mental health specialty
courts is that, “If you’ve seen one mental health court, you’ve seen one mental health court”
(Castellano and Anderson 2012). Because of this lack of program standardization5, there is a large
amount of uncertainty about the effectiveness of any given problem-solving court. As a result, the
efficacy of any single court demands an intensive, rigorous, longitudinal case study. In this spirit,
this dissertation will evaluate the mental health court established in Utah’s First District.

The Current Site and Study
The beginning of the mental health court in Utah’s First Judicial District can be traced back
to 2008 when attorney Kevin K. Allen was interviewed about becoming a First District judge (Utah
Courts 2014). Policymakers had seen the popularity of the state’s first mental health specialty
court founded in 2001 in Salt Lake County, Utah’s Third District, and wanted to establish a similar
court in Cache County. This decision is noteworthy in that the seat of the First Judicial District in
Logan, Utah, is city with only a quarter of the population of Salt Lake City and with only a fraction
of the available mental health treatment facilities. After Judge Allen was appointed by Governor
Jon M. Hunstman, Jr., and once the court found a treatment provider in Dennis Kirkman and Bear
River Mental Health Treatment Center, the problem solving court began operating as the second
mental health court in the state of Utah in December 2008 (Macavinta 2013b).

As the

establishment of the court was largely a political decision and not one that came as a result of a
locally conducted needs-based assessment, there were no preexisting data about the role of mental

5

Courts tend to vary in a number of ways, from what mental health diagnoses will be screened out to what crimes are
under consideration for alternative sentencing to the treatment benchmarks necessary for successful program
completion. In the majority of cases, each court system tends to “reinvent the wheel” once state legislature requests
that a mental health court be implemented in a given jurisdiction.
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health in Cache Valley crime rates and the utility of the court is unknown. Based upon informal
first person accounts of successful participants and graduates (Jensen 2010; Macavinta 2013a;
Macavinta 2013c), the court seems to be anecdotally effective and appears to be making an impact
with the intervention’s target population, but it is difficult to quantify the court’s local impact
without substantial empirically guided assessment. This study will attempt to demonstrate how
the specialty court program is an essential alternative to strictly punitive prosecution, one which
provides participants with the necessary treatment service contacts that will initially provide courtmandated community supervision and then later provide post-program treatment support.
When evaluating the effectiveness of this court, the very first step will be to calculate
descriptive statistics including the total number of referrals, the program acceptance rate, the
program termination rate, and the program completion rate. In addition, the current study will
estimate some very basic demographic characteristics for the referral, acceptance, termination, and
completion groups including variables such as gender, race, ethnicity, age at time of acceptance or
rejection, living conditions, relationship status, highest level of education, and employment status.
Next, beginning with three years prior to the referral charges, this study will construct criminal
histories and treatment histories for those that participated in the specialty court program and for
those that were rejected in order to run a series of bivariate comparisons estimating whether or not
there are any significant preexisting group differences; if there are significant group differences
prior to acceptance into the program (i.e., if the participant group is already significantly less
criminally-prone or is significantly more treatment-oriented) than this study will use a fixed-effects
model in an attempt to neutralize such a threat to internal validity. Then, this study will employ a
quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test design using participants as the treatment group and rejected
referrals as the control group in order to estimate the long-term effects that program involvement
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has both on reoffending and on continuing to use community-based therapeutic services.
Recidivism will be examined by calculating the number of new charges and the number of jail
days up to three years after leaving the program (whether due to rejection, termination, or
graduation.) Continued treatment use will be estimated by calculating the number of services used
in the thirty-six months post-involvement. Finally, the current study will examine whether there
are significant differences between participants and non-participants in the post-program hazard
rates of new charges, incarceration, and therapeutic service use.
While the current study is intended primarily to fulfill the requirements for a doctoral
dissertation project, the process of gathering data and the potential applicability of the research
results expands the current research objectives considerably. The overarching objective of the
current study is fourfold and, while there may be some overlap, the first two goals would be
classified as mostly institutional and the second two goals are assessment-based. The first
institutional aim is to establish a data collection format that will not only aid the current project
but also provide the First District mental health court with an electronic database that may be added
to over time for purposes of periodic analyses. The second institutional goal is to validate these
data collection techniques locally so that they can be adopted elsewhere in the state of Utah in an
attempt to establish a statewide database across all mental health court jurisdictions. In an ideal
situation, the results of the current study could be used to influence future research opportunities
within the state, potentially allowing for evaluations of each specific mental health court as well
as the overall system of mental health and justice collaboration in Utah. The first assessmentrelated objective is to conduct a much needed impact assessment of the local court’s effectiveness
at reducing recidivism and increasing community-based mental health treatment contact. The
second assessment-related aim is to help empirically inform the greater community of mental
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health practitioners, researchers, and policy makers who are ideally interested in evidence-based
assessment outcomes tied to these specialty courts.
Beyond the local need for programmatic evaluation, there is a larger, more global utility to
studying Utah’s First District mental health court located in Cache County. None of the current
mental health court research has ever looked at a metropolitan area that is so small. While most
evaluations focus on large, urban areas with populations well over 1,000,000 residents (Behnken
2008; Boothroyd et al. 2003; Boothroyd et al. 2005; Christy et al. 2005; Eckberg et al. 2006;
Herinckx et al. 2005; Hughes et al. 2012; Kopelovich et al. 2013; Morin 2004; Neiswender 2005;
O’Keefe 2006; Poythress et al. 2002; Pratt et al. 2013; Ridgely et al. 2007; Rossman et al. 2012),
examinations of areas with the smallest population during the time of study include: Butte County,
California, with a year 2000 population of 203,171 residents (Bess Associates 2004); Akron, Ohio,
with a population of 217,074 citizens in 2000 (Teller et al. 2004); and Anchorage, Alaska, with a
2000 population of 260,283 people (Ferguson, Hornby, and Zeller 2008). Given that mental health
courts are starting to expand into decidedly non-urban, less populated jurisdictions, research
examining the utility of this type of problem solving in regions with smaller populations is
essential. While there is some precedent for examinations of the unique effects of rural settings
on drug courts (see Mateyoke-Scrivner et al. 2004), the research on mental health courts is not
nearly as robust. In addition, many assessments have been conducted in large urban centers where
mental health resources, while not abundant, are more available. Finally, there is a potential
argument to be made that the stigma of mental illness may actually be greater in smaller areas; the
social mistreatment and rejection of the mentally ill in a more socially limited area may be more
threatening to their quality of life than the illness itself (Kaufman 1999). As the majority of the
new problem-solving courts in the United States, and especially in Utah, are developing in more
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rural districts and counties, an empirically guided assessment of attempts to integrate those
struggling with mental illness into community-based services using preexisting rural district courts
becomes more and more valuable.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE HISTORY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Serious Mental Illness and Crime
There is currently a tremendous amount of overlap between the mental health and criminal
justice systems in the United States, and as the social safety net for mental illness has shrunk, the
criminal justice system is the institution that has filled the void (Torrey 1995). The correctional
system has seen a significant rise in the mentally ill prisoner population in the past forty years. In
2006, the U.S. Department of Justice released a report estimating that 705,600 state prisoners (56.2
percent), 70,200 federal prisoners (44.8 percent), and 479,900 jail inmates (64.2 percent) could be
classified as having a mentally health problem. In total, that is an expected population of over
1,250,000 mentally ill offenders that are incarcerated by the criminal justice institution. While
those percentages are lowered to 49.2 percent of state prisoners, 39.8 percent of federal prisoners,
and 60.5 percent of local jail inmates respectively when diagnoses are limited to just major
depressive disorder, mania disorder, or psychotic disorder, these statistics still imply that the
majority of offenders behind bars are subject to some form of serious mental illness. In many
instances, the mentally ill will cycle through the courts and correctional systems repeatedly, thus
“jails and prisons have become America’s mental hospitals. The country has reverted to a situation
last seen in the early 19th century” (Torrey et al. 2010:9).
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The largest issue with using the criminal justice system as the primary institution of
addressing mental illness is in how dissimilarly society views mental illness and criminality.
When analyzing what causes crime, there is some debate about human agency and the role of free
will (see Akers and Sellers 2012). On one hand, a variety of theories that emphasize the role of
biology or social influence believe that forces beyond an individual’s control compromise choice,
and so the role of biological or social determinism must be confronted. On the other side, rational
choice allows for “bounded” rationality, but still posits that crime is a choice or sequence of
choices that facilitates criminal behavior (Cornish and Clarke 1986). Either way, while actors in
the criminal justice system consider the role of potential mitigating or aggravating factors when
weighing how to punish a crime, the system itself is designed to punish behaviors that threaten
individuals and the public good. For the most part, public sentiment is less inclined to see a
convicted criminal as entirely sympathetic.
Mental illness is framed as a medical problem where any confinement “serves the goal of
treatment because of an underlying societal value of compassion for a person who has an illness”
(Erickson and Erickson 2008:7). Mental illness is often framed as a condition beyond an
individual’s control, perfectly in alignment with assumptions of biological determinism, and
therefore that individual is viewed with a level of compassion. The response that must be taken is
treatment-based in order to address those medical issues, and the result will benefit both the
individual and the greater society. The last thing one would argue is that society must punish that
person in order to get them to overcome his or her mental illness.
In contrast, crime is framed as a personal problem that results from any number of reasons,
but the resulting imprisonment is justified because of “the underlying value of keeping the
community safe from someone who has committed a crime” (Erickson and Erickson 2008:7).
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Whether we see it as a purposeful choice or not, we can all agree that criminal behavior threatens
public safety and therefore an individual who breaks the law is viewed as dangerous and a little
contemptible. The response that must be taken is punitive-based in order to punish any social
transgressions, and the result will mostly benefit the general public. As persons with mental illness
become more and more embedded within the criminal justice system, the chronic mentally ill
population runs a significant risk of not only never receiving adequate treatment, but also of public
perceptions shifting from viewing a mentally ill individual as sympathetic toward being someone
that should be scorned.
In an effort to restrain this growing tendency to address mental health issues with the
punitive approach that criminal justice demands, there has been a recent shift toward embracing
treatment-based approaches to criminal sanctioning (Council of State Governments 2005). This
movement has seen a dramatic increase in specialty mental health courts, which are aimed at
specifically targeting the mentally ill who engage in criminal behaviors and attempting to stabilize
symptoms and reducing chemical dependence (Almquist and Dodd 2009). For proponents of this
movement, the goal is now transitioning these defendants out of the correctional system and
steering them toward community-based treatment services by increasing service accessibility and
defendant integration at every stage in the process (Council of State Governments 2005). As
conceptualized, the role of the criminal justice system actually ends up being advantageous for all,
as this integrative procedure is technically housed within the sanctioning structure of the courts
and is therefore mandatory.
The problem-solving design is one that was specifically derived from the drug court model
(Almquist and Dodd 2009). Though mental health courts and drug courts focus on differing key
criminogenic risk factors, both share a number of common principles including: (1) enhanced
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information about program participants and treatment-related issues; (2) increased community
engagement; (3) pointed collaboration between criminal justice institutions and community
treatment organizations; (4) individualized justice using valid, evidence-based assessment tools;
(5) participant accountability through regular compliance monitoring; and (6) outcome analysis
(Wolf 2007). The problem-solving court model calls upon voluntary participation in communitybased treatment that is continuously monitored by the court in an effort to reduce recidivism,
reduce corrections costs, and improve the quality of life of offenders (Almquist and Dodd 2009).
While the root cause of anti-social behavior may be different, the overarching approach of all
specialty courts is one guided by therapeutic jurisprudence.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the "study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent"
(Wexler 2000:125). This approach regards the use of law as a social force that produces behaviors
and consequences that can either be therapeutic or anti-therapeutic (Wexler 2000). This is not to
say that therapeutic goals should entirely supersede other legal values, such as justice and due
process, but that this approach suggests that, when possible, therapeutic and anti-therapeutic
outcomes should be factored into judicial decision-making (Wexler 2000). Many of the drug
courts that first appeared in the mid-1980s as a response to the dramatic rise in drug offenses
emphasized court-monitored treatment over straight incarceration because the later was decidedly
anti-therapeutic (Winick 2003). The mental health court in Broward County, Florida, was
specifically founded on therapeutic jurisprudence principles, as the specialty court judge described
the program as "a therapeutic agent balancing treatment needs against those of Public Safety and
of course the individual's constitutional rights" (Casey and Rottman 2000: 450). The court was
designed to enhance therapeutic outcomes by facilitating timely access to individualized treatment,
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followed by ongoing judicial monitoring that oversees treatment adherence (Casey and Rottman
2000).
When discussing the specific role of judicial behavior in therapeutic jurisprudence, Wexler
(2000) stressed the need for an open dialog between the judge and the program participant. He
cited judges that spoke directly to the defendant, saying things such as: "Okay, you realize this is
the offense that you're pleading to. Please tell me in your own words what happened, when, and
so on" (2000:132) as being particularly effective at fostering positive change. Because therapeutic
jurisprudence emphasizes that the law in practice operate to promote pro-social cognitive
restructuring, such judicial behavior takes the first step of confronting denial and minimization,
and encouraging an offender to take responsibility (Wexler 2000). In fact, judges need to
understand the psychology of procedural justice so that specialty court participants feel validated
and experience greater program satisfaction, and are therefore more likely to willingly comply
with court orders (Winick 2003).
Outside of how well a judge facilitates dialog during status hearings in order to encourage
program compliance, the mechanisms that lead to positive change are tied primarily to the
treatment services provided. Such services tend to be incredibly individualized as a given mental
health court participant receives treatment services based primarily on that client's specific needs
and the community services that are available (Almquist and Dodd 2009). Mental health courts
do not operate nor fund treatment services, and have no direct control over the quality of the
services themselves (Almquist and Dodd 2009). In short, the court leaves it up to local mental
health experts to develop a treatment schedule that will work for a given defendant and the role of
the mental health court is to provide the legal incentive to comply with that treatment schedule. In
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this way, the court itself is a secondary agent of therapeutic change that is reliant upon the local
community treatment provider or providers to act as the primary agent of rehabilitation.
While increasing the accessibility of mental health services does not guarantee a lack of
recidivism, this approach appears to provide the best institutional response for yielding long-term
positive results. To better understand how both the mental health and criminal justice systems
have evolved over the years to become this integrated, the following section will detail how midTwentieth Century deinstitutionalization in the United States led to an increased reliance upon the
criminal justice intervention.

Deinstitutionalization and Criminogenic Risk Factors
Deinstitutionalization is the term used to describe the nationwide closure of the majority
of large state-run psychiatric hospitals in the 1970s (Torrey et al. 2010). While there were a
number of reasons for this deinstitutionalization, the primary result was a severe drop-off in
preexisting resources available to the mentally ill (Torrey 1988).

In 1955, there was one

psychiatric bed for every 300 American; in 2005, there was only one psychiatric bed for every
3,000 United States citizens (Torrey et al. 2010). The end result has been an increase of those
suffering from mental illness in the general population and in the criminal justice system.
The relationship between mental illness and treatment is a storied one that involves debates
over public safety, governmental intervention, federal versus state responsibilities, the loss of civil
liberties, the right to proper treatment, and conflicting policy recommendations (Torrey 1988).
Caring for the mentally ill in the United States became an institutionalized governmental
responsibility in the mid-1800s as a part of the social welfare movement to care for “feeble” people
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in society (Fakhoury and Priebe 2007). In the beginning, the focus was on “moral therapy” in the
1830s and 1840s, a movement spawned largely in Victorian Europe that argued for the treatment
of mental illness through a combination of psychiatric care and moral reprogramming (Fakhoury
and Priebe 2007; Torrey 1988).
Drawing upon the “moral therapy” movement, Dorothea Dix testified to the United States
Congress in the early 1850s about how the then-current system of incarcerating the mentally ill in
local jails with no concurrent treatment led to mentally ill citizens becoming more homicidal,
suicidal, or destructive (Luchins 1988). Based upon this evidence, she called for a federal policy
shift toward dedicated treatment facilities or asylums that would be subject to federal
administrative supervision.

Despite fears by then-President Franklin Pierce that federal

involvement in the care of the mentally ill would set a dangerous precedent that the government
should care for all impoverished Americans, the asylum movement gained popular support among
state governments and eventually resulted in the construction of mental hospitals in every state in
the pre-Civil War Union (Luchins 1988). President Pierce’s hesitancy6 did set precedent though
for a lack of federal oversight over state-run mental institutions, which became problematic in the
next century as state budgets shrank and asylum populations swelled. Due to a lack of federal
regulation and growing neglect, the bureaucratic goals of institutions that initially symbolized the
strong and compassionate arm of a responsible government aiding its most marginalized citizens
in the mid-19th Century largely became one of containment, oppression, neglect, and abuse in the
mid-20th Century (Earley 2006).

6

Pierce did veto the 1854 Congressional act granting 10 million acres of federal lands for construction, expansion,
and improvement of state facilities for the “furiously insane”.
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Critics of the institutional system began voicing discontent in the 1960s, and those critiques
came from a myriad of sources (see Birnbaum 1960; Foucault 1965; Goffman 1961; Rothman
1971; Szasz 1961). Challenges were leveled from a variety of different perspectives on the
political spectrum—liberal academics of the anti-psychiatry movement, civil rights lawyers, cashstrapped state legislatures, all three branches of the federal government, and private-sector thirdparty insurance companies. Although each party attacked the mental institution for different
reasons, the common thread among all of them was an understanding that the system that existed
at the time was wholly unacceptable.
The anti-psychiatry movement began in the 1960s with the release of psychiatrist Thomas
Szasz’s The Myth of Mental Illness and sociologist Erving Goffman’s Asylum. Around the same
time, philosopher Michel Foucault published Madness and Civilization and medical historian
David J. Rotham wrote The Discovery of the Asylum. All four texts were critical of the current
iteration of psychiatric institutionalization, but for slightly different reasons. While Szasz (1961)
claimed that the very concept of mental illness was flawed and scientifically worthless, he argued
that the administration of social labels like “mental illness” or “mental retardation” was especially
socially harmful, as it became the basis for excusing personal failings and/or punishing alternative
lifestyles. Foucault (1965) viewed mental illness in a similarly critical way, claiming that it was a
sinister invention of the ruling class used as an excuse to punish and imprison the poor and
marginalized. Rothman (1971) was also wary of the implementation of the asylum as less of a
magnanimous tool of philanthropic treatment and more of an attempt to separate the poor and the
infirm from the rest of society due to a fear of moral disintegration.
Goffman (1961) collected data while doing fieldwork as a hospital employee in order to
illustrate the severe disconnect between the stated goals and actual outcomes in “total institutions”
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like mental hospitals and prisons7. In his assessment, Goffman saw the mental hospital as a place
of humiliation and dehumanization accentuated by the on-going acknowledgement of differences
between the patients and the staff. While Goffman’s analysis was rather nuanced, his critiques
provided further justification for the anti-psychiatry movement, and this movement adopted five
highly critical principles: 1) mental illness is a label with no medical foundation, 2) no mental
illness warrants confinement for treatment or incapacitation, 3) the mental hospital is a corrupt
institution of social control that should be abolished, 4) psychiatry is dominated by religion and
superstition with no medical foundation, and 5) the mentally ill, not being ill, should not be
punished for abnormal behavior, excused for criminal acts, or entitled to treatment (see also
Shorter 1997). In short, the ideal of institutionalization as a compassionate, state-run response to
mental illness was now viewed entirely with suspicion and contempt.
Within this climate of hostility toward institutionalization, Dr. Morton Birnbaum put forth
a legal critique of the current system built upon arguments of “right to treatment” (Birnbaum
1960)—a view that was sympathetic to the compassionate motivations underpinning the asylum
movement of the 1800s, but that was highly critical of the civil commitment process that was
currently being used. At the time, patients who had been civilly committed could not be discharged
and released back into the general public until hospital officials documented that the patient had
demonstrated marked improvement.

Unfortunately, due to state budget constraints, many

hospitals had no treatment programs in place, and also had no formal system for patients to assert
themselves as being improved (Earley 2006). As a result of this bureaucratic inability to treat and
then discharge patients, state facilities ended up functioning as the anti-psychiatrist advocates

7

According to Goffman (1961), a total institution is a place of confinement and exclusion, where individuals do not
have true freedom of movement and all needs are provided by (and therefore regulated by) a governing body of
policy makers and staff.
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claimed—warehouses for the ill and marginalized. According to Birnbaum, mental patients who
were confined indefinitely while at the same time being denied the necessary treatment that would
grant release (i.e., the “right to treatment”) were victims of civil rights violations. The Fifth
Amendment guarantees that no citizens shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. V), so mental patients committed to a total institution despite
not having committed a specific crime, were being held unnecessarily and illegally. In the end,
Birnbaum argued that the state had no choice but to either provide adequate treatment for mental
illness or discharge all patients. Birnbaum’s argument eventually became legal precedent when a
federal appeals judge sympathetic to civil rights ruled in Rouse v. Cameron (1966) that state mental
hospitals were obligated to treat and not just confine their patients.
Five years later, the state of Alabama would set off a chain of events that would eventually
lead to the mass systemic overhaul of the institutional response to mental health in the United
States after firing more than one-hundred staff members from a state-run Tuscaloosa mental health
facility as a cost-cutting measure. To combat these firings, civil attorney George Dean filed a
class-action lawsuit on behalf of the former employees and utilized Birnbaum’s “right to
treatment” thesis as a justification for employee reinstatement by highlighting the unconstitutional
impact that inadequate staffing would have on patient recovery (Wyatt v. Stickney 1971). The
judge ultimately sided with the plaintiffs using the language of Birnbaum’s “right to treatment”
doctrine, and then demanded an overhaul of the entire Alabama mental health system. The
decision was upheld in appeals and the Alabama legislature was charged with systematically
upgrading their treatment facilities and programs in a way that was consistent with the “right to
treatment” perspective. While this legal win appeared to be beneficial in that it would force the
state to provide adequate treatment lest it commit civil rights violations, the truth is that Alabama
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ended

up

adopting

the

only

other

alternative

to

systematic

upgrade—wide-scale

deinstitutionalization.
Ironically, Birnbaum’s legal call for decent conditions in mental health facilities actually
ended up being the downfall of the entire system. Recall that “right to treatment” charged that if
a state could not provide adequate treatment for mental illness, then patients must be free to leave;
Birnbaum’s ultimatum was one of treatment or release. In the fallout of Wyatt v. Stickney,
Alabama opted to abolish the state-run asylum system rather than upgrade it. Shortly after
Alabama’s policy decision, a faction of lawyers associated with the case started the Mental Health
Law Project with the express purpose of deinstitutionalizing state mental health facilities (Earley
2006). Using the “right to treatment” argument, the Mental Health Law Project sued multiple
states, including Nebraska, Tennessee, Maine, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and
Virginia, in an attempt to prove that each state needed to pay exorbitant amounts of money to run
their hospitals adequately or else shut them down. From a fiscally conservative perspective, the
decision was easy to make—states with underfunded mental health programs would not be
expected to come up with more money for system-wide upgrades if they simply cut programs
altogether.
The “right to treatment” argument also fed into socially conservative justifications for
deinstitutionalization as it inadvertently allowed states to sidestep the responsibility that President
Pierce and the federal government had shrugged off in the 1850s. States found that intervention
yielded a significantly diminished return when confronted with civil rights litigation that fed off
of the concerns of Szasz, Foucault, and Goffman (Donaldson v. O’Connor 1974). According to
the Supreme Court, a state cannot confine an individual who is “capable of surviving safely in
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freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends”
(O’Connor v. Donaldson 1975:1).
During the same era, federal lawmakers had begun to rework the national policy as
ideological shifts away from institutionalization also extended into the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government. Emboldened by the youthful idealism of Kennedy and then
the social activism of Johnson, legislative policymakers had begun to distance themselves from
the traditional hospital model and embrace the ideal of “community psychiatry”. Just a few weeks
before Kennedy’s assassination, the young President championed the presumption that
community-based centers could usher in “a wholly new emphasis to care for the mentally ill”
(Sharfstein 2000). This new approach would place the responsibility of early identification of
symptoms and providing effective preventative treatment on the shoulders of local, communitybased mental health service centers instead of larger, state-run institutions (Grob 1991).
By signing the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963 (or CMHA)
into law, Kennedy brought the federal government into the 109-year debate about the role that
national policy should play in the treatment of mental health, representing a radical attempt to
facilitate the transition away from custodial hospitals (Sharfstein 2000). Enacted before Johnson
assumed the Presidency, the policy rested on the assumption that federal leadership and funding
under the overview of the National Institute of Mental Health would combine with high levels of
local activism and community integration to solve a longstanding and troublesome social problem
(Grob 1991). Unfortunately, the CMHA immediately ran into complications on the federal and
state levels that compromised this ideal.
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One of the biggest issues the CMHA faced was the budget compromise that developed as
a function of both the Vietnam War and President Johnson’s aggressive social policies, which
included his progressive Great Society and War on Poverty. By the end of 1967, only 200 of the
proposed 2,000 community treatment facilities had been built, and most were only located in areas
where the population was large enough to justify the need and staff the facility with professional
personnel; this number increased minimally to only 786 centers by 1989, still well short of the
early 1963 goal (Grob 1991). Congress, for its part, also undermined the CMHA by first failing
to specify the linkages between the existing state hospital systems and the new centers, and then
by passing a series of CMHA amendments between 1968 and 1974 that expanded the therapeutic
responsibilities of the community health centers to include the prevention and treatment of
alcoholism and drug addiction (Grob 1991).
The failure to specify the transition from state institutions to community treatment opened
the door for significant pushback by local stakeholders interested in abandoning the state hospital
system. Moreover, the expansion of treatment to include those not suffering from mental illness
diluted the mission of the centers themselves. In a similarly ironic turn of events to Birnbaum’s
idealistic “Right to Treatment” campaign, the 1963 federal legislature’s idealistic attempt to create
a more integrated systemic response to mental illness actually served to incontrovertibly damage
the entire system over time; by inadvertently giving states the freedom to dismantle the preexisting
system without following through and effectively filling the void, there was now no robust
federally mandated mental health treatment system in place, community-themed or otherwise
(Earley 2006).
Another significant change in mental health care that influenced deinstitutionalization was
the introduction of psychotropic medications. More specifically, chlorpromazine was clinically
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introduced as thorazine in the 1950s and met with a measure of therapeutic success as an
antipsychotic drug (Lopez-Munoz et al. 2005). This sparked an even greater interest in the
employment of more drugs that could be used to alter people's thoughts, emotions, and behaviors,
causing psychiatry in the United States to experience a strong shift away from the psychoanalytic
treatment tradition toward a "psychopharmacological revolution" (Lopez-Munoz et al. 2005). This
increased use of antipsychotics became more prevalent in the treatment of schizophrenia and manic
episodes of bipolar disorder, and encouraged treatment providers to see the potential for patient
success outside of the asylum model.
The final factor complicating widespread deinstitutionalization was the lack of private
funding. From the end of World War II until 1970, private sector third-party health insurance
coverage expanded rapidly for many medical issues like hospitalization, surgical services, inhospital visits, and home consultations, but not for other medical problems like mental disorders,
alcoholism, drug addiction, and self-inflicted injuries (Grob 1991). While one could argue that
behaviors like alcohol dependency, drug use, and self-harm could or should be excluded as they
all result from private citizens making personal decisions to behave self-destructively, the
additional exclusion of mental illness hastened the process of reframing psychological distress as
an individualized problem that did not demand a “right to treatment.”
In truth, private insurance companies excluded mental illness for a wide range of reasons,
including fears about the excessive pressure on costs tied to the high incidence of psychiatric
illnesses and long hospital stays; a skepticism about the precision of diagnostic categories and how
best to differentiate between oddity and actual illness; and a dearth of reliable actuarial data (Grob
1991). But, within a political climate that saw a large lack of consensus about the nature of mental
illness, lumping mental disorder in with alcoholism and the like for exclusion further recast mental
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illness as a personal failing. As one Blue Cross official put it in 1954, “We are not going to use
subscribers’ money to pay for rest cures, to buy sobering-up vacations for drunks, or to coddle a
hypochondriac who wants nothing better than to be waited on in a hospital bed” (Grob 1991:265).
Without the funding of state or federal agencies, and with a pronounced hesitancy among private
third-party insurance agencies to fill the financial void, the support system available to the mentally
ill grew weaker and weaker.
Because federal and state policy decisions caused deinstitutionalization in the 1970s, which
resulted in the closure of the majority of state-run psychiatric hospitals, stewardship of the mentally
ill has shifted to the local level. While this approach is consistent with the spirit of 1963
Community Mental Health Act, the institutional and cultural shift toward reframing mental illness
as a personal failing has compromised the effectiveness of this approach (Erickson and Erickson
2008). According to this perspective, the need for treatment for mental illness is not a “right”, as
much as it is a personal responsibility, and so the mentally ill could—and should—in large part
take care of their own mental health issues. As community mental health systems are less
restrictive and rely heavily on client treatment compliance, maintaining individuals with severe
forms of psychosis or mood disorders is a highly challenging task. As a result, many mentally ill
people manifest their disorders as problematic anti-social behaviors, and thus come to the attention
of the criminal justice system. This is not to say that mental illness itself has been criminalized,
just that the criminal justice system has become one of the dominant social institutions interacting
with and affecting persons with mental illness.
At this point, the vision of deinstitutionalization has given way to “transinstitutionalization”, where custody responsibilities for many of those persons with the most severe
mental illness has shifted from state-run psychiatric hospitals to county-run jails, state-run prisons,
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or federal penitentiaries (Trupin et al. 2001). The anti-psychiatrist movement of Goffman, et al.
opposed the mental hospital on principle and the critiques leveled at the asylum were that it served
as a coercive and punishing “total institution” in the same vein as prisons but without the mandate
of “due process.” As a result, free citizens could be incarcerated and controlled indefinitely despite
never having been found guilty of committing a crime. Ironically, without a strong alternative
means in place to address the mentally ill in the wake of deinstitutionalization, the criminal justice
system actually ended up filling the void (Torrey 1998). Returning full circle to the pre-Dixian
era, the mentally ill are still subject to a “total institution”, but now that institution is prison itself.
The crucial difference between the asylum and the prison is a philosophical one—society views
the asylum patient with compassion and the prisoner with contempt (Erickson and Erickson 2008).
While those who killed the asylum may have hoped to free its patients, they ultimately transformed
them into prisoners.

Deinstitutionalization and Criminal Behavior
While deinstitutionalization played a significant role in the increased criminal incarceration
of the mentally ill, it would be disingenuous and simplistic to assume that it is the lone contributing
factor. Deinstitutionalization did play a significant role, but not solely because it increased the
number of mentally ill citizens free to roam the streets; according to that perspective, the
assumption is that persons suffering from mental illness are more likely to engage in criminal
behavior as a direct expression of their mental condition. The standard set for temporary civil
commitment by Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) is justified by being mentally ill and a danger to one’s
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self or to others, further feeding into this conceptual link between mental illness and potential harm
that justifies incarceration.
The truth is that, based upon all of the available evidence, there is no empirically-validated
model that predicts a clear causal relationship between mental illness and criminal behavior
(2004). In the immediate wake of deinstitutionalization in the 1970s, the arrest rate for those
suffering from chronic mental illness did increase, but that increase was limited to those with
previous offense histories (Cocozza, Steadman, and Malick 1978). In a review of 200 studies on
the relationship between crime and mental disorder, researchers found that major mental illness in
and of itself presents little or no added risk of criminal involvement (Monahan and Steadman
1983). In fact, Monahan and Steadman concluded that any significant correlation between mental
illness and crime:
“can be accounted for largely by demographic and historical characteristics that the
two groups share. When appropriate statistical controls are applied for factors, such
as age, gender, race, social class, and previous institutionalization, whatever
relations between crime and mental disorder are reported, tend to disappear” (1983:
152).
According to these findings, the relationship between deinstitutionalization and increased criminal
involvement is spurious—a secondary correlation that is moderated by other traditional
criminogenic risk factors.
One of the most popular arguments used to justify the trend to criminalize the mentally ill
is the potential role of mental illness in acts of violence. While there some overlap between a
serious mental illness diagnosis and violent behavior, it is more complicated than it would
superficially appear. According to the Department of Justice (2006), 61.0 percent of state prison
inmates with a violent criminal record suffer and 47.4 percent of violent recidivists from mental
illness. In spite of these findings, research has found that the prevalence of community violence
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by psychiatric patients is strongly conditioned by the presence of and intensity of psychotic
symptoms (Link, Andrews, and Cullen 1992), and varies considerably according to the type of
mental illness and, especially, the presence of co-occurring substance dependency or abuse
(Steadman et al. 1998).
Among mentally ill state prisoners, 62.8 percent used illicit drugs in the month prior to the
current offense and 41.7 percent are substance dependent (U.S. Department of Justice 2006).
According to Stuart and Arboleda-Florez (2001), while 61.0 percent of newly admitted inmates
had a diagnosable mental health or substance use-related disorder, only 3 percent of violent
offenses during data collection could be attributed to individuals with a serious mental illness. An
additional 7 percent was attributable to inmates with a substance-only diagnosis (Stuart and
Arboleda-Florez 2001). While rates of violence initiated by persons with mental illness are higher
than in samples of average citizens, that violence is contingent upon more than just the mere
presence of a mental disorder. Violence is not caused by mental illness alone.
When examining offender patterns among the mentally ill that have been incarcerated,
Hiday and Wales (2011) developed a typology of persons with mental illness who have come into
contact with the criminal justice system. Classifying by the immediate causes of criminal
behavior, the typology consists of five distinct subgroups of mentally ill offenders. Group one
consists of mentally ill persons who are arrested solely for nuisance behaviors (e.g., loitering or
disturbing the peace due to lingering in commercial or recreational areas as a result of having
nowhere to go) that would typically not escalate into arrest when involving non-disordered
persons. Group two is comprised of mentally ill persons who commit offenses involving “survival
behaviors” (e.g., shoplifting or failure to pay for restaurant meals) that arise as a result of not
having access to basic needs like food, clothing, and shelter. Prior to deinstitutionalization,
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members of neither of these groups would have been arrested, as state mental hospitals would have
provided somewhere to be and something to do (group one), or would have meet their basic
survival needs (group two). These first two groups commit only misdemeanor offenses and
comprise the majority of persons in the mentally ill offender population.
The remaining three groups in Hiday and Wales’s typology (2011) make up the minority
of mentally ill offenders and include all individuals with the highest potential for violence. The
third group is made up of those with severe mental illness who abuse alcohol and/or illegal drugs.
In addition to engaging in nuisance and “survival” crimes, members of this group are also arrested
for illegal drug use and possession, for disruptive behaviors tied to alcohol and drug intoxication,
for property crimes and prostitution aimed at supporting their addiction, and for violence arising
from substance dependence/abuse. The fourth group consists of persons with severe mental illness
who are also suffering from a co-occurring character disorder, such as psychopathy or a diagnosis
of anti-social personality disorder. Just like individuals in the non-disordered criminal population,
the presence of this personality disorder increases the likelihood of substance abuse, aggression,
abusiveness, and a history of violence. When considering all five groups within this typology, this
fourth group appears to be the most at-risk of criminal involvement outside of the presence of a
mental illness, implying that members of this group are not criminally prone because they have a
mental illness but just happen to suffer from a mental illness while already being highly criminally
prone. Finally, the fifth group is a much smaller subgroup of mentally ill offenders whose
members fit the stereotypical image of a severely disordered person driven to criminally violent
action by delusions tied to intense psychotic symptoms. In summary, only a slim portion of the
violence associated with mental illness results directly from extreme psychosis and in the majority
of cases the relationship between mental illness and violence is not causal.

31

With that in mind, the strongest relationship between mental health and violence actually
goes in the opposite direction—people with major mental disorders are much more likely to be
victims of crime and violence than any other group (Teplin et al. 2005). In fact, more than one
quarter of persons with serious mental illness have been victims of a violent crime in the past year,
a rate more than 11 times higher than the general population (Teplin et al. 2005). In addition,
incarcerated males with mental illness were more than twice as likely as non-mentally ill inmates
to have suffered physical or sexual abuse before entering prison, and nearly 8 out of every 10
female prisoners with mental illness reported physical or sexual abuse prior to incarceration (U.S.
Department of Justice 1999). While suffering from severe mental illness does put one at a higher
risk of committing violence, this occurs for only a minority of mentally ill persons and is heavily
conditioned by substance dependence/abuse, co-occuring personality disorders, and/or the
intensity of psychotic symptoms. In contrast, chronic mental illness increases the likelihood of
violent victimization for all persons with mental illness.
In reality, deinstitutionalization increased the incarceration rate among persons with mental
illness because it served to increase the presence of the mentally ill in already “high-risk”,
impoverished populations (Hiday and Burns 2010). Without a meaningful replacement system to
address the survival needs that were formerly provided by the mental health institution, the
mentally ill were left without a safety net. When most of the state hospitals shut down or decreased
their number of patients by anywhere from 45 to 96 percent, the mentally ill were released into the
general population without any system of communal supports (Torrey 1988). As federal and state
governments have continued to fail to provide the basic sustaining services and communal mental
health treatment outlined in the 1963 Community Mental Health Act, each subsequent generation
of persons with major mental illness have not fared any better. The result is that many of the
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chronically mentally ill population typically reside in highly impoverished environments that
exercise significant pressures on them to engage in criminal behaviors (Lurigio 2011). The risk
factors that characterize these environments already exert a significant amount of criminogenic
influence on non-disordered residents (i.e., economic inequality, cultural disorganization, family
disruption, etc.), meaning that the environmental risk factors that predict crime are the same for
those with and without mental illness.
While mental illness is by no means a prerequisite for living in a low socioeconomic
environment, mental illness appears to increase the likelihood that one will live in poverty and that
poverty, in turn, appears to intensify the negative social effects of mental disorder (Teplin et al.
2005). According to the U.S. Surgeon General (1999), people of lower socioeconomic status are
more likely than wealthier comparison groups to be diagnosed with a serious mental disorder,
although there is also counter-directional evidence that the ongoing strain of being poor can
precipitate a dormant mental disorder (Eaton and Muntaner 1999). Whether one assumes that
mental illness is the initial cause of the downward drift into poverty or that the unrelenting stress
of being poor leads to the development of the illness itself, there is no denying the cyclical
exogenous effects that either has on the other. Mental illness can cause problems when integrating
into school or work and that poor integration can then act as a barrier toward future opportunities
for financial security. In addition, those who are poor are less likely to have adequate health care
coverage, which can preclude or limit access to mental health treatment (Lurigio 2011). Thus,
symptoms go untreated and poor mental health exacerbates already problematic social situations.
In this regard, mental illness and poverty actually work in tandem to worsen each other, meaning
that the already significant negative effects of poverty may actually be more potent when coupled
with the presence of mental illness.
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The collaborative damaging effect of the overlap between poverty and mental illness can
be seen in key areas such as unemployment and homelessness. When compared with other inmate
populations, prisoners with mental illness housed in federal, state, and local facilities had higher
rates of unemployment in the month prior to arrest, and were significantly less likely to list wages
as a primary source of income8 (US Department of Justice 1999). In addition, mentally ill prisoners
were also much more likely to be homeless at the time of arrest and in the year before arrest (US
Department of Justice 1999); in fact, mentally ill state and local inmates were two to three times
as likely as comparison groups to be homeless, and federal inmates were almost six times as likely
to be homeless in the year prior to incarceration and thirteen times as likely to be homeless at the
time of arrest. Prior to deinstitutionalization, basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter would
have been met by the state hospitals so these issues of economic viability and procuring private
housing would have been moot. Now that this system has been disbanded, greater portions of the
mentally ill population have been forced into deleterious social conditions rife with drugs, alcohol,
violence, and stress that encourage a variety of criminal behaviors. In the absence of an adequate
integration of the mental health and social welfare systems, the criminal justice system is now the
primary point of institutional contact.
In summary, while the state hospital system was far from perfect, deinstitutionalization
created a different set of problems. While there were pockets of success in various communities
throughout the United States during the transition from the state institutional system to communitybased services (see Rothbard and Kuno 2000; Stein and Test 1980), closing the state hospital
system without ensuring that that appropriate treatment was in place in many areas had a large,

8

Mentally ill inmates were significantly more likely to list family/friends, welfare, and pensions (i.e., Supplemental
Security Income, Social Security, or other pension) as a primary source of income.
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negative effect on the mentally ill population. Those suffering from chronic mental illness began
to fall through the cracks of the social safety net, as nearly half of the patients discharged during
deinstitutionalization ended up homeless or incarcerated in prisons and jails (Torrey et al. 2010).
Currently, the failure of public systems to provide basic services and supports has led to a
decrease in treatment contacts, which in turn has led to an increase in criminal justice contacts.
While a significant portion of persons with mental illness who are charged with a crime are booked
for only benign non-violent misdemeanor offenses (Hiday and Wales 2011), there has still been a
larger trend toward “criminalization” of the mentally ill. Acknowledging that the criminal justice
system now plays a prominent role in responding to persons with chronic mental illness, there is
now a pressing need for a treatment-based approach within criminal processing that is sensitive to
the role that mental illness may play in some offender populations. This pressing need has given
rise to a type of specialty court that straddles the two worlds of criminal justice and mental health;
a court that aims to not only reduce the incarceration and reoffending of the mentally ill but also
to establish essential links between this at-risk population and local mental health services and
supports. This need lead to the development of the mental health court.

Mental Health Courts
At its most general, a mental health court is a criminal court for offenders suffering from
mental health problems. While this statement is simple, the differences between the traditional
court and the mental health specialty court are anything but. Redlich (2013) argues that the key
differences between mental health courts and traditional courts can be divided into three topic
areas: (1) planning and sustainability, (2) pre-court enrollment considerations, and (3) in-court
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considerations. These three areas account for all of the essential elements of mental health
processing as listed by the Council of State Governments, which include:


broad-based group planning and administration;



periodical data collection and analysis measuring program sustainability;



eligibility criteria that pertain only to the target population;



timely participant identification;



clear terms of participation that facilitate positive legal and treatment outcomes;



informed consent that hinges on addressing issues of defendant competency whenever they
arise;



attempts to connect participants to comprehensive and individualized treatment supports
and services;



a heightened level of confidentiality when sharing health and legal information;



a court team staffed with both criminal justice and mental health service providers;



collaborative monitoring of defendants in order to insure adherence to court requirements
(Almquist and Dodd 2009)
The motivations to start a mental health court can be varied, but the first fundamental step

when planning such a specialty court hinges upon coordinating a broad-based group of
stakeholders outside of the criminal justice system who will work with criminal justice officials to
collectively guide the planning and administration of the court (Almquist and Dodd 2009). The
criminal justice system, as it currently stands, is charged with prosecuting the accused and
punishing the guilty; while some policyholders debate the role of punishment versus the role of
rehabilitation, the end goal is almost universally to use punitive sanctions as an avenue to deter
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future crime. The objective of mental health courts is similar in that it aims to lessen future
offending, but is different as it aims to do so by diverting eligible persons from jail or prison into
community-based mental health services and substance use treatment. Developing such a court
depends upon the collaboration and involvement of multiple systems and this focused integration
of these “core elements” creates a court workgroup that is significantly larger and much more
varied than the traditional court workgroup (see Table 2). Not only does the uniqueness of the
court factor into planning and administration, but it also affects sustainability. Theoretically,
because these specialty courts are seen as a break from the established protocol of offender case
management, the sustainability of such courts hinges upon periodic programmatic research and
evaluation to assess performance and demonstrate an ongoing need (Redlich 2013). In application,
while such periodic evaluation is recognized as an ongoing need and multiple examples of such
applied research have emerged with greater frequency in recent years, this process is still in its
infancy.
Table 2. Differences in Court Workgroups
Traditional Court Workgroup
Mental Health Court Workgroup
Judge
Judge
Prosecutor
Prosecutor
Defense Attorney
Defense Attorney
Municipal LEO (Crisis Intervention Team
Member)
County LEO (County Jail)
Adult Probation & Parole Officer
Mental Health Treatment Service Provider
Substance Abuse Treatment Service Provider
Social Worker

Beyond issues of program design and implementation, another topic area that further
separates mental health court from traditional court proceedings is the role of pre-court enrollment
considerations. In the traditional trial process, the only element that differentiates defendant types
is the level of offense—felony cases and higher-level misdemeanors are tried in district courts
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which have general jurisdiction, while lower-level misdemeanors are heard in justice courts which
have limited jurisdiction (Utah Courts 2014). In mental health courts, level of severity of criminal
charges has been used to define eligibility in many jurisdictions, but the first and most critical
criterion allowing for program participation is the presence of a clinical diagnosis. This is not to
say that theses courts accept all defendants with a diagnosable mental condition, but the nature of
the court specifically asks that the relationship between mental illness and criminal offense be
considered when weighing pretrial detention (Almquist and Dodd 2009). The traditional court
system requires some coordination between the courts and police, but the role of mental health
court eligibility complicates things further. Within the specialty court framework, all criminal
justice actors, including the police, are asked to identify and refer potential participants in a timely
manner in order to hasten their acceptance into a program that will facilitate linkages with
community-based providers as quickly as possible (Almquist and Dodd 2009).
Another difference in pre-court proceedings can be seen in how the terms of participation
must be clearly stated before a defendant agrees to join the program. In traditional proceedings,
sentencing is either laid out beforehand as part of a plea bargain or is defined post-trial after a
defendant has been found guilty. Setting aside state-level variations in parole eligibility or “truthin-sentencing” mandates, the terms of the sentence are often well defined. In contrast, mental
health courts adopt a treatment-based approach that comes with a more ambiguous timeline; best
practice dictates that in order to make a fully informed decision about whether to enroll in the
specialty court, defendants should know the length of program involvement, including notice of
the potential factors that may extend or abbreviate participation, before agreeing to opt in (Redlich
2013).
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Finally, the last pre-court consideration that helps differentiate traditional courts from
mental health courts revolves around issues of defendant competency. In traditional courts,
competency is only seen as an issue (1) if a defendant does not meet the Dusky standard and is
incapable of understanding the court proceedings including the roles and responsibilities of each
courtroom actor, and (2) if a defendant is not capable of aiding in his or her defense; in most
instances, mental illness is the primary reason to question competence (Redlich 2013). It therefore
stands to reason that in a specialty court where many clients have diagnosable mental conditions,
competency is something that is treated in a more nuanced or responsive manner that monitors the
phenomenon on an ongoing basis rather than as a one-time issue.
The final topic area that separates traditional court from mental health court involves incourt considerations. Mental health courts focus on community health treatment in lieu of
incarceration, typically attempting to connect participants to comprehensive and individualized
treatment services and then requiring strict adherence to that treatment regimen (Council of State
Governments 2005). Traditional courts do not take such a holistic approach to sentencing;
sentences are often dictated by mandatory guidelines and the role of treatment services is
contingent upon what resources are available in the prisons or jails.
Another difference that is highlighted by the mental health court model is the heightened
level of confidentiality necessary when sharing health and legal information. Adult criminal court
proceedings are public record, but personal health information is not.

Any mental health

information gathered as part of a defendant’s participation in mental health court should be
safeguarded in order to ensure that his or her constitutional rights as a defendant are not violated
in the event that he or she is returned to a traditional court for processing (Council of State
Governments 2005).
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Lastly, yet another difference that comes from in-court considerations is the intense level
of ongoing judicial status review hearings conducted in order to insure adherence to court
requirements. Traditional sentencing does not involve sustained contact between the court and an
offender; after a defendant is found guilty, he or she is then taken into correctional custody and the
judge does not see him or her again unless an appellate court remands the case back to the district
court for a retrial. In contrast, mental health court sentencing stresses a continued collaborative
dialogue between the court, community supervisor, and defendant in order to (1) ensure
collaborative monitoring of defendant program obedience and (2) to operate under the model of
“therapeutic jurisprudence” (Wexler and Winick 1996) where praise and encouragement is offered
for compliance and sanctions (i.e., potential incarceration) are imposed for violations. The
relationship between the participant and the judge is not meant to be adversarial, but cooperative,
with the judge using affirming and complimentary language to encourage positive growth and
development.
In conclusion, mental health courts operate within the same criminal justice system as
traditional courts, but necessitate a dramatically different approach. Due to the nature of the target
population, and due to the multi-system goal of incarceration diversion and community-based
treatment, mental health courts come with unique issues tied to program planning, pre-court
considerations, and in-court proceedings. When planning a mental health court, there must be a
coordinated effort involving the criminal justice system and systems outside of criminal justice to
plot out how intervention will be administered. Before a client agrees to participate, mental health
courts require a concerted effort to make a timely connection between a mentally ill defendant and
the court, and that his or her acceptance is both informed and voluntary (Redlich 2013). And once
enrolled, a participant is subject to a series of ongoing judicial status hearings that act as both a
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source of encouragement and a reminder of strict program adherence. Of course, all of these
attributes have been identified post-hoc in the nearly twenty years since the first modern mental
health court was established, but they serve as general guidelines linking all contemporary
specialty courts that attempt to address the legal and extra-legal issues of mental illness. In reality,
many of the pioneering mental health courts that began this shift toward systems integration arose
simply out of need, without the advantage provided by such a well-identified and cogent list of
ideals (Redlich et al. 2005).

History of Mental Health Courts
In the years after deinstitutionalization, grassroots attempts to address mental illness began
to crop up in a number of different demographically and geographically diverse jurisdictions
within the United States. Although it is typically not acknowledged alongside the present-day crop
of mental health courts, the first specialty court targeting mentally ill offenders began in 1980 in
Marion County, Indiana (Steadman, Davidson, and Brown 2001). The original court functioned
until it was temporarily suspended in 1992 and was then reintroduced in Indianapolis in 1996 as
the first modern mental health court, the Psychiatric Assertive Identification Referral/Response
(PAIR) program. PAIR is widely cited as the first example of the contemporary mental health
specialty court as it was the first court program launched as a comprehensive initiative that
included a pre-trial and post-booking diversion system expressly for mentally ill misdemeanor
offenders. Around the same time but totally independent of PAIR, individual judges in Florida,
Alaska, and California also arrived at the conclusion that something needed to happen within their
own jurisdictions to address the growing number of mentally ill misdemeanor offenders that kept
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coming through the criminal justice system. Thus, PAIR was quickly joined in 1997 by the
Broward County (Florida) Felony Mental Health Court, and in 1998 by the Anchorage (Alaska)
Mental Health Court, Santa Clara (California) Mental Health Treatment Court, and San Bernardino
(California) Superior Court (Goldkamp and Iron-Guyn 2000). By the end of the Twentieth
Century, 15 specialty courts had been established in the United States in the aforementioned states
as well as Ohio, Washington, North Carolina, and Tennessee (Adult Mental Health Treatment
Courts Database 2013).
In the nearly 15 years since then, the number of mental health courts has swelled to almost
350 courts in 43 different states and the District of Columbia (Adult Mental Health Treatment
Courts Database 2013). Due to the well-publicized successes of many of these earlier courts
(Goldkamp and Irons-Guynn, 2000; Petrila et al. 2000), the federal government enacted two major
policies to provide funding for promoting mental health courts in the United States—the initial
Mental Health Court Program run through the Bureau of Justice Assistance beginning in 2002 and
the much larger Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act (MIOTCRA) passed
by the United States Congress in 2004. The aim of both was to establish or expand existing:


mental health courts or mental health-related court-based programs;



community-based treatment programs that offer specialized training to criminal/juvenile
justice officials and mental health personnel in identifying symptoms of mental illness in
order to better respond;



local programs that fostered collaboration between criminal justice and mental health
agencies where public safety is ensured by providing rehabilitative mental health and
substance abuse treatment services to offenders;
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intergovernmental programs that encourage cooperation between State and local
governments when addressing issues tied to mentally ill offenders (U.S. Congress 2004).
From 2002 to 2003, the BJA provided funding to establish 37 new mental health courts,

while, from 2004 on, MIOTCRA has authorized $50 million in government grants, awarding an
average of 25 grants per year for specialty court creation or expansion (Redlich et al. 2005). The
funding afforded by MIOTCRA increased the popularity of the mental health court model and
ushered in the “second generation” of such specialty courts. A mental health court is said to be a
second generation court if it is much more inclusive (e.g., considering felony defendants for
acceptance into the alternative sentencing program) and much more punitive (e.g., program
acceptance is contingent upon a plea in abeyance; ongoing supervision and monitoring is much
more reliant upon criminal justice staff than community treatment providers; jail is regularly used
as a sanction for noncompliance with court orders) (Redlich et al. 2005).
The inclusion of felony defendants as a characteristic of later mental health court
implementation highlights the first of two major inconsistencies that exist when comparing every
criminal court that falls under the mental health court umbrella. A 2006 survey of 110 courts found
that nearly all courts (98 percent) accept misdemeanor crimes, while only a quarter of the courts
(27 percent) accept felony defendants, and an extreme minority (4 percent) actually allow for the
inclusion of violent felonies (Erickson, Campbell, and Lamberti 2006). While the majority of
courts attempt to steer clear of the controversy that comes with being seen as soft on or too
accommodating of violent felons, there are still some critics that take issue with the solitary
inclusion of misdemeanants. According to the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (2004),
misdemeanor offenders should be diverted entirely from the criminal justice system via prebooking diversion programs, meaning that diversion should take place at the point of initial contact
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when law enforcement officers first interact with would-be offenders and screen potential mental
illness. Either way, this debate hints at a lack of uniformity in specialty courts that leads to only
49 percent of courts allowing for the inclusion of both felony and misdemeanor offenders (Redlich
et al. 2005).
The second major inconsistency that exists when discussing the implementation of mental
health courts in the United States is the role of diagnostic criteria. As previously stated, a mental
health court is a criminal court for offenders suffering from mental illness, with the primary
assumption being that the mental illness itself is the primary cause of criminal behaviors. That
said, defining mental illness, especially those diagnoses that most significantly affect criminal
behavior, is problematic when one considers the substantial variation in symptoms, severity, and
duration.
In an examination of 110 mental health courts operating in the United States, Erickson et
al. (2006) found that 28 percent of courts just require a diagnosis of “mental illness,” another 38
percent specify that defendants must have an “Axis I” diagnosis 9, and yet another 21 percent
necessitate the presence of a mental condition be “severe and persistent.”10 Within offender
populations, there is a significant spectrum of primary diagnoses, with the majority of both jail and
state inmates suffering from either major depression or an anxiety disorder (see Table 3). Given
this wide range, there is a noteworthy lack of uniformity when comparing admissions from one
court to the next based upon diagnostic eligibility. While the admission standards of some courts
are incredibly broad (see Bess Associates 2004; Ferguson et al. 2008) and others are exceedingly
limited (see Eckberg 2006), most tend to focus the majority of efforts on disorders that have a
9

Axis I disorders include all psychological diagnostic categories except mental retardation and personality disorder
(American Psychiatric Association 2000).
10
The remaining 18 percent did not provide any diagnostic eligibility criteria.
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heightened risk of significantly compromising a given defendant’s ability to make reasonable
decisions, such as schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizoaffective disorder
(Redlich 2013).
Schizophrenia is a psychotic disorder characterized by major disturbances in thought,
perception, emotion, and behavior (American Psychiatric Association 2000).

As with any

psychotic disorder, schizophrenia is problematic because its defining characteristic is disordered
thought process. Schizophrenia can cause: grossly disorganized behaviors tied to impairments in
information processing, reason, and judgment; disorganized speech characterized by frequent
derailment or incoherence; intense emotional outbursts or severe affective flattening; the presence
of hallucinations, or reacting to stimuli that are not present; and the presence of delusions, or
strongly held beliefs that are contradicted by superior evidence (American Psychiatric Association
2000). In order to be diagnosed as schizophrenic, one must exhibit two or more of these behaviors
within a one-month period, and it must be demonstrated that this condition has had a significant
impact on social or occupational functioning for at least six months (American Psychiatric
Association 2000). Given that this psychotic disorder is so heavily associated with the presence
of hallucinations and delusions, it stands to reason that a specialty court targeting individuals
engaging in criminal behavior as the result of psychological impairments in judgment would
privilege defendants suffering from schizophrenia.
Table 3. Estimated Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness in Incarcerated Populations (1999)
Axis I Diagnosis
% of Jail Inmates % of State Prison Inmates
Schizophrenia
1
2-4
Major Depression
8-15
13-19
Bipolar Disorder
1-3
2-5
Dysthymia
2-5
8-14
Anxiety Disorder
14-20
22-30
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 4-9
6-12
Source: National Commission on Correctional Health Care, 2002

45

Major depression is a mood disorder associated with severe sadness that causes
indecisiveness and even delusions (American Psychiatric Association 2000). The defining feature
of any mood disorder is the presence of abnormal emotions and in the case of major depression
those emotions are always negative ones of despair and worthlessness. An individual can be
diagnosed with major depression if he or she displays an abrupt change in five or more of the
following features during the same two-week period: depressed mood, diminished interest or
pleasure, significant weight loss, insomnia or hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation,
fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or excessive guilt, difficulty concentrating or
experiencing high levels of indecisiveness, and recurrent thoughts of death (American Psychiatric
Association 2000). While a diminished level of energy and an inability to concentrate on tasks
and make simple decisions is problematic, persons suffering from major depression are also at a
heightened risk of despair and even suicide due to psychotic symptoms such as delusions. While
major depression is still technically a mood disorder, because delusions tend to persist in the face
of stronger contrary evidence, and because this persistence compromises defendant’s standards of
“reasonable” behavior, the inclusion of major depression in most mental health courts also makes
a tremendous amount of sense.
Generally, bipolar disorder, or manic-depressive disorder, is a mood disorder characterized
by major mood swings that alternate between mania and depression (American Psychiatric
Association 2000). Typically, those with bipolar disorder experience intense episodes of mania
characterized by positive feelings of elation, exuberance, confidence, and excitement, as well as
similarly intense episodes of deep depression associated with negative feelings of sadness and
insecurity (American Psychiatric Association 2000). In more exacting clinical settings, bipolar
disorder includes a number of variations and subtypes that are differentiated by criteria such as:
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whether an individual is more prone to mania or depression (or neither); if the individual is prone
to ongoing, continuous mood swings or is only suffering from a one-time, episodic event; and
whether the latest episode was one of mania or depression. As with major depression, those
suffering from bipolar are also subject to psychotic features, such as delusions, which feed both
the highest highs and the lowest lows; the extreme confidence and accompanying elation are fueled
by the same disordered thought processes that catalyze the intense self-doubt and despondency.
Finally, schizoaffective disorder is a diagnosis that is characterized by both disordered
thought and abnormal emotions, making it neither a purely psychotic disorder nor a mood disorder,
but a combination of both (Malaspina et al. 2013). While established criteria for major depression
and bipolar do allow for a mood disorder diagnosis “with psychotic features” when delusions are
present, schizoaffective disorder is diagnosed when a patient has features of both schizophrenia
and a mood disorder but does not meet the strict criteria for either alone (Malaspina et al. 2013).
Technically classified alongside schizophrenia as a psychosis due to the potential presence of
delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech, thinking, and behavior, schizoaffective
disorder is also characterized by episodes of abnormal mood that may be manic, hypomanic,
depressive, or mixed (Malaspina et al. 2013). As with the other priority diagnoses, the presence
of psychotic features belies a compromising pathology and makes individuals with schizoaffective
disorder an optimal target population for inclusion in mental health court.
An additional issue to consider when talking about the role of diagnostic eligibility is the
high rate of overlap between mental illness and substance abuse. According to the Department of
Justice (1999), when compared with other inmates, convicts suffering from mental illness in all
correctional communities are between 53 and 57.5 percent more likely to have a history of alcohol
dependence, and are between 22.71 and 43.65 percent more likely to have used drugs at the time
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of offense. When examining 13 mental health court evaluations which included information about
the rate of co-occurring disorders in target populations, the lowest rate of mental health participants
suffering from both mental illness and substance abuse is 22.3 percent in an unspecified southwest
United States court (Sneed et al. 2006) and the highest rate is 85 percent in Washoe County,
Nevada (Palermo 2010); the mean rate of comorbidity is 61.275 percent and the median rate is
70.2 percent (see Table 4).
Table 4. Presence of Co-occurring Disorders (Serious Mental Illness and Substance Dependence
or Abuse Diagnoses)
Court
Comorbidity Rate Dates
Publication
Allegheny County, PA
51.6
2001-2004
Ridgely et al. (2007)
Anchorage, AK
73.1
2003-2006
Ferguson et al. (2008)
Bronx, NY
66.0
2002-2009
Rossman et al. (2012)
Brooklyn, NY
70.2
2002-2009
Rossman et al. (2012)
Broward County, FL
29.0
1999-2001
Poythress et al. (2002)
Butte County, CA
73.47
2000
Gary Bess Associates (2004)
Hall County, GA
82.8
2004-2010
Burns et al. (2013)
Hennepin County, MN
52.0
2004-2005
Eckberg et al. (2006)
Jackson County, MO
80.5
2011
Liedtke et al. (2012)
Salt Lake County, UT
57.4
2004-2008
Van Vleet et al. (2008)
Santa Barbara County, CA
83.21
NA
Cosden et al. (2003)
Washoe County, NV
85.0
2001-2009
Palermo (2010)
Wayne County, MI
82.67
2009-2013
Kubiak et al. (2014)
Unspecified Southwest USA 22.3
2003-2006
Sneed et al. (2006)
Mean
64.95
Median
71.65

Substance abuse requires at least one of the following maladaptive behaviors occur within
a 12-month period: a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home due to
recurrent substance use; recurrent use in situations in which it is physically dangerous, such as
operating an automobile or other machinery; recurrent substance-related legal problems; and
continued substance use despite persistent or recurrent substance-related social or interpersonal
problems, such as verbal and physical confrontations (American Psychiatric Association 2000).
According to the APA (2000), substance dependence is a more intense form of substance abuse,
as the diagnostic criteria are tied to dependency issues like tolerance (i.e., a need for markedly
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increased amounts of the substance to achieve the desired effect or a markedly diminished effect
when continuing to use the same amount over time), withdrawal (i.e., substance use undertaken in
order to relieve or avoid unpleasant physical symptoms that result from past prolonged use), and
compulsive use (i.e., a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control substance
use, or spending a great deal of time on activities necessary to obtain a substance and recover from
its effects). While substance dependence has farther-reaching implications for the deterioration of
physical health, both diagnoses demonstrate a high potential for problematic social behaviors with
broad negative consequences.
While these diagnoses typically feature prominently in most mental health courts, there is
still no guarantee that any two courts allow for the exact same diagnostic eligibility criteria and/or
the exact same types of offenses. In fact, each court may be as unique as the presiding judge and,
as previously mentioned, most attempts to quantify the positive effects of mental health courts are
limited by the research reality that once you have seen one mental health court, you have seen one
mental health court (Fader-Towe, Fisler, and Saffo 2011).

While this lack of program

standardization increases the difficulty of comparing one court to the next, there are still key areas
to consider when attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of any given mental health court that,
when measured effectively, can give a strong indication of how much of an impact said court has
when addressing the role of mental illness in criminal involvement.

Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts
Based upon the previous evaluation research (see Table 1), when gauging the effectiveness
of mental health courts, there are a number of areas to consider: successful program completion,
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reductions in criminal justice outcomes, increased treatment linkages, and improved mental health
functioning (Almquist and Dodd 2009). Program completion, or “graduation” as it is referred to
in many mental health court settings, is the acknowledgement that all court-mandated requirements
have been met and that the individual has paid his or her debt to society. In most jurisdictions,
potential participants officially “opt in” to a mental health court by submitting a “plea in
abeyance”, a signed agreement between the defendant and the prosecutor that acknowledges that
the defendant has waived his or her constitutional right to trial and is entering a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere (Almquist and Dodd 2009). As with traditional plea bargains, such an agreement
can only be entered into if the prosecutor recommends it to the court, but in contrast to most pleas,
a plea in abeyance allows the court to dismiss criminal violations upon program completion.
Once entered into, this plea is held for a specific amount of time during a period of
probation that requires ongoing conferences with the court, community corrections, and any other
specific treatment or training programs mandated by the court (Redlich et al 2005). If the
defendant maintains program compliance and satisfies the ongoing court conditions, the probation
ends and the case will be dismissed. If he or she fails to fulfill the court-ordered criteria, than the
case will be remanded back to criminal court and the defendant will be sentenced based upon the
guilty plea. In this regard, graduation is not only recognition of successful program completion,
but also confirmation that all charges have been dropped.
It is important to begin any examination of the potentially positive effects of mental health
courts with program graduation, as adherence to a structured series of required appointments
demonstrates one’s ability to comply with the ongoing demands of pro-social integration.
Acknowledging that the target population of mental health courts is comprised of individuals who
are subject to the extreme stresses of both traditional criminogenic environmental risk factors, such
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as poverty and substance abuse, as well as mental illnesses, such as psychosis and mood disorders,
the ability to maintain program adherence is significant. As stated earlier, no two programs are
identical and, while all are charged with the dual aim of decreasing contact with the criminal justice
system and increasing connections with the community-based mental health treatment system,
many are implemented in very different ways. As such, the graduation rates of mental health
courts in the United States vary considerably, ranging from as low as 26.85 percent in Wayne
County, Michigan, from 2009-2013 (Kubiak et al. 2014), to as high as 80.8 percent in Marion
County, Indiana, from 2005-2008 (Redlich et al. 2010). Outside of those two extremes there is
still a wide amount of variability, although, based upon twenty-four mental health court
evaluations in which the graduation rate was expressly stated, the mean and median rate of
successful program completion is 53.65 and 54.435 percent respectively (see Table 5).
Considering that, on average, nearly eleven out of every twenty participants successfully adheres
to the strict schedule of supervision and treatment, the growth of such courts appears to be a
positive step in an attempt to decriminalize mental illness. The next question is whether or not
mental health court graduation has a positive effect on decreasing criminal behaviors and
increasing mental health treatment involvement.
When examining how such specialty courts affect criminal justice involvement or
community treatment integration, most research has gauged effectiveness by looking at withingroup changes, between-group differences, or a combination of both (see Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9).
When assessing only within-group changes, evaluation studies will employ a pre-test/post-test
design with no control group comparing behavioral measures at Time 1 with identical measures at
a post-treatment Time 2. Within these experimental-group-only pre-test/post-test evaluations,
most researchers will either designate Time 1 as entry into the program or at so many months prior
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to enrollment, and will define Time 2 as a specific period either so many months post-enrollment
or a given time period post-graduation/discharge (see Tables 6 and 7). Based upon this design, a
mental health court will be deemed effective if (1) the levels of criminal behavior are higher prior
to specialty court involvement and significantly lower after program participation or successful
program completion, and (2) if involvement with community-based treatment providers is
generally lower prior to participation and significantly higher post-intake.
Table 5. Mental Health Court Graduation Rates
Court
Graduation Rate
Anchorage, AK
41.35
Akron, OH
45.5
Austin, TX: Juvenile
69.1
Bronx, NY
52.0
Brooklyn, NY
74.01
Clark County, NV
32.97
Chittenden County, VT
56.57
El Paso, TX: Juvenile
76.25
Harris County, TX: Juvenile
79.41
Hennepin County, MN
41.2
Marion County, IN
80.8
Jackson County, MO
60.68
Salt Lake County, UT
52.6
San Francisco, CA
64.8
San Francisco, CA
31.0
Santa Clara County, CA
38.8
Santa Clara County, CA: Juvenile 48.12
St. Louis County, MO
60.83
Washoe County, NV
30.86
Wayne County, MI
26.85
Washington, DC
58.33
Unspecified Southwest USA
41.49
Unspecified, NC
63.4
Unspecified, NC
60.6
Mean
53.65
Median
54.435

Publication
Ferguson et al. (2008)
Teller et al. (2004)
Makany-Rivera et al. (2013)
Rossman et al. (2012)
Rossman et al. (2012)
Palermo (2010)
Wicklund et al. (2013)
Makany-Rivera et al. (2013)
Makany-Rivera et al. (2013)
Redlich et al. (2010)
Redlich et al. (2010)
Liedtke et al. (2012)
Van Vleet et al. (2008)
McNeil and Binder, (2007)
Redlich et al. (2010)
Redlich et al. (2010)
Behnken (2010)
Dirks-Linhorst and Linhorst (2012)
Palermo (2010)
Kubiak et al. (2014)
Hiday, Wales, and Ray (2013)
Sneed et al. (2006)
Moore and Hiday (2006)
Hiday and Ray (2010)

When examining between-group differences in outcomes, mental health court evaluations
will employ a quasi-experimental post-test only design using a control group for comparison.
Within this research, the majority of experimental groups are made up of only program graduates,
with a minority of studies assessing all program participants. When defining the control group,
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there is a much larger amount of variability. Some studies use a comparison group of mentally ill
offenders who are sentenced through the traditional criminal courts and are subject to
incarceration-based treatment-as-usual (or TAU). Other evaluations use a control group made up
of terminates, or those that were once active participants in the specialty court but have been
terminated non-compliant from the alternative sentencing program due to new charges or an
inability to adhere to the prescribed course of action. And yet others examine comparisons
between a treatment group and more than one control group, often assessing not only the outcome
behaviors for the aforementioned terminate group, but also rejected referrals or opt-outs. A control
group of rejected referrals is comprised of those that have been referred to the court but deemed
ineligible for a specific reason and thus rejected from participating. Opt-outs are court referrals
who have been screened and deemed eligible for the court, but who voluntarily elect not to
participate for some reason. Research employing the control-group post-test only comparison will
collect data at only one time point after a series of months either post-enrollment or postgraduation/discharge (see Tables 8 and 9). Any of the studies employing this research design view
a specialty court as successful if participation in the treatment group yields a lower level of criminal
involvement and a higher level of treatment integration than the comparison group (i.e.,
participants, and especially graduates, should have lower levels of criminal behavior and higher
levels of treatment service usage than any of the control groups). Some of the more elaborate
evaluations have combined both within-group measures and between-group comparisons into the
same study, thus adopting a quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test control group design (see Tables
10, 11, and 12).
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Table 6. Criminal Justice Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with No Control Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
(Months)
Case et al. (2009)
14 sites, USA
Participants NONE
12 pre-entry
Henrickx (2005)
O’Keefe (2006)
Palermo (2010)

Clark County, OR
Brooklyn, NY
Clark County, NV

Participants
Participants
Participants

NONE
NONE
NONE

Palermo (2010)

Washoe Cty, NV

Participants

Pratt et al. (2013)
Trupin et al. (2001)

4 sites, NY
Seattle, WA

Participants
Participants

Post-Test
(Months)
12 post-entry

NONE

12 pre-entry
12 pre-entry
24 pre-entry
24 post-entry
12 pre-entry

12 post-entry
12 post-entry
24 post-entry
24 post-discharge
12 post-discharge

NONE
NONE

At entry
11 pre-entry

12 post-entry
11 post-entry

p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***

54

Measure

MHC Effect

Ave. arrests
Ave. jail days
Ave. arrests
% Arrested
Total # arrests
Total # arrests
# Jail days (2007)
# Jail days (2008)
% Involved w/CJS
Ave. bookings
% Booked

52% decrease
33% decrease
141% increase*
40% decrease
82% decrease
23% decrease
95% decrease
76% decrease
Decreased
29% decrease*
57% decrease

Table7. Criminal Justice Outcomes: Post-test Only Evaluations with a Control Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
(Months)
Dirk-Linhorst/
St. Louis, MO
Graduates
Terminates; NONE
Linhorst (2012)
Opt-outs

Post-Test
(Months)
12 post-discharge

Measure

MHC Effect

% Arrested

23.5% lower***;
11% lower***
15% smaller;
10% smaller
56% smaller;
43% smaller
51-69% lower
88-143 fewer
74% fewer***

Hazard rate rearrest
Hazard ratio rearrest
Kubiak et al. (2014)

Wayne County, MI

Graduates

NONE

12 post-discharge

Graduates

Terminates;
Rejections
Terminates

NONE

12 post-entry

% Arrested
Ave. jail days
Ave. arrests

Moore/Hiday
(2006)

Unspecified, NC

Moore/Hiday
(2006)

Unspecified, NC

Participants

TAU

NONE

12 post-entry

Severity new offense
Ave. arrests

71% lower***
53% fewer***

Rossman (2012)

Bronx, NY

Graduates

TAU

Wickland (2013)

Chittnden Cty, VT

Graduates

Terminates
+ Opt-outs

NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE

NONE
NONE
12 post-discharge
24 post-discharge
36 post-discharge

Severity new offense
Hazard ratio rearrest
Hazard ratio rearrest
% Arrested
% Arrested
% Arrested

59% lower***
36% smaller**
55% smaller**
10% lower
10% lower
10% lower

p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
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Table 8. Criminal Justice Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Graduates as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
(Months)
(Months)
Burns et al. (2013)
Hall County, GA
Graduates
Terminates; NONE
24 post-entry
% Arrested
Opt-outs
Ave. jail days

Ferguson (2008)

Anchorage, AK

Graduates

Graduates

NONE

Opt-outs;
TAU

24 pre-entry
12 pre-entry

24 post-entry
Participation

Participation

12 post-discharge

12 pre-entry

12 post-discharge

NONE

12 post-discharge

Ave. jail days
# Police contacts
# Arrests
# Jail days
# Police contacts
# Arrests
# Jail days
# Police contacts
# Arrests
# Jail days
% Arrested
% Charged

Hiday/Ray (2010)

Unspecified, NC

Graduates
Graduates

Teller et al. (2004)

Akron, OH

Graduates
Graduates

Van Vleet (2008)

Salt Lake Cty, UT

Graduates

TAU
Terminates;
Opt-outs
Terminates
Terminates

NONE

NONE
24 pre-entry

NONE
24 post-discharge

Days to rearrest
Ave. arrests

NONE
2000

24 post-discharge
2001

% Arrested
Ave. incarcerations

2001

2002

Ave. incarcerations

2002

2003

Ave. incarcerations

24 pre-entry
12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge
24 pre-entry
12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge

12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge
24 post-discharge
12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge
24 post-discharge

% Booked
% Booked
% Booked
% Charged
% Charged
% Charged
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MHC Effect
73% lower***;
68% lower***
99% fewer***;
98% fewer***
94% decrease***
59% decrease
90% decrease
82.5% decrease
29.6% decrease
50% increase
79.5% decrease
71% decrease
85% decrease
69% decrease
50% lower;
58% lower
43% lower;
102% lower
10% longer
68% decrease***
55% fewer***
65% lower***
13% increase;
45% fewer
77% decrease;
94% fewer
90% decrease;
99% fewer
5% decrease
69% decrease
64% increase
12% decrease
73% decrease
66% decrease

Table 8 (Continued). Criminal Justice Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Graduates as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
MHC Effect
(Months)
(Months)
Van Vleet (2008)
Salt Lake Cnty, UT Graduates
Terminates 12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge % Arrested
75% decrease***;
66% lower***
12 post-discharge 24 post-discharge % Arrested
125% increase*;
31% lower*
24 post-discharge 36 post-discharge % Arrested
27% increase;
18% decrease
NONE
NONE
Days to new booking 87.5% longer*
Days to rearrest
42% longer*
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
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Table 9. Criminal Justice Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Participants as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
MHC Effect
(Months)
(Months)
Bess Assoc. (2004)
Butte County, CA
Participants TAU
36 pre-entry
24 pre-entry
% Booked
18% increase;
14% more
24 pre-entry
12 pre-entry
% Booked
33% increase*;
5% more
Graduates
TAU
6 pre-entry
6 post-discharge
Ave. bookings
52% fewer
NONE
6 post-discharge
% Booked
44% decrease
Average convictions 19% decrease
Average jail days
19% decrease
% Convicted
39% decrease
Christy et al. (2005)
Broward Cnty, FL
Participants TAU
12 pre-entry
NONE
Ave. arrests
45% fewer***
3 pre-entry
NONE
# aggressive acts
50% fewer***
NONE
12 post-entry
% Arrested
17% lower
12 pre-entry
12 post-entry
Ave. arrests
33% decrease;
29% fewer
NONE
NONE
Days to rearrest
14% longer
Cosden et al. (2005)
Santa Barbara, CA Participants TAU
24 pre-entry
24 post-entry
Ave. bookings
79% increase;
37% more**
Ave. convictions
1% decrease; 12%
fewer
Ave. jail days
38% decrease;
35% fewer*
Eckberg et al. (2006)
Hennepin Cty, MN Participants Rejected
4 pre-entry
4 post-entry
% Charged
39% decrease;
28% lower
% Convicted
55% decrease;
27% lower
Frailing (2010)
Washoe Cnty, NV
Participants TAU
12 pre-entry
12 post-entry
Ave. jail days
79% decrease***;
+Graduates
91% fewer***
12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge Ave. jail days
90% decrease***;
96% fewer***
Participants Terminates 12 pre-entry
12 post-entry
Ave. jail days
33%** decrease;
+Graduates
86% fewer***
Participants Terminates 12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge Ave. jail days
90% decrease;
+Graduates
97% fewer***
Hiday et al. (2013)
Washington, DC
Participants TAU
12- pre-entry
12- post-discharge Ave. arrests
72% decrease***;
42% fewer
NONE
12- post-discharge % Arrested
26% lower***
% Felony
17% lower
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Table 9 (Continued). Criminal Justice Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Participants as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
MHC Effect
(Months)
(Months)
Hiday et al. (2013)
Washington, DC
Participants TAU
NONE
12- post-discharge % Violent felony
47% lower
% Zero arrests
16% more***
NONE
NONE
Hazard ratio rearrest 19% smaller
Graduates
Terminates 12- pre-entry
12- post-discharge Ave. arrests
84% decrease***;
56% fewer***
NONE
12- post-discharge % Arrested
57% fewer
NONE
NONE
Hazard ratio rearrest 45% smaller
Morin (2004)
Hennepin Cty, MN Participants TAU
12 pre-entry
12 post-discharge Ave. misdemeanors
79% decrease***;
74% fewer ***
Ave. jail days
66% decrease;
3% more
Steadman et al (2011) Hennepin Cty, MN Participants TAU
18 pre-entry
18 post-entry
Annual arrests
54% decrease;
50% lower
Ave. jail days
95% increase;
146% fewer
Steadman et al (2011) Marion County, IN Participants TAU
18 pre-entry
18 post-entry
Annual arrests
45% decrease;
150% lower
Ave. jail days
30% decrease;
867% fewer
Steadman et al (2011) San Francisco, CA Participants TAU
18 pre-entry
18 post-entry
Annual arrests
39% decrease;
32% lower
Ave. jail days
Increased 16%;
26% fewer
Steadman et al (2011) Santa Clara, CA
Participants TAU
18 pre-entry
18 post-entry
Annual arrests
26% decrease;
45% lower
Ave. jail days
Increased 3%;
62% fewer
Trupin/Richards
King City, WA
Participants Opt-outs
At entry
9 post-entry
% Booked
Decreased***
(2003)
Trupin/Richards
Seattle, WA
Participants Opt-outs
At entry
9 post-entry
Severity nw offense Increased (opt)*
(2003)
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
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Table 10. Mental Health Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with No Control Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
(Months)
Eckberg et al.
Hennepin Cty, MN Participants NONE
4 pre-entry
(2006)

Post-Test
(Months)
4 post-entry

Frailing (2010)

Washoe Cnty, NV

Henrickx (2005)

O’Keefe (2006)

NONE

12 pre-entry

12 post-discharge

Clark County, OR

Participants
+
Graduates
Participants

NONE

12 pre-entry

12 post-entry

Brooklyn, NY

Participants

NONE

At entry

12 post-entry

Measure

MHC Effect

% Crisis episodes

15% decrease

Ave. crisis episodes
Ave. inpatient days

100% increase
72.5% decrease

Ave. case mgmt. hrs.
Ave. med mgmt. hrs.
Ave. ind. thrpy hrs.
Ave. group thrpy hrs.
Ave. crisis hours
Ave. inpatient days
Ave. outpatient days
% Hospitalized
Ave. hospital days
Ave. hospitalizations
% Visited ER
% Abstaining alcohol

83% decrease*
128% decrease*
58% decrease ns
102% increase ns
69% decrease*
74% decrease*
100% decrease*
62% decrease**
8.7% decrease ns
53% decrease ns
43% decrease
115%
increase***
100% decrease**
86% decrease*
200%
increase***
86% decrease ns
93% decrease***
10% increase*
10% increase ns

% Alcohol abuse
% Alcohol dependent
% Abstaining drugs

Trupin et al. (2001)

Seattle, WA

Participants

NONE

11 pre-entry

p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
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11 post-entry

% Drug abuse
% Drug dependent
Ave. treatments
Ave. treatment hours

Table 11. Mental Health Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Graduates as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
(Months)
(Months)
Bess Assoc. (2004)
Butte County, CA
Graduates
TAU
At entry
At discharge
Ave. drug use
Ferguson (2008)

Anchorage, AK

Graduates

Graduates

NONE

Opt-outs;
TAU

12 pre-entry

Participation

Participation

12 post-discharge

12 pre-entry

12 post-discharge

12 pre-entry

12 post-discharge

% Using alcohol/drug
Ave inpatient days
% In treatment
% Using alcohol/drug
Ave inpatient days
% In treatment
% Using alcohol/drug
Ave inpatient days
% In treatment
Ave inpatient days

Ave inpatient stays

# Inpatient stays

Van Vleet (2008)

Van Vleet (2008)

Salt Lake Cnty, UT

Salt Lake Cnty, UT

Graduates

Graduates

NONE

NONE

36 pre-entry

18 pre-entry

18 pre-entry

6 pre-entry

6 pre-entry

Participation

Participation

6 post-discharge

6 post-discharge

18 post-discharge

18 post-discharge

36 post-discharge

36 pre-entry

36 post-discharge

18 pre-entry

18 post-discharge
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% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
% In treatment
Ave. days b/t trtmnts

MHC Effect
33% decrease*;
21% fewer ns
68% decrease
17% decrease
118% increase
83% increase
53% decrease
17% decrease
42% decrease
61.5% decrease
82% increase
17% decrease;
15% more (opt);
26% fewer (tau)
12% decrease;
149% fewer (o);
45% fewer (t)
8% decrease;
298% fewer (o);
277% fewer (t)
5% decrease
19% decrease
69% decrease
No change
64% increase
46% decrease
12% decrease
15% increase
73% decrease
35% increase
66% increase
42% decrease
28% increase
61% decrease
9% increase
16% decrease

Table 11 (Continued). Mental Health Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Graduates as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
MHC Effect
(Months)
(Months)
Van Vleet (2008)
Salt Lake Cnty, UT Graduates
NONE
6 pre-entry
6 post-discharge
% In treatment
17% increase
Ave. days b/t trtmnts
38% decrease
Van Vleet (2008)
Salt Lake Cnty, UT Graduates
Terminates NONE
6 post-discharge
% In treatment
22% more*
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
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Table 12. Mental Health Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Participants as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
MHC Effect
(Months)
(Months)
Boothroyd (2003)
Broward Cnty, FL Participants TAU
8 pre-entry
8 post-entry
% In treatment
32% increase;
47% more*
Ave. treatments
62% increase;
47% more*
Cosden et al. (2003)
Santa Barbara, CA Participants TAU
At entry
6 post-entry
Ave. alcohol severity 39% decrease;
29% lower*
Ave. drug severity
33% decrease;
88% lower*
6 post-entry
12 post-entry
Ave. alcohol severity 7% increase;
7% more*
Ave. drug severity
No change;
No difference*
Cosden et al. (2005)
Santa Barbara, CA Participants TAU
6 pre-entry
6 post-entry
% In treatment
100% increase;
25% more***
Ave. treatment hours 1200% increase;
77% more***
6 post-entry
12 post-entry
% In treatment
10% decrease;
22% lower***
Ave. treatment hours 31 decrease;
67% more***
12 post-entry
18 post-entry
% In treatment
22% decrease;
21% more**
Ave. treatment hours 11% decrease;
88% more***
18 post-entry
24 post-entry
% In treatment
No change;
21% lower**
Ave. treatment hours 63% decrease;
33% more***
Keator et al. (2013)
3 sites, USA
Participants TAU
18 pre-entry
18 post-entry
Ave. int. treatments
35% decrease ns;
129% more***
Ave. crisis episodes
120%
decrease*** 62%
more ns
% In treatment
33% decrease;
51% more***
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Table 12 (Continued). Mental Health Outcomes: Pre-test/Post-test Evaluations with a Control Group using Program Participants as the Treatment Group
Publication
Court
Treatment Control
Pre-Test
Post-Test
Measure
MHC Effect
(Months)
(Months)
Keator et al. (2013)
3 sites, USA
Participants TAU
18 pre-entry
18 post-entry
Ave. treatments
357% increase***
243% more***
Ave. treatment hours 28% increase ns;
12% more ns
Participants Graduate;
NONE
12 post-entry
Ave. int. treatments
97% more (grad);
Terminates
266% more (t)***
Ave. crisis episodes
98% more (g);
1.52% more (t) ns
Ave. treatments
10% more (g);
111% more (t)*
Ave. treatment hours 26% more (g);
176% more (t) ns
Trupin/Richards (03) King City, WA
Participants Opt-outs
At entry
9 post-entry
% In treatment
55% more**
Ave. treatment hours increase***;
between, ns
Trupin/Richards (03) Seattle, WA
Participants Opt-outs
At entry
9 post-entry
Ave. treatment hours increase, ns;
more (opt)*
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
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One issue to consider is that not every study that evaluates a mental health court should be
considered equally rigorous. For the most part, the strongest experimental design is the classic
pre-test/post-test study with random assignment that compares a treatment group against a control
group. As most examinations of existing mental health courts cannot employ true random
assignment when placing specialty court referrals into either a participant group or a comparison
group, much of the mental health evaluation research cannot maintain the methodological rigor of
the true experiment. In this regard, most specialty court evaluations are said to be quasiexperimental, because while “they lack random assignments of units to conditions, [they]
otherwise have similar purposes and structural attributes to randomized experiments” (Shadish,
Cook, and Campbell 2002:104).
In social science, proving causation requires (1) the independent variable (or cause)
precedes the dependent variable (or effect) in time, (2) the cause correlates significantly with the
effect, and (3) the study has controlled for any alternative explanations that may be plausibly
affecting the causal relationship. In theory, random assignment into an experimental group and a
control group should account for such alternative explanations due to the principle of the Equal
Probability of Selection Method, or EPSEM (Healey 2010). According to EPSEM, if every case
in the population of interest has the same chance of being selected for the sample, then the sample
is likely to be representative and any perceived differences between groups will be due to random
chance and not due to something systematic. Because specialty courts tend to have selection
criteria resulting in samples that are non-random, there is a very real fear of systematic bias and a
high risk of violating the causal requirement of controlling for all potentially explanatory variables.
Campbell defined internal validity as the question, “did in fact the experimental stimulus
make some significant difference in this specific instance?” (Shadish et al. 2002). Over time,
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threats to internal validity have been identified in nine different arenas: (1) ambiguous temporal
precedence, or a lack of clarity about which variable occurred first; (2) selection, or the presence
of preexisting systematic differences between experimental and control conditions; (3) history, or
the manifestation of some change in the experimental condition due to a concurrent event other
than X that has an effect on Y; (4) maturation, or a continuation of naturally occurring trends; (5)
statistical regression to the mean; (6) attrition, or the systematic loss of respondents due to
treatment or measurement; (7) testing or priming effects; (8) instrumentation, or issues with
measurement that change overtime and may be confused with the treatment effect; and (9) additive
or interactive effects that result from the presence of more than one threat to internal validity.
While each threat to internal validity does pose a serious risk toward establishing causal
relationships in social science research, a strong research design can compensate for many of these
threats.
While the true experiment is the strongest method for addressing threats to internal validity,
Shadish et al. (2002) argue that quasi-experiments can also address these threats by embracing
additional principles aimed at demonstrating that other potential causal explanations are likely
implausible. The first principle is the explicit identification of and study of plausible threats to
internal validity, whereby researchers acknowledge any such potential threats and build in an
analysis of such threats in order to control them while highlighting the treatment-outcome
correlation. The second principle involves instilling a primacy of control by design, which requires
adding design elements that either prevent the confounding of the validity of treatment effects by
plausible threats or provide evidence about the plausibility of those threats (e.g., adding more pretest time points or an additional control group). The final principle is coherent pattern matching,
or constructing a complex prediction about a given causal hypothesis that few alternative
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explanations can match. In sum, due to the lack of statistical control that is provided by simple
random sampling, researchers attempting to make causal inferences in quasi-experimental
evaluations must employ research designs guided by complex predictions that both identify and
analyze alternative causal explanations.
When examining studies specifically exploring criminal outcomes, Farrington et al. (2002)
propose employing the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale, a 5-point scale assessing
methodological rigor, in order to assess the quality of the research design. A study is said to be
more rigorous if the design addresses as many of the aforementioned threats to validity as possible.
In this way, Level 5 is the score assigned to the most methodologically sound research and is
reserved for true experiments with random assignment. In contrast, Level 1 indicates the weakest
studies, which are typically cross-sectional one-group post-test only designs. In between the two
poles are three levels of quasi-experimentation that vary in ability to rule out threats to internal
validity. Level 2 is reserved for one-group pre-test/post-test designs where measures of crime
before and after the program are not compared to a control condition. This design is stronger than
Level 1 because it establishes causal order, but is the weakest type of pre-test/post-test study
because it fails to rule out any of the other threats to internal validity. Level 3 builds upon this
design by adding a single control group and is cited as the minimum design that is adequate for
drawing conclusions about what criminal justice practices work. If done correctly with an
adequate comparison group, this quasi-experimental design can be used to rule out internal validity
threats such as history, maturation, attrition, testing, and instrumentation. Level 4 is the most
rigorous of the non-random experiments as it includes measures of crime before and after the
intervention in multiple experimental and control units, thus controlling for other factors that may
influence outcomes. This design allows for better statistical control of extraneous influences, thus
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addressing threats of selection and regression to the mean. Farrington et al. (2002) argue that in
order to establish that a program prevents crime adequately, the program evaluation must have
demonstrated desirable results that are statistically significant and employ a research design at
Level 3 or higher.
It therefore makes perfect sense that the most common of all quasi-experiments is the Level
3 nonequivalent comparison group design with dependent pre-test and post-test samples because
the joint use of a pre-test and a comparison group allows researchers to examine the majority of
threats to internal validity (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). Given that the groups are
nonequivalent, the assumption is that selection bias is present by definition and the use of a pretest allows researchers to examine both the size and direction of that bias. When pre-test
differences are present, there is the possibility that selection bias will add to or interact with other
threats to validity. According to Shadish et al. (2002:61), such threats might include selectionmaturation (i.e., if respondents in the treatment group are growing more experienced, tired, or
bored than the control group due to preexisting differences), selection-instrumentation (i.e., if both
groups start at dramatically different points on outcome measures during the pre-test such that a
small change during the post-test becomes overstated), selection-regression (i.e., if both groups
start at different ends of a distribution and then regress to the mean the result is disingenuous
differential regression), and selection-history (i.e., the possibility that an event occurred between
pre-test and post-test that affected only one group or both groups differentially). Shadish et al.
(2002) do warn that if there appears to be no pre-test differences (i.e., there is no significant
difference between both groups prior to the administration of the independent variable) that is not
irrefutable proof that selection bias is absent. Bias may still be inherent due to the potential role
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of any unmeasured variables that influence selection and are correlated with the outcome, but using
both a control group with a dependent pre-test still makes this a rigorous design.
Much of the mental health court evaluation research examining program outcomes
operationalizes criminal justice involvement by focusing on rates of reoffending after program
participation. A successful program should see a decrease in reoffending when comparing changes
within-groups over time and/or should see a lower rate of re-offense for participant populations
when compared with control groups. For the most part, reoffending is estimated by focusing on a
combination of areas: jail stays, hazard rates of “failure” or re-arrest, and measures of either arrests,
charges, bookings, or convictions. Jail stays are often operationalized by the length of stay, and
can either be estimated by measuring the total number of jail days for all subjects during a given
period of time or can be assessed by calculating the average number of jail days per sample.
Hazard rates estimate the amount of time that it will take two different groups to reach a “failure
event” (e.g., re-arrest), and can be used either to estimate the hazard ratio of “failure” of group one
versus group two or to predict the likely percentage of “failures” within each population at a given
time. The variability of use between measures of arrests, charges, bookings, and convictions
appears to be dictated by what information a given researcher is able to access. An arrest involves
law enforcement officers taking a criminal suspect into custody, while a charge is filed by law
enforcement officers when they suspect that a crime has been committed and that a given suspect
has committed it. Bookings often happen at the local jail and involve the processing of personal
information, such as mug shots and fingerprints, for purposes of criminal investigation; a booking
can either be initiated by a law enforcement officer dropping off an arrested suspect or by a suspect
him or herself reporting to the jail because he or she has been notified of pending charges by an
officer of the court and has been requested to visit the jail for processing. Finally, a conviction is
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the end result of the trial process indicating that there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant committed a crime. Because there is such a high amount of
measurement variation among mental health court evaluations, no two studies answer the exact
same research questions, although an examination of the entire body of evaluation literature can
point to some key generalizable effects.
On the whole, the evaluation literature examining a diverse group of mental health courts
in the United States provides a large amount of evidence that such specialty courts have the
intended diminishing effect on criminal behaviors. Although assessments gauging only withingroup participant change find significant differences from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 6 for the
results of pre-test/post-test evaluations with no control group) and evaluations examining only
between-group differences find significant disparities between the treatment and control groups
(see Table 7 for post-test only evaluations with a control group), both quasi-experimental designs
fail to meet the rigorous criteria for Level 3 on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale. As such,
both sets of results should be viewed with a certain amount of skepticism. The majority of
compelling evidence for the effect such specialty courts have on recidivism comes from pretest/post-test evaluations that use a control group, although one could further argue that there may
be a disparity in outcomes based upon the selection of the treatment group. In short, choosing to
only use program graduates (see Table 8) and not all participants (see Table 9) may pose an
unintended threat to internal validity.
In quasi-experiments, selection threatens internal validity due to the endogeneity problem.
Endogenous variables are defined as variables that develop or originate from within, whereas
exogenous variables are those that develop or originate from without (McClendon 1994). When
modeling a relationship between a predictor and an outcome, the cause of the exogenous variable
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is not specified within the model and so the exogenous variable is positioned as the independent
variable; it marks the start of the theoretical causal chain and it seen as external to the outcome.
In a simple bivariate cause-and-effect relationship, the cause of the endogenous variable is
specified (i.e., changes are due to measured and unmeasured causes), thus dependent variables are
said to be endogenous. Identifying variables as either exogenous or endogenous in causal
modeling becomes problematic when there is a potential intervening variable that is both affected
by the independent exogenous predictor and affects the dependent endogenous outcome.
McClendon (1994) identifies an intervening variable as another type of endogenous variable
because causes are known, in part, and measured (i.e., the influence of the exogenous predictor),
but it is different than the exogenous dependent variable because it is also affecting the outcome
in measured and unmeasured ways. Whereas the exogenous independent variable is external to
the outcome and causes a change, an endogenous intervening variable is internal to the outcome
and also causes a change.
The endogeneity problem is a term used by econometricians to describe complications in
developmental studies that have been, at least in part, determined or influenced by the actions of
the individuals under study (Duncan, Magnuson, and Ludwig 2004). Developmental models that
use external contextual influences as exogenous explanatory variables (i.e., studies measuring the
effects of peers, parents, programs, etc.) must allow for some change in the endogenous dependent
variable due to internal endogenous effects tied to the actions of the individuals under study. Any
significant correlations that are measured between the outcomes of interest and the external
exogenous predictors may in fact be the product of unmeasured internal variables; in other words,
the effects are not due to “exogenous change” but due to “endogenous change”.
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According to Duncan, Magnuson, and Ludwig (2004), in the absence of experimental
design with random assignment, the best defense against the endogeneity problem is to incorporate
a longitudinal component to estimate change models. They recommend using individual fixedeffects models because the equation incorporates unmeasured individual variables that are both
constant over time and that vary over time. Individual fixed-effects models employ a technique
known as first-differencing the data, a procedure in which each individual’s observation at Time t
- 1 is subtracted from his or her observation at Time t (Duncan et al. 2004). With sufficiently long
panels, more elaborate methods using first-differencing can be used to control for unmeasured
variables whose values change over time in specific ways. For example, looking at how changes
in the rate at which contextual variables change affect the rate at which individual outcomes change
(obtained by twice-differencing the data) can help control for unmeasured individual-level
variables that change over time at a constant rate (Duncan et al. 2004).
According to Duncan et al. (2004), another set of methods that might reduce selection bias
exploits within-group variation. When using group fixed-effects models each individual’s score
on the dependent and independent variables is subtracted from the average scores of all individuals
in his or her group, and the deviation-from-group-means model becomes a participant-difference
model (Duncan et al. 2004). When estimating a group fixed-effect model, individual differences
in the endogenous dependent variable are regressed onto individual differences in observed group
characteristics. Once observed and unobserved group factors are differenced out, any omittedvariable bias caused by the potential presence unmeasured endogenous variables is eliminated.
When placed within the context of specialty court evaluation research, there is a very real
fear that the efficacy of the exogenous independent variable—mental health court participation—
on the endogenous dependent variable—decreased criminal activity and increased use of
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therapeutic treatment services—may be compromised by an unmeasured endogenous variable.
Changes in behavioral outcomes may be due to internal, endogenous variables and any evidence
supporting an external cause is therefore spurious. In theory, the criminal behavior that results in
a referral to a mental health court may be due to an unmeasured, internal variable—a temporary
period of “bad functioning” and antisocial behavior that is relatively atypical for a given person—
that would have resolved itself with our without treatment-based intervention. Using one of the
aforementioned fixed-effects models may be able to better estimate whether outcome behaviors
were influence by exogenous or endogenous change.
Treating graduates as the only representative of the experimental group may have a biasing
effect as graduate-only treatment groups run a heightened risk of capturing “endogenous change.”
Common sense would argue that graduates not only bias the results because they have
demonstrated greater levels of program compliance than participants that fail to complete the
alternative terms of sentencing, but also because they would appear to have a higher implicit
willingness to complete the program itself. In this regard, any analysis that uses a graduate-only
group as the lone experimental sample runs a risk tantamount to statistical tautology—successful
program completion is predicted by successfully participating in the program, while participant
success leads to program completion. In some evaluations, it is clear that graduates and terminates
start at significantly different levels of criminality in the 24 months prior to program involvement,
as measured by average arrests (Hiday and Ray 2010) and average jail days (Burns et al. 2013;
Frailing 2010). In other instances, graduates and terminates appear to respond to the program
differently as graduates see a significant reduction in criminal justice measures while the
terminated actually see an increase in the same activities either during program participation
(Burns, et al. 2013) or post-graduation/discharge (Hiday and Ray 2010, Van Vleet, et al. 2008).
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Either way, any evaluation estimating a significant difference solely between graduates and a
control group (see Table 7) runs a heightened risk of suffering from a threat to internal validity
caused by selection bias.
When examining criminal justice outcomes using a quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test
design comparing program participants with a control group, there appears to be a significant
period of “ramping up” in criminal activity for both groups prior to program placement (although
the initial level of activity may vary significantly between the treatment and control groups),
followed by a period of frequent criminal justice sanctioning for only the mental health court
participants in the immediate period post-enrollment, and then a significant decrease in overall
criminal behavior for program participants post-graduation/discharge (see Table 8). According to
Bess Associates (2004), both the participant and the treatment-as-usual groups in Butte County,
California, experienced a significant increase in the percent of offender bookings in the year prior
to specialty court involvement, implying similar periods of “bad functioning” pre-enrollment.
That said, Christy et al. (2005) found that the treatment-as-usual group in Broward County,
Florida, was still significantly more criminally prone than the experimental group, having 31
percent more average arrests in the twelve months prior to program entry and 33 percent more
total aggressive acts in the three months prior to enrollment. In contrast, Frailing (2010) found
that an aggregated treatment group of active participants and former graduates in Washoe County,
Nevada, actually had a greater average number of jail days than the treatment-as-usual comparison
in the year prior to program entry. Clearly, there is some variability in starting points for the
treatment and control groups, although this variability does not appear to systematically favor one
group over the other across all studies.
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During enrollment, there are significant group differences in criminal behavior but these
differences appear to vary by control group. When comparing a treatment-as-usual control group
to specialty court participants in Santa Barbara County, California, Cosden et al. (2005) found that
only program participants saw a significant increase in the number of average bookings from 24
months prior to specialty court entry to 24 months post-enrollment. The control group average
remained consistent at 3.9 average arrests per subject from Time 1 to Time 2, but the treatment
group actually increased from 2.97 to 5.33 average arrests per subject. The resulting 79 percent
increase was significantly higher than both the treatment group at Time 1 and the control group at
Time 2, implying that program participants were much more likely to be booked on new charges
as a function of the increased sanctioning that came with specialty court enrollment. While this
may be the case, Cosden et al. (2005) also found that participants actually served 35 percent fewer
average jail days over the same period, a significant difference that implies that while participants
may be arrested at higher rates due to program enrollment, the offenses may be relatively benign
and thus do not demand incarceration. The treatment-as-usual group is committing offenses at the
same rate as before and those offenses demand jail time as a function of severity. In contrast, when
comparing an opt-out control group against mental health court participants first in King City,
Washington, and then in Seattle, Washington, Trupin and Richards (2003) found that participants
in King City experienced a significant decrease in booking rates and that only the opt-outs in
Seattle experienced a significant increase in the severity of new offense. While the effect of
program participation on arrests and bookings during enrollment may vary depending upon the
comparison group, it appears that program participants are less likely to engage in more severe
criminal activities during the two months post-enrollment.
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While these quasi-experimental evaluations using program participants as the treatment
group are the strongest studies so far in controlling for selection bias, they are still not without
methodological issues.

Only seven studies limit the research comparison to all program

participants against a control group (see Table 9), but only four of those seven studies find some
statistically significant difference from Time 1 to Time 2 in favor of the specialty court (see Cosden
et al. 2005; Hiday et al. 2013; Morin 2004; Trupin and Richards 2003). Of those four, only Hiday
et al. (2013) and Morin (2014) look at the impact of the court on criminal behavior postinvolvement. While it may be important to examine measures of criminal behavior while enrolled
in the program, any attempt to tap into the enduring effects of the court must look at measures at
some point post-involvement.

The strongest evidence supporting the long- or even short-term

benefits of enrollment in a mental health court will come from estimates of how former participants
are functioning out in the general population after they have been discharged from the program.
Of the two remaining studies that examine behavior post-discharge, only Hiday et al. (2013) is a
peer-reviewed work.
In a study comparing participants in a Washington, DC, specialty court with a treatmentas-usual comparison group, Hiday et al. (2013) found that the treatment group appears to
experience lower rates of recidivism and criminal activity in the months post-discharge. More
specifically, they found that mental health court participants experienced 72 percent fewer average
arrests from 12 months prior to specialty court enrollment to the 12 months immediately after
discharge. While they found that the treatment-as-usual group also experienced a significant
decrease in average arrests 12 months after discharge, the level of criminal activity for the
participant group was still significantly lower than the control group. The experimental group
had a 26 percent lower percentage arrested and a 16 percent higher percentage with zero arrests
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during that 12-month period. In addition, the participant group had lower rates of felony arrest
and violent felony arrest, although neither was statistically significant. In short, even though both
groups experienced a period of relatively “good functioning” in the immediate aftermath of
criminal justice system involvement, the program participants appear to experience a significantly
larger pro-social effect and engage in less severe forms of crime.
Outside of these post-treatment examinations of bivariate difference between-groups and
within-groups, many studies have employed some type of regression analysis to examine the effect
of multiple variables on criminal outcomes. Logistic regression examines whether covariates have
a unique, significant effect on the odds of being in one group or another, and is used in many
mental health court evaluations to estimate whether specialty court involvement has an influence
on rearrest (see Burns et al. 2013; Herinckx et al. 2005; Hiday et al. 2013; Moore and Hiday 2006;
Van Vleet et al. 2008). According to research using logistic regression, graduating from a mental
health court has a significant, positive effect on the odds of not being in the rearrest group at twelve
months post-entry (Herinckx et al. 2005; Moore and Hiday 2006) and twenty-four months postentry (Burns et al. 2013). More importantly, mental health court participation alone significantly
increases the odds of not being rearrested twelve months post-discharge (Hiday et al. 2013).
Other studies use count regression models like negative binomial regression or Poisson
regression to estimate whether a series of variables have a significant effect on the predicted values
of a dependent variable expressed in non-negative whole numbers. According to studies that use
count regression techniques, mental health court participation has a significant negative effect on
the annualized number of arrests and the number of jail days eighteen months post-enrollment
(Steadman et al. 2011). In addition, mental health court graduation has a significant negative effect
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on the rate of rearrest one year post-discharge (Moore and Hiday 2006) and the number of jail days
two years post-discharge (Burns et al. 2013).
Finally, a number of studies use Cox regression, a type of survival analysis that uses
measures of time, in order to estimate what impact key variables might have on the estimated
hazard rate of a failure event. As previously mentioned, hazard rates estimate the amount of time
that it will take two different groups to reach a specific failure event and can be used to either
estimate the hazard ratio of “failure” of one group versus another or to predict the likely percentage
of “failures” within each population at a given time.

Overall, researchers have estimated

significantly smaller hazards of rearrest as a result of program participation, although the groups
compared in each study tend to vary greatly. When comparing program graduates with those that
terminated unsuccessful from the same program, successful completion was associated with a 45
to 56 percent smaller hazard of rearrest (Dirk-Linhorst and Linhorst 2012; Hiday et al. 2013) and
nearly 200 more days to new booking and days to rearrest (Van Vleet et al. 2008). In comparisons
of graduates versus a treatment-as-usual control group, graduation was again associated with a 36
to 55 percent smaller hazard rate of rearrest (Rossman et al. 2012). Finally, in studies examining
the different outcomes for program participants in contrast to inmates subjected to treatment-asusual, just participating in a mental health court is associated with a 19 percent smaller hazard of
rearrest (Hiday et al. 2013) and almost 44 more days to rearrest (Christy et al. 2005).

While

graduates are clearly more successful than any other group, a fact that speaks well for the success
of such specialty courts, there is still evidence that any form of participation is useful in staving
off criminal behavior.
When determining why participation may have an effect on behavioral outcomes, the most
potentially useful explanations could come directly from program participants themselves. While
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all of the quasi-experimental studies discussed earlier attempted to quantify the effect that
involvement with the court had on criminal justice outcomes, there are a two studies that
interviewed specialty court participants directly in an effort to find out what mechanisms may be
causing a reduction in recidivism. Camarena (2008) conducted a qualitative assessment using
direct observation and semi-structured interviews when evaluating the mental health court in
Norfolk, Virginia, while Canada and Watson (2013) conducted a mixed-methods evaluation of
procedural justice in four mental health courts across two unidentified counties. Both studies were
primarily concerned with participant perceptions about the mental health court itself, although both
did include some discussion about what participants thought was most successful about the courtordered treatment services.
In both research projects, the largest direct effect that the court had was on program
compliance. Both studies found that the judge in particular was pivotal in getting participants to
adhere to the court-ordered treatment services. While non-compliance at both sites usually
manifested as drug use and resulted in a brief court-ordered jail stay, both studies found that
participants thought the judge treated them fairly (Camarena 2008; Canada and Watson 2013).
Respondents assumed that the judge had their best interest at heart (Canada and Watson 2013) and
especially appreciated the judge’s capacity for “second chances” (Camarena 2008). In fact, the
majority of participants said that the judge’s ongoing encouragement and support kept them
connected to the court (Camarena 2008).
When assessing what it was about the program outside of the court that was successful at
reducing recidivism, Camarena (2008) found that the majority of participants said that specialty
court involvement helped them to avoid individuals who might get them into trouble and engaging
in illegal activities. Participants also cited the close supervision and frequent communication
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between members of the specialty court workgroup as playing a significant role in quickly
detecting and then addressing deteriorating functioning (Camarena 2008). In addition, the case
managers associated with the court helped program participants obtain the services that they
needed (Camarena 2008). Finally, Canada and Waston (2013) found that program clients felt more
respected by the process when afforded the opportunity to participate in treatment planning and
have some say goal setting. While these participant explanations do not totally get at the specific
treatment mechanisms that might cause long-term behavioral change, there is still evidence that
the mental health court model that adheres closely to the ideals of therapeutic jurisprudence does
influence participant perceptions of effectiveness.

Mental Health Outcomes
In contrast to these relatively obvious measures of recidivism, operationalizing intended
mental health outcomes is more complex. From a criminal justice standpoint, the aim is to simply
see a decrease in criminal involvement by examining the aforementioned jail days, hazard rates,
and various measures of law enforcement contact because any involvement with the criminal
justice system within this context is universally negative. On the other hand, the stated goal of
increased treatment contacts is much more variable because some contacts can be negative while
others are clearly positive, and yet other contact types can exist somewhere ambiguously between
the two.
One area of measurement that is viewed negatively revolves around hospital stays and
institutionalization days. The more frequently an individual stays in a mental facility or the longer
the duration of that stay, the more that individual is using up valuable resources and the less often

80

s/he has the opportunity to be out in the general population as a pro-social member of the
community.

In contrast, an area that is viewed as overwhelmingly positive is treatment

maintenance. As someone suffering from a serious mental illness makes more frequent use of
therapeutic community services and engages in more hours of treatment, s/he is more likely to
sustain communal ties and be a functional member of the general public.
An air of uncertainty exists around measures of crisis and emergency intervention. Crisis
denotes an episode that is much more serious than ongoing maintenance and requires treatments
that are potentially more intensive than purely therapeutic services, but it also hints at a potential
level of awareness that demonstrates that there is some recognition of the warning signs of
impending emergency that requires steps be taken. Not that every crisis episode is necessarily
subject-initiated—many states have temporary 72-hour commitment laws tied to the standard set
by Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) that can be initiated by criminal justice and treatment professionals
when an individual poses a risk to him or herself or others. Attempting to measure crisis episodes
is a process that lends itself to a classification that is somewhere between institutionalization and
maintenance.
Examining mental health outcomes as a result of program involvement is subject to the
same variation in quasi-experimental design discussed earlier (see Tables 10, 11, and 12). Some
evaluations adopt only a pre-test/post-test design with no control group (see Table 10) and, while
there is some evidence for significant increases in the use of therapeutic services (Henrickx et al.
2005; Trupin et al. 2001) and significant decreases in hospital stays and crisis episodes (Henrickx
et al. 2005; O’Keefe 2006) for mental health court participants, this quasi-experimental design is
relatively weak.
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The strongest evidence for the strength of program intervention on the use of treatment
services should come from pre-test/post-test evaluations with a control group using program
participants as the experimental group (see Table 12).

Every study that uses all program

participants as a treatment group (e.g., Boothroyd et al. 2003; Cosden et al. 2003; Cosden et al.
2005; Keator et al. 2013; Trupin and Richards 2003) finds at least one significant within-group
increase in the use of services post-enrollment and one significant between-group difference when
compared with a control sample of treatment-as-usual inmates or voluntary opt-outs. The principle
methodological issue with most of these findings is not about adequately defining who should be
the treatment group and who should be the comparison group, but about the period of data
collection. More specifically, none of these studies evaluates anything post-involvement.
From a quasi-experimental perspective, this design appears to be biased. To enroll subjects
in a court-ordered treatment program and then compare their use of mandated services to a
comparison sample who is defined principally by the absence of an agent of the law forcing them
to participate in treatment would appear to yield dubious results. Keator et al. (2013) is one of two
studies that spanned three year total. When assessing the use of services for both program
participants and a treatment-as-usual comparison group at 18 months prior to program enrollment
compared with 18 months post-entry, the study found that those enrolled in the program saw a
significant 357 percent increase in the average number of treatments post-entry, and that that
increase was 243 percent higher than the comparison group. For the most part, these appear to be
tests of program adherence, not of the enduring effects of utilizing therapeutic services long after
it stops being required. In order to effectively capture a treatment effect, it is necessary to examine
whether former participants interact with mental health providers in a different way than a
comparison group.
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In summarizing the short-term and long-term effects of mental health courts, it appears that
such specialty courts meet some aspects of the two-pronged goal of decreased criminal justice
involvement and increased mental health treatment integration.

While it appears that the

eradication of criminal behaviors may be exceptionally challenging, the evaluation evidence
available points to a short-term variable increase in criminal bookings and arrests during the
enrollment phase of program involvement, but an overall decrease in incarceration and future
arrests in the long-term. In addition, there appears to be evidence that affiliation with the court
promotes a significant decrease in the negative treatment contacts tied to hospital stays and a
significant increase in the positive treatment contacts like ongoing therapeutic treatment
maintenance, although almost every evaluation as listed in Tables 10, 11, and12 suffers from some
methodological limitation. Based upon the limited research that attempts to overcome threats to
internal validity and/or meets a Level 3 rating on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale, these
courts appear to be working on criminal recidivism, but the evidence on mental health is
inconclusive. From a scientific perspective, it remains unclear whether these positive outcomes
are more apparent than real.

Summary
In summary, the relationship between mental illness and crime has changed over time.
Policy decisions informed by a number of perspectives in the mid-Twentieth Century lead to
deinstitutionalization and the dissolution of the long-established state hospital system. Initially,
the treatment void created by shutting down these mental institutions was supposed to be filled by
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the creation of community-based outpatient treatment facilities. Unfortunately, these facilities
never received consistent funding and so were never established in large enough numbers to
adequately address the need for mental health treatment. The result of this dearth of services
resulted in many individuals diagnosed with severe mental illness living in high-risk, criminogenic
social environments, placing them at a greater risk of both criminal involvement and violent
victimization. This growing overlap between mental illness and crime resulted in a transinstitutionalization where the criminal justice system ended up acting as the primary service
provider for many of the mentally ill, thus increasing the risk of criminalization of mental illness
itself. As more and more judges began to notice that offenders with mental illness needed more
therapeutic services and did not respond to traditional punitive measures like incarceration,
individual jurisdictions created specialty courts aimed at focusing on community-based mental
health treatment over jail time. As those pioneering courts began to become better known, state
policymakers began to push for more problem solving courts in a variety of areas. Even though
mental health court evaluation research is in its infancy, some of the more scientifically rigorous
research has found that these mental health courts seem to have a significant effect on decreasing
recidivism and increasing prolonged used of treatment. Embracing the mental health court model
appears to alleviate some of the negative social issues caused by deinstitutionalization.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE CURRENT STUDY

Current Research Goals
The preceding chapters briefly introduced the topic of mental health courts and discussed
the historical changes that necessitated the development of such problem solving courts in the
United States. This chapter turns our attention to (1) articulating the goals of this research project,
(2) providing the relevant context and setting, (3) describing the data collection processes involved
in this research, (4) specifying the hypotheses to be tested, (5) outlining the methods that will be
used to conduct the analysis, and (6) discussing the limitations that the present research will likely
encounter.
This project first came to my attention when I attended the 2012 Intermountain Mental
Health Court Conference at Utah State University. At the July event, Judge Kevin K. Allen of the
First District Mental Health Court gave a presentation on the successes and challenges associated
with running such a specialty court, but ended his talk by saying that the majority of his data was
anecdotal. While his assessment of what the court did well was not based on anything quantitative,
he was open to the possibility of collaborating with researchers to conduct a more formal process
evaluation. After he spoke, I introduced myself and we started to talk about the possibility of
putting a program assessment together.
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Based upon these discussions, the overarching aims of this comprehensive study are
fourfold. First, to institute a local, baseline data collection format that will provide a mental health
court electronic database for Utah’s First District. Second, to use that database to conduct a much
needed impact assessment of the court’s effectiveness at reducing recidivism and increasing
mental health treatment contact. Third, to help empirically inform the greater community of
mental health practitioners, researchers, and policymakers who have been demanding evidencebased assessment outcomes for mental health courts for years (see Castellano and Anderson 2013).
And fourth, to validate data collection techniques that can be adopted elsewhere throughout the
state of Utah. Currently, Utah has eight adult mental health courts and three juvenile courts
(National Alliance of Mental Illness-Utah 2014). At this point, only one court has received any
sort of impact assessment—a report prepared by the University of Utah analyzing the Salt Lake
County court from 2004 to 2008 (Van Vleet et al. 2008). While that assessment is informative,
some argue that the court system in the state’s largest urban center is unique in that it has more
mental health resources than any other area in Utah. In contrast, the majority of the new problemsolving courts in Utah are developing in largely rural districts and counties, and need assessment
approaches that are more sensitive to the service limitations inherent within less urban contexts.
The current proposal has the potential to establish a more generalizable statewide system standard
across all jurisdictions that will evaluate the effectiveness of each specific court as well as inform
the state government about the overall efficacy of the mental health and justice collaboration in
Utah.
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Mental Health in Utah
The first mental health court in the state of Utah was established in 2001 in Salt Lake
County in Utah’s Third District (Van Vleet et al. 2008). As it was one of the “first generation” of
such specialty courts, the court was initially established to only process misdemeanors, although
the inclusion criteria later expanded in 2002 to also include felonies (Van Vleet et al. 2008). Data
collected from June 2004 to April 2008 found that the court had served 263 participants with a
long history of mental illness and criminal justice involvement, and the program had a high
acceptance rate of 88.14 percent and, relative to the national average (see Table 4), a high
successful completion rate of 52.6 percent (Van Vleet et al. 2008). When compared with those
that terminated the program unsuccessfully, mental health court graduates had significantly fewer
post-program bookings, had a significantly longer time to rearrest, and had significantly more
therapeutic treatment contacts (Van Vleet et al. 2008). Over time, the Third District mental health
court in Salt Lake City was viewed more and more favorably, and as such the Utah specialty court
system expanded to seven adult mental health courts by establishing courts in Cache County in the
First District, Weber County in the Second District, Davis County in the Third District, the cities
of Provo and Orem in the Fourth District, and Washington County in the Fifth District. In addition,
Utah lawmakers expanded the scope of such problem solving courts beyond adult district courts
to include one mental health justice court in Salt Lake City and three juvenile mental health courts
in Salt Lake City, Cache County, and Box Elder County.
According to the Synthetic Estimate of Needs for Utah11 and the results of a 2013 Student
Health and Risk Prevention Survey published by the Utah Department of Human Services (2013),
11

The Synthetic Estimates of Mental Health Needs is an estimation technique that was created by Holzer and Nguyen
in 2007, which compared figures from the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiological Surveys against those from the
most current regional U.S. Census Population Estimate. Mental health needs are calculated for people who have one
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12.7 percent of adults in the state of Utah—a population estimated to be just over 250,000 people—
were classified as needing some sort of mental health treatment in 2012. At the same time, 7.9
percent of Utah youth under the age of 18, or 70,500 young people, were also identified as in need
of treatment for mental health issues. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2013), the state
population of Utah was 2,900,872 in 2013, meaning that roughly 1 out of every 10 Utah residents
is in need of some type of mental health treatment. According to the Utah Department of Human
Services (2013), the public mental health treatment system in Utah in 2012 served 45,594
individuals or just over 14 percent of the current estimated need; potentially a combined total of
almost 275,000 adults and children (or up to 86 percent of the target population) in need of services
who are left untreated. In short, for every one patient who needs aid and receives treatment, there
are 6.5 patients in need who do not. In 2013, the majority of services provided were in urban areas
and the number of urban individuals in mental health services outnumbered the amount of
equivalent rural clients at a ratio of 2.45 to 1. Demographic analyses found that Utah was relatively
consistent with national averages for gender and age of individuals served12, although Utah was
significantly less racially diverse as whites only comprise 62.5 percent of the national service
consumer population but made up 86 percent of the Utah’s 2012 treatment population. In addition,
the Utah population also diverged from national trends when assessing current living
arrangements, as only 63.5 percent of the national population of clients live in a private residence,
while that number increases to 82.6 percent of Utah’s 2013 service consumers. Clearly, Utah has

of a specified set of relatively severe mental health diagnoses, along with a high level of functional impairment, and,
if an adult, have taken more than 120 days off work as a result of their mental illness in the last year (TriWest Group
2010). For more information about the specific report used by the Utah Department of Human Services, see Holzer,
Charles E., and Hoang T. Nguyen. 2008. Synthetic estimates of mental health needs for Utah.
12
Client populations were 53 percent female in 2012 and 52.2 percent female in 2013, both of which are consistent
with the 51.8 percent national average. The majority of those aged 21 to 64 receiving mental health services during
the 2012-2013 fiscal years was 62.6 percent nationally, which is relatively close to Utah’s averages of 56.8 percent in
2012 and 55.6 percent in 2013.
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a relatively large population of individuals in need of mental health treatment who are more
racially homogenized and have more private support when compared with the larger national
population, but who are not receiving treatment at rates comparable to the need.
Of course, to suffer from mental illness does not automatically translate into increased
criminal involvement, but there appears to be evidence that offending populations in Utah suffer
from severe mental illness at higher rates than the general Utah population, and that serious mental
illness may play a role in recidivism. In an examination of Utah state prisoners released from
incarceration between January 1998 and December 2002, Cloyes et al. (2010) found that 23 percent
of the sample of 9,245 offenders met criteria for serious mental illness. Within that mentally ill
offender population, the most common primary diagnosis by far was major depression (72 percent,
N=1,529) followed by bipolar disorder (22 percent, N=465) and borderline personality disorder (9
percent, N=184)13. When analyzing hazard rates of rearrest, a diagnosis of mental illness played
a statistically significant role in time to reincarceration, as the predicted return to prison for excons suffering from mental illness was 381 days versus 728 days for the non-mentally ill offenders.
Stated differently, offenders diagnosed as mentally ill returned to prison nearly one full year (358
days) sooner than their non-mentally ill peers. In addition, the model predicted that 77 percent of
the mentally ill group would have returned to prison within 36 months of release as compared to
only 62 percent of the comparison group. While some of the data collected does overlap with the

Cloyes et al. defined severe mental illness was as “a major thought disorder, mood disorder, or organic brain
syndrome that fits well-established categories of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
substantially impairs functioning, and requires treatment” (2010: 178). The Axis I diagnoses that met the study
selection criteria included Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, Psychosis NOS (not otherwise specified), Bipolar
Disorders I and II, Major Depression, Mood Disorder NOS, and Organic Brain Syndromes and Dementia. The only
Axis II diagnosis that was allowed was Borderline Personality Disorder; Antisocial Personality Disorder was not
included because less than 1 percent of the offender population with major mental illness had an Axis II diagnosis
other than Borderline Personality Disorder. The authors suggest that “although Cluster B personality disorders,
particularly Antisocial Personality Disorder, are seen as risk factors for incarceration, they have less clinical relevance
in the treatment of mental illness in this setting than other symptoms and patterns of disorder” (2010: 180).
13
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existence of the Salt Lake County mental health court, the majority of it was amassed prior to the
formation of said court. This implies that the diagnosis of a mental disorder does increase the risk
of ongoing episodes of incarceration once an individual with serious mental illness becomes
involved with the criminal justice system. Given that only 14 percent of the potential local
population in need of therapeutic services is actually connected to treatment providers (Utah
Department of Human Services 2013), the failure to make those linkages does put the neglected
target population at an increased risk of enduring criminal justice involvement.
Two of the potential reasons why as much as 86 percent of those suffering from mental
illness go unnoticed by the treatment system until a crisis episode are both tied to different aspects
of social integration. On one hand, an individual suffering from mental illness may be so separate
from the general population and so secretive, that s/he goes unnoticed by community treatment
providers (Karp 1996). On the other, s/he may be so well integrated into a family or other social
support network that any “out of place” behavior will be met with attempts of normalization or
dismissal (Lynch 1983). Either way, such an individual is shielded from the view of treatment
professionals until a definitive outburst—a disruptive anti-social emergency typically associated
with an unmanageable episode like attempted suicide or public hallucinations (Cockerham
2006)—demands formal attention. In the current treatment climate, it is more likely that such a
definitive outburst would be met with a criminal justice response (Torrey 1988).

The First District Mental Health Court
As previously mentioned, given the apparent success of the Salt Lake County court in the
early 21st Century, state policymakers sought to aggressively develop the mental health court
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system into other districts throughout the state. After expanding south in 2004 into the city of
Provo in Utah County, officials decided to establish a new problem solving court in northern Utah
in 2008. As the decision coincided with the retirement of First District Judge Clint Judkins, which
necessitated the selection of a new judge, members of the state judiciary decided that the newly
sworn-in replacement should spearhead the development of the new court. Judge Kevin K. Allen
was appointed by Governor Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., in March 2008 and, despite having no
professional experience with mental illness, was charged with creating a brand new court by the
end of the year (Utah Courts 2014). Once treatment linkages were made with the largest mental
health provider in the First District, Bear River Mental Health Services, Inc., and once a
rudimentary court workgroup was founded, the court began hearing cases involving mental illness
in December 2008 and has continued to meet weekly ever since (Macavinta 2013b). As the court
was founded based upon ideological assumptions of need and utility, there was no formal, locallybased needs assessment and so there is no preexisting snapshot of the role that mental illness may
have specifically played in criminal activity within the First District, and more specifically within
Cache County. In addition, the young court did not launch a concurrent data collection program
when the court was started so some of the most basic information (e.g., program acceptance rates,
participant demographics, graduation rates, etc.) remains entirely unknown.
Utah’s First District contains three different counties—Box Elder, Cache, and Rich—
although the mental health court is located specifically in the city of Logan in Cache County.
Eligible defendants with mental illness in all three jurisdictions are processed through the Cache
County courthouse, and a small Bear River Mental Health Services facility in Box Elder County
provides treatment for Box Elder program participants. The primary Bear River Mental Health
Services facility in the city of Logan services consumers in both Cache and Rich Counties.
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According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Cache County contains 68.3 percent of the First District’s
total populace with a population of 112,656 residents and the city of Logan contains 42.8 percent
of the county populace with a population of 48,174 residents. The county is 89.1 percent nonHispanic white, with a 9.96 percent Hispanic or Latino population. The average household
contains 3.1 residents and the average family size is 3.6 persons. While the median age is 25.5
years old, 36.3 percent the population is under the age of 20 and 27 percent of citizens are between
the ages of 25 and 44. Within the city of Logan in 2000, the median household income was
$30,778 and the median family income was $33,784, with about 22.7 percent of the population
and 12.6 percent of families living below the poverty line (U. S. Bureau of the Census 2000).
According to the most recent Uniform Crime Report, Cache County had a violent crime rate of 13
acts per 100,000 persons and a property crime rate of 409 per 100,000 (Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2012).
The Utah Department of Human Services (2013) estimates that 5.9 percent of adults in the
First Judicial District, including but not limited to those that are involved in the criminal justice
system, are theoretically in need of mental health treatment. This equals a target population of
6,760 spread out over three counties. Statewide, the bulk of mental health patrons are self-referred
at 37.6 percent, while those referred by courts and law enforcement professionals only make up a
minority of 11.4 percent. Further statistics from Bear River Mental Health Services estimate that
1,902 adults and 1,208 youths were served in 2013, and within the First Judicial District, the most
commonly treated conditions—24 percent or 1,213 adults—involve anxiety. Only 17.27 percent
of the treatment population of Bear River Mental Health Services, or 873 adults, are diagnosed
with a mood disorder such as bipolar disorder or major depression, and only 5.3 percent of all
clients, or 273 adults, are diagnosed with schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Given that
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most specialty courts tend to only focus on diagnoses of mood disorders or psychosis, it would
appear that such a specialty court in Utah’s First District would serve less than 1,200 people.
However, one complication to consider is that the Utah Department of Human Services estimates
that only 14 percent of the mentally ill population of the state has made contact with treatment
providers, implying that up to 86 percent of the target population has no ties to public mental health
services. If this estimate is accurate and generalizable to those in the justice system, then the First
District population of those operating under an impaired decision-making processes due to
disordered thought or compromised moods could be as high as 8,300 persons. Given that this
portion of the population may run a disproportionately higher risk of repeatedly coming into
contact with the criminal justice system (Torrey 1995), it is imperative to quantify the amount of
impact that the Cache County specialty court, and the treatment associated with that specialty
court, has had on reducing reoffending behaviors caused specifically by the presence of mental
illness.

The Program Theory of the First District Mental Health Court
All referrals are subject to a period of orientation prior to acceptance into or rejection from
the program. The point of such a period is twofold as (1) it allows a mental health professional to
assess the defendant in order to establish a baseline diagnosis and (2) it allows the defendant to
observe how the problem solving court works in order to make an informed decision about
voluntarily enrolling into the program. If an offender decides that he or she does not want to
participant, then that person is free to opt-out and will be remanded back to the criminal court for
sentencing-as-usual. If a referral is rejected, then he or she is also placed back on a non-specialty
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docket for criminal processing. If a defendant is accepted into the program, then he or she is
subject to ongoing community-based corrects that acts in concordance with court-ordered mental
health treatment (Redlich et al. 2010).
Bear River Mental Health Services (BRMHS) provides almost exclusive therapeutic
services during specialty court participation. It is possible to receive services from a private
treatment provider like a personal therapist, but this is extremely rare. For the most part, mental
health court clients work entirely with the court-affiliated program out of convenience. Outpatient
services offered by BRMHS include psychological and behavioral assessments, as well as
individual, group, and family psychotherapy. In addition, BRMHS offers a series of coping
services such as psychosocial rehabilitation, skills development for both individuals and groups,
and training in behavioral and medication management. Each program participant's experience
begins in more group-based learning environments before shifting to a more person-specific
therapeutic approach.
Dennis Kirkman of Bear River Mental Health Services designed the majority of the
treatment program associated with the First District mental health court.

Transitioning

successfully through the specialty court program involves four ascending levels of advancement,
each of which is expected to last anywhere from 90 to 180 days. Mr. Kirkman has combined
Organization Assimilation Theory (see Jamblin 1984) with the Trans-theoretical Model of
behavioral change (see Prochaska, Norcross, and DiClemente 1994) and the monomyth of the
Hero’s Journey (see Campbell 2008) in order to give each stage a distinct program focus. At this
point, in order to successfully complete the program, an offender must complete each stage in
order.
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Phase I is identified as the “Slumber/Anticipation/Preparation” stage (see Campbell 2008,
Jamblin 1984, Prochaska et al. 1994), and focuses on functional survival and a deference to a
generalized treatment plan (Kirkman 2013). This stage involves an intense amount of court
supervision, including weekly status hearings where the program participant chronicles his or her
level of treatment and program compliance for the judge (Kirkman 2013). At this point, the
majority of treatment efforts go towards stabilizing an individual's symptoms and establishing a
baseline treatment/recovery plan with a case manager at BRMS (Kirkman 2013). Stabilizing
symptoms requires behavioral intervention tied to group and individual therapy services, and may
involve pharmaceutical treatment if required. In addition, this stabilization process requires an
individual to obtain housing, seek out employment or education, and maintain functional living; if
a program participant lacks the community resources necessary to meet these baseline goals,
BRMS provides complimentary services like life-skills training and case management.
The next phase, Phase II, is the “Departure/Encounter/Action” stage where the emphasis
shifts toward functional recovery (Kirkman 2013). Court supervision is lessoned to status hearings
every other week and the treatment plan becomes more person-specific (Kirkman 2013). In Phase
II, treatment services are aimed at developing commitment strategies that will ultimately result in
successful program completion (Kirkman 2013). Case managers at BRMS focus on more precise,
individualized services (i.e., less group therapy and more individual therapy) that will help create
the coping skills necessary to maintain the functional living established in Phase I. Phase II
necessitates a level of program compliance that is less externally coerced and is more dependent
upon the level of commitment of the client him- or herself.
Phase III is the “Initiation/Metamorphosis/Maintenance” stage which centers on functional
mastery, asking participants to move beyond functional living and toward more substantial goals
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(Kirkman 2013). Participants appear before the judge only once a month and are expected to
become more proactive about their participation in recovery (Kirkman 2013). At this point, the
use of treatment services is focused entirely on maintenance as program participants are asked to
put the coping skills learned in Phase II into consistent practice. (Kirkman 2013). The program
stresses greater community integration and typically promotes defendants to become more active
in a vocation, in education, or in other productive pursuits.
The final stage before successful program completion, Phase IV, is the period of
“Return/Disengagement/Termination” (Kirkman 2013). In completing Phase III, a program
participant has demonstrated a sustained ability to maintain and even increase pro-social
functioning. In Phase IV, defendants focus on functional fulfillment and must demonstrate that
they are at a low risk for a relapse (Kirkman 2013). Participants prove this low level of risk by
maintaining pro-social behaviors while only meeting with the court once every three months
(Kirkman 2013). In addition, participants return to group-based therapy in a leadership role, and
provide peer mentoring and guidance to other program participants (Kirkman 2013). Graduation
from Phase IV represents the end of the mental health court rehabilitative process.

Data Collection and Variables of Interest
The subject population of the current research consists of all referrals to the Utah First
District mental health court dating back to the court’s inception in December 2008. The sole
inclusion criterion for this study is a referral to the Utah First District mental health court itself,
and, because the study is meant to be exhaustive, the final data set will include all program
referrals. Due to the referral criteria of the program itself, all potential program participants have

96

committed a Class A misdemeanor or higher, and all referrals are believed to be eligible for an
Axis I diagnosis (Cache County District Attorney’s Office 2015). Since the current study is looking
at a very specific subset of the criminal population in Utah's First District, any local offenders
prosecuted for felony or misdemeanor crimes during the same time period that have not been
referred to the mental health court will be excluded.
In an effort to meet the minimum standards of a Level 3 quasi-experimental research
project on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale, the current study aimed to use a pre-test/posttest design with a control group. Unfortunately, this study only had access to information about
those referred to the mental health court and not to any other offender populations. Due to this
inability to create a treatment-as-usual control group, the comparison group had to be created from
the roster of referrals. Those that voluntarily opt-out could make an ideal control group (see Trupin
and Richards 2003), although that event may be relatively rare in this instance; estimations found
that purposefully opting-out only happened a handful of times. Due to this limitation, it appears
that the best approach to conducting a Level 3 research design involving a comparison group would
be to separate out those that are accepted into the court from those that are not but that still would
like to be (Eckberg et al. 2006). Comparing two groups that are made up of subjects who are
motivated to participate but who are divided by decisions beyond their control, allows for the
willingness to participate to be held constant and not act as a confounding variable. Removing
this potential threat to internal validity strengthens the research design and provides the inclusion
of a comparison group that certainly makes the current study higher than a Level 2 project.
When considering this seemingly straightforward design comparing participants to nonparticipants, it is important to illuminate why it is that anyone is rejected from the court at all.
Given that the court requires only that all referrals have (1) criminal charges that are classified as
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a felony or class A misdemeanor and (2) a diagnosable Axis I mental illness, it is easy to assume
that most rejected referrals simply fail to meet one of these criteria. While the severity of criminal
charges dictates that defendants must be processed at the district level as opposed to a smaller
municipal justice court, there is a strong possibility that various courtroom decision-makers may
be unwilling to consider specific offenses that may not align with personal value systems or public
opinion. Due to the more conservative elements of Utah, crimes that are heavily stigmatized
locally by the public, the prosecutor, and even the judge may include sexual assault, child abuse
or neglect, illicit drug use, and alcohol abuse. In this regard, the comparison group could well be
composed of program referrals that met the criminal and diagnostic criteria, but failed to qualify
due to a political technicality (Cache County District Attorney’s Office 2015).
From the mental health perspective, the court limits admission to only a select set of Axis
I diagnoses. As stated earlier, most courts privilege offenders suffering from schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and major depression. Traditionally, the site of the
current study will only admit defendants suffering from psychosis or bipolar disorder (Kirkman
2013). This means that traditionally, local referrals who committed an eligible crime but who are
diagnosed with the other mood disorder—major depression—will not be granted admission into
the program and will be subject to traditional criminal processing. In addition, those diagnosed
with a mental illness like anxiety, another disorder that is much more common than psychosis or
bipolar, will also be turned away (Cache County District Attorney’s Office 2015).
Due to the nature of some of the program criteria, it makes logical sense that one could
construct a control group by combining the mentally ill criminals who committed the “wrong”
type of crime with the mentally ill criminals who are diagnosed with the “wrong” type of illness.
Such a design would demand a series of pre-test bivariate analyses assessing any significant
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differences in proportions of categorical variables and mean differences of continuous variables in
order to establish that such a comparison group can act as a true control. These variables would
need to include items related to criminal history and mental health severity, as well as demographic
characteristics and other potentially criminogenic risk factors.
Data collection consisted entirely of agency file reviews. Working with agents of Judge
Allen’s court and with service providers at Bear River Mental Health Services, the principal
investigator constructed a primary dataset containing demographics, criminal histories, and
clinical histories using information about individual program participants filed only at the Bear
River Mental Health Services treatment facility. Because data consisted of information from
agency files, participants were not directly approached and the researcher did not personally
interview any program participants. As such, there was no recruitment or compensation necessary.
In addition, outside of the researcher, all other parties involved in data collection and record
reviews (e.g., First District Court staff and Bear River Mental Health Services staff) already have
access to sensitive information about program participants.
Data collection went in three stages. The first stage involved accessing files housed at Bear
River Mental Health Services, including paper copies of court dockets dated from January 2009 to
present, as well as an electronic database of demographic and clinical characteristics. The second
stage involved working with the court clerk of the First District mental health court to access Utah
State criminal records. For the purposes of this study, documented criminal histories began at 36
months prior to the offense that brought the individual to the courts attention and ended 36 months
post-involvement with the specialty court; the current study is using such a broad range of dates
in an attempt to capture the long-term effects of program involvement. The same clerk then
coordinated getting information from the Cache County jail about incarceration during the same
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period of time 36 months pre-charges and 36 months post-program involvement. The final stage
of data collection required working with the Mental Health Court Administrative Supervisor at
Bear River Mental Health Services to access the BRMHS database of treatment histories in order
to assess the level of therapeutic service involvement for each client during the same period from
36 month prior to offense and 36 months post-program involvement.
The first stage of data collection necessitated creating a complete roster of all court
participants because neither the First District Court nor Bear River Mental Health Services have a
single document containing the names of every man and woman that has been referred to the court
for observation. As the Mental Health Court Administrative Supervisor and the Director of
Corporate Compliance at Bear River Mental Health Services, Mr. Kirkman has kept a paper copy
of every court docket dating back to January 21, 2009, in a locked drawer at Bear River Mental
Health Services. Each docket documents the names, case numbers, current charges, and current
level of program involvement of every case that was heard during any given weekly meeting of
the mental health court. The very first step of creating a database involved documenting the name
of each referral, as well as a timeline of program participation by detailing (1) the offense date, (2)
the first date that he or she appeared on a court docket, (3) the date that he or she either opted out
of participating in the court, was rejected from the program, or was officially accepted into the
court via a plea in abeyance, (4) any significant dates that marked when he or she transitioned into
a higher phase of treatment, and (5) the date that he or she either terminated from the program or
graduated successfully. Armed with a complete list of mental health court referrals, data collection
continued by running those names through the electronic database of clients at Bear River Mental
Health Services in order to code only for the demographic and clinical characteristics that BRMHS
collects. What follows is a list of the variables to be used in the current study.
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Demographics
Gender is a dichotomous variable where referrals will either be coded as “Male” or
“Female.” Age is a ratio variable where referral age will be the date that he or she either was
officially accepted into the court via a plea in abeyance, was rejected from the program, or opted
out of participating in the program all together. Race is a dichotomous variable where referrals
will either be coded as “Caucasian" or “Non-Caucasian.” Given that the majority of the population
in Utah self-identifies as white, the non-white racial categories were collapsed. Ethnicity is a
dichotomous variable where referrals with either be coded as “Hispanic” or “Non-Hispanic.”
Education Level is a ratio variable where referrals will note the highest grade completed prior to
mental health court involvement. High School Graduate is a dichotomous variable where referrals
will either be coded as a “High School Graduate” or not. Being a high school dropout may
theoretically impact a participant's ability to meet some of the requirements of functional living
outlined in Phase I, such as obtain a job or acquire more education. Housing Status is a
dichotomous variable where referrals will be coded as living in “Private Residence without
Support” or "Residence with Some Support" based upon the absence or presence of some form of
residential support at the time of acceptance, rejection, or having opted out of program
participation. Because obtaining and maintaining housing is required in Phase I, the ability to do
so with or without support may be theoretically important. Employment Status is a dichotomous
variable where referrals will be coded as either “Unemployed but Not Seeking/Disabled” or
"Employed/Seeking" at the time of acceptance, rejection, or having opted out of program
participation. Given that transition through the various phases of the court involve employment,
separating subjects based upon the desire or willingness to work would appear to be theoretically
important.
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Clinical Characteristics
Axis I diagnoses. Several Axis I disorders will be coded for in the data, including
Psychosis, Bipolar Disorder, Depression, and Anxiety. These are all nominal level variables and
will be coded dichotomously as either "Present" or "Absent". In addition, analysis will include a
related variable, Severity, which will be an ordinal variable based upon the severity of the
symptomatology of each subject's diagnosis (i.e., “Mild”, “Moderate” or “Severe”).
Axis II personality disorders. Two types of personality disorders will be included as
dichotomous variables. Both Anti-social Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality
Disorder will be examined, and each will be coded as either "Preset" or "Absent".
Substance use disorder. Whether or not the participant was diagnosed with Substance
Abuse/Dependence will be measured dichotomously (i.e., "Present" versus "Absent"). This
diagnosis will be assessed at the time of acceptance, rejection, or having opted out of program
participation.
Time in program, by phase. The time spent in various phases of the program will be
assessed, and measured by the number of days.

Time from Charge to First Court

Observation/Orientation begins with the date of the specific charges that lead to a program referral
and ends at the first court appearance for observation/orientation. Time in Orientation includes
the point from the first court appearance for observation/orientation to the date of program
acceptance or rejection. Time in Phase I spans from the date of acceptance to being promoted to
Phase II. Time in Phase II includes the period of time between being promoted to Phase II to being
promoted to Phase III. Time in Phase III includes the span of time from being promoted to Phase
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III to being promoted to Phase IV. Finally, Time in Phase IV includes being promoted to Phase
IV to graduating successfully from the program
At this point, the size of the target population is known. Preliminary estimates place the
entire target population size (i.e., anyone that has been referred to the problem solving court since
December 2008) at 215 participants. Currently, the average ongoing case enrollment each week
(i.e., those that are being screened for program participation as well as those that are actively
enrolled within the program) includes twenty-five participants, and the court sees an average of
forty or fifty defendants a year.
The second stage required working with Traci Hillyard, the court clerk of the First District
mental health court, to access court records and collect information on criminal justice-specific
variables. First, Ms. Hillyard used courtroom notes from weekly status hearings to clarify the
specific reason why each defendant that was rejected from participating in the alternative
sentencing program was not accepted into the specialty court, and confirm why each accepted
defendant that was terminated from the program was dismissed as unsuccessful. Second, she
accessed Utah State criminal records in order to measure criminal involvement 36 months prior to
mental health court charges through 36 months post-program involvement (i.e., when the
participant graduated, terminated, opted out, or was rejected from participating in the court). If
the defendant’s affiliation with the court ended too recently to have a complete 36 months of
information, as much post-involvement information as possible was collected and the primary
researcher calculated the proportion of police contacts, charges, jail stays and jail days based upon
the available post-program time frames. Police records are available for every referral to the court,
so data collection was not limited to only those that were accepted and only those that graduated
successfully. Finally, Ms. Hillyard coordinated getting information from the Cache County jail
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about jail involvement during the same period of time pre- and post-program involvement.
Working with the court clerk resulted in the following set of criminal justice-related variables.
Program characteristics. Two nominal variables will be included that categorize why
some referrals did not make it into the program or did not complete the program successfully.
Reason for Rejection from the Program codes rejected referrals as excluded due to having a noneligible “Diagnosis”, for having charges that the “Judge Rejected” such as sexual violence or child
abuse, for having charges that the “DA Rejected” such as a DUI, for having an issue with
“Jurisdiction” such as primary residency outside of Cache County, or for some “Unknown”
heretofore unidentified reason. Reason for Termination from the Program codes unsuccessful
participants as terminating from the program due to “Non-compliance”, “New Charges”,
“Relocating” outside of Cache County, “Incompetence”, “Absconding”, or “Death.”
Criminal Characteristics
Criminal histories. Three nominal measures of criminal histories will be measured. They
include History of Violence, History of Drug Violations, and History of Incarceration. Each is
coded as present or not. In addition, four count variables will be assessed. Criminal Charges PreInvolvement documents the number of criminal charges up to 36 months prior. Criminal Charges
Post-Involvement begins with the final date of program involvement and, if available, documents
the number of criminal charges in the 36 months post. Jail Days Pre-Involvement counts the
number of jail days 36 months prior. And Jail Days Post-Involvement records the number of jail
days in the 36 months post-mental health court involvement.
Time to recidivism and reincarceration.

Time to First Non-Traffic Charge Post-

Involvement chronicles the number of days from the end of program involvement to the first non-
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traffic charge. Time to First Incarceration Post-Involvement counts the number of days from the
end of program involvement to the first day in jail.
The final stage of data collection necessitated returning to Bear River Mental Health
Services and again working with Dennis Kirkman to access treatment histories in order to collect
information about mental health-specific variables. Using records at Bear River Mental Health
Services, the third state of data collection involved gathering measures of state hospital and
therapeutic treatment involvement 36 months prior to a mental health court referral through 36
months post-program involvement (i.e., when the participant graduated, terminated, opted out, or
was rejected from participating in the court). As with the examination of criminal records, if the
defendant’s affiliation with the court ended too recently to have a complete 36 months of
information, as much post-affiliation data as possible will be collected and the primary researcher
will estimate the proportion of hospital stays, hospital days, therapeutic treatment contacts, and
therapeutic treatment service hours during the available post-program time frame. Variables used
to assess the impact that the specialty court has on treatment outcomes include the following.
More Clinical Characteristics
Treatment histories. Two nominal measures of treatment histories will be assessed,
including History of Hospitalization and History of Therapeutic Services. Both are coded as either
absent or present.

In addition, examinations will include four additional count variables.

Therapeutic Contacts Pre-Involvement counts the number of therapeutic contacts in the 36 months
prior to the date of the mental health court charges. Therapeutic Contacts Post-Involvement begins
with the final date of program involvement and, if available, documents the number of therapeutic
contacts in the 36 months post.

105

Time to treatment. The various times to hospitalization or to a therapeutic mental health
service will by measured by the number of days. Time to First Hospital Stay Post-Involvement
assesses the number of days from the end of program involvement until the first state or regional
hospital stay. Time to First Therapeutic Contact Post-Involvement counts the number of days from
the end of program involvement until the first therapeutic service

Research Questions and Research Analysis
The current study will conduct three different waves of statistical analysis, each with a
different set of research aims. The first stage will compare program participants against rejected
referrals on a number of demographic, criminal, and clinical characteristics in order to establish
any significant baseline group differences prior to the introduction of the intervention. The second
stage will contrast graduates (i.e., participants that successfully complete the program) with those
that terminate unsuccessful from the mental health court in order to assess whether there are any
significant disparities across groups within the program itself. And the final stage will revisit the
first comparison—program participants against rejected referrals—and provide the most
statistically in-depth analysis by comparing outcome behaviors post-program of both groups in
order to estimate the long-term impact of the court on criminal justice involvement and mental
health service use.
In the first stage of analysis, when comparing the treatment group with the control group
of rejected referrals prior to program enrollment, this study will attempt to answer the following
questions:
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What are the demographic, criminal, and clinical characteristics of the mental health court
participant population?



What demographic, criminal, and clinical characteristics, if any, play a significant role in
determining who is accepted and who is rejected?



Is there a significant difference between comparison groups when looking at the average
number of charges per month, jail days per month, or use of therapeutic services per month?



What proportion of referrals is accepted into the mental health court? What proportion of
referrals is rejected? What proportion voluntarily opts-out?

All tests of significant differences were calculated using use chi-square tests of independence or
two-sample t-tests, depending upon the level of measurement for the given variable.
The second stage of analysis will briefly examine the differences within the treatment
group by comparing program graduates with program terminates. This exploratory phase of the
evaluation will be limited to answering the following questions:


What proportion of program participants successfully complete the program? What
proportion terminates unsuccessful?



What demographic, criminal, and clinical characteristics, if any, play a significant role in
determining who is successful and who is not?



Is there a significant difference between comparison groups when looking at the average
number of days spent in each Phase of the program?

Once again, all tests of significant difference will depend on the level of measurement for the
variable of interest and will be limited to chi-square tests and independent-samples t-tests.
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Building off of any baseline differences established in the first phase of analysis, the final
series of tests of significant difference between program participants and rejected referrals will
gauge the enduring treatment effects that mental health court participation has on criminal
behaviors and mental health outcomes post-involvement. In general, this study assumes that
mental health court involvement should predict a decrease in criminal offending, a decrease in
incarceration, a decrease in hospitalization, and an increase in use of treatment services. These
assumptions are based upon (1) the theoretical framework of therapeutic jurisprudence and (2)
prior research findings.

As a reminder, therapeutic jurisprudence focuses on whether the

consequences produced by legal action is therapeutic or anti-therapeutic (Wexler 2000), and most
mental health courts attempt to operate in a way that is pro-therapeutic (Casey and Rottman 2000).
In this regard, most decisions within the court should theoretically be aimed at steering participants
away from criminal behavior and toward using therapeutic services.
While issues of methodological rigor may challenge the validity of prior evaluation
research, many findings still hint at significant directional effects. Examinations of within-group
change find that participants experience a significant reduction in average bookings (Hiday et al.
2013, Morin 2004, Trupin and Richards 2003) and average jail days post-discharge (Frailing
2010), while graduates experience a significant decrease in proportion rearrested (Van Vleet et al.
2008), average arrests (Frailing 2010, Hiday et al. 2013, Hiday and Ray 2010), and average jail
days post-involvement (Burns et al. 2013). Clearly, when assessing how such specialty courts
affect criminal justice involvement, a mental health court will be deemed effective if the levels of
criminal behavior are higher prior to specialty court involvement and decrease after discharge from
the program.
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According to research comparing program participants with various control groups postinvolvement in order to assess between-group differences, participation correlates with a
significantly smaller proportion of new arrests (Hiday et al. 2013), significantly fewer average
arrests (Hiday et al. 2013; Moore and Hiday 2006), and significantly fewer average jail days
(Cosden et al. 2005; Frailing 2010). Studies that examine the specific effect of successful program
completion find that graduation is associated with a significantly smaller proportion of new arrests
(Burns et al. 2013; Dirk-Linhorst and Linhorst 2012; Hiday and Ray 2010; Hiday et al. 2013; Van
Vleet et al. 2008), significantly fewer average arrests (Hiday and Ray 2010; Hiday et al. 2013;
Moore and Hiday 2006), and significantly fewer average jail days post-discharge (Burns et al.
2013; Frailing 2010). In addition, graduates have a significantly smaller hazard ratio of rearrest
(Rossman 2012) and significantly more days to rearrest (Van Vleet et al. 2008). On the whole,
mental health courts appear to have the intended diminishing effect on criminal behaviors. Based
upon these trends, a successful program should see a decrease in reoffending when comparing
changes within-groups over time and/or should see a lower rate of re-offense for participant
populations when compared with non-participant control groups.
In contrast to these relatively obvious measures of recidivism, operationalizing intended
mental health outcomes is more complex. From a criminal justice standpoint, the aim is to simply
see a decrease in criminal involvement by examining the aforementioned new charges, new jail
days, or hazard rate of recidivism/reincarceration. On the other hand, the stated goal of increased
treatment contact is much more variable because some contacts can be negative while others are
clearly positive, and yet other contact types can exist somewhere ambiguously between the two.
One area of measurement that is viewed negatively revolves around hospital stays and
institutionalization days; in short, the more frequently an individual stays in a mental facility or
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the longer the duration of that stay, the more that individual is using up valuable resources and the
less often her or she has the opportunity to be out in the general population as a pro-social member
of the community. In contrast, an area that is viewed as overwhelmingly positive is treatment
maintenance; as someone suffering from a serious mental illness makes more frequent use of
therapeutic community services and engages in more hours of treatment, he or she is more likely
to sustain communal ties and be a functional member of the general public. An air of uncertainty
exists around measures of crisis and emergency intervention. Crisis denotes an episode that is
much more serious than ongoing maintenance and requires treatments that are potentially more
intensive than purely therapeutic services, but it also hints at a potential level of awareness that
demonstrates that there is some recognition of the warning signs of impending emergency that
requires steps be taken. Not that every crisis episode is necessarily subject-initiated—many states
have temporary 72-hour commitment laws that can be initiated by criminal justice and treatment
professionals when an individual poses a risk to him or herself or others—but this measure of
intervention lends itself to a classification that is somewhere between institutionalization and
maintenance.
Examinations of within-group changes in treatment-related behaviors over time find
participants experience a significant decrease in the percent hospitalized (O'Keefe 2006) and a
significant decrease the number of crisis episodes post-enrollment (Henrickx et al. 2005; Keator
et al. 2013). In contrast, participation is associated with a significant increase in the proportion of
respondents in treatment (Trupin and Richards 2003) the average number of treatment services
used (Keator et al. 2013; Trupin et al. 2001), and the average number of treatment hours postenrollment (Trupin and Richards 2003). Between-group comparisons using a control group also
find that participation is associated with a greater proportion of subjects in treatment (Boothroyd
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et al. 2003; Cosden et al. 2005; Keator et al. 2013; Trupin and Richards 2003) and significantly
more average therapeutic services post-enrollment (Keator et al. 2013). Program graduation is
also associated with a significantly larger proportion still in treatment post-involvement (Van Vleet
et al. 2008). In summary, participation in mental health court appears to significantly decrease the
frequency and duration of hospital stays, and significantly increase the use of maintenance
services.
In summarizing the effects of mental health court, it appears that such specialty courts meet
the two-pronged goal of decreased criminal justice involvement and increased mental health
treatment integration.

While it appears that the eradication of criminal behaviors may be

exceptionally challenging, the evaluation evidence available points to an overall decrease in
incarceration and future arrests in the long-term. In addition, there appears to be some evidence
that affiliation with the court promotes a significant decrease in the negative treatment contacts
tied to hospital stays and a significant increase in the positive treatment contacts like ongoing
therapeutic treatment maintenance. Based upon this limited evidence, this analysis will attempt to
address the following directional hypotheses tied to different sets of outcome measures:
Recidivism Hypotheses


H1) The proportion of program participants committing a new non-traffic offense
in the 36 months post-involvement will be significantly smaller than the proportion
of rejected referrals committing the same type of new offense



H2) The average number of charges per month will be significantly fewer for
program participants than rejected referrals at every month in the 36 months postinvolvement
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H3) Program participation will have a significant negative effect on the estimated
hazard ratio of reoffending

Incarceration Hypotheses


H4) The proportion of program participants that are reincarcerated will be
significantly smaller than the proportion of rejected referrals



H5) The average number of jail days per month will be significantly fewer for
program participants than rejected referrals at every month in the 36 months postinvolvement



H6) Program participation will have a significant negative effect on the estimated
hazard ratio of reincarceration

Hospitalization Hypotheses


H7) The proportion of program participants that are hospitalized in the 36 months
post-involvement will be significantly smaller than the proportion of rejected
referrals that will be hospitalized during the same time period

Use of Therapeutic Services Hypotheses


H8) The proportion of program participants that utilize therapeutic services in the
36 months post-involvement will be significantly larger than the proportion of
rejected referrals that utilize therapeutic services during the same time period



H9) The average number of therapeutic services per month will be significantly
greater for program participants than rejected referrals at every month in the 36
months post-involvement
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H10) Program participation will have a significant positive effect on the estimated
hazard ratio of use of therapeutic services

Any bivariate analysis of within-group change for program participants pre- and post-intervention
will be estimated using dependent-samples t-tests. Any tests of between-group differences will
again use either a chi-square test of independence or an independent-samples t-test depending upon
the level of measurement of the outcome variable.
In order to examine the effect of multiple variables on criminal outcomes at one time, this
study will include a series of Cox regressions. More specifically, the aim will be to use this
particular type of survival analysis to estimate whether program involvement has a significant
effect on the time to recidivating, to reincarceration, and to use of treatment services within the
first 36 months post-involvement. According to Hamilton (2006), Cox regression estimates the
hazard rate for failure at time t, which is defined as:

ℎ(𝑡) =

probability of failing between times 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝚫𝑡(𝚫𝑡)
(probabilty of failing after time 𝑡)

This hazard rate is modeled as a function of the baseline hazard (h0) at time t, and the effects of
one or more predictor x variables:
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0 (𝑡) exp(𝛃1 𝑥1 + 𝛃2 𝑥2 + … + 𝛃𝑘 𝑥𝑘 )
In this estimation, “baseline hazard” means the hazard for an event with all independent variables
x equal to 0. Cox regression will also be used to estimate how much impact demographic, clinical,
prior criminal histories, or prior mental health histories may have on significantly changing the
risk of a given failure event.
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Summary
The current study is an attempt to gather baseline information about a population that has
never been assessed. In an attempt to make this research project as rigorous as possible, certain
methodological decisions have been made in order to overcome the shortcomings present in
previous mental health court evaluations. By including a control group, this study will improve
upon the limited one-group pre-test/post-test design (see Tables 6 and 10). By including measures
prior to the intervention, this study will be more rigorous than the two-group post-test only model
(see Table 7). By including all program participants in the experimental group, this study will be
less threatened by the selection bias that plagues graduate-only evaluations and compromises
internal validity (see Tables 8 and 11; Bess Associates 2004; Frailing 2010). By including posttest measures that are actually from a period of time post-discharge as opposed to post-entry, this
study will be better equipped to answer questions about long-term criminal and treatment
behaviors that are not currently mandated by the court (see Boothroyd et al. 2003; Christy et al.
2005; Cosden et al. 2003; Cosden et al. 2005; Keator et al. 2013; Steadman et al. 2011; Trupin and
Richards 2003). Finally, by including measures for three years prior to current charges and three
years post-program involvement, this study will be able to examine enduring patterns of behavior
(see Eckberg et al. 2006). In addition, by including a test of multivariate relationships, this study
will be able to examine why we might see differences in long-term outcome behaviors.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS

Sample Descriptions and Comparisons
Table 13 presents the demographic, criminal, and clinical characteristics of all referrals to
the mental health court. Table 14 shows the demographic, criminal, and clinical differences
between the treatment group of 95 participants and the control group of 107 rejected referrals. Both
samples are nearly half female, are over 93 percent white, are less than 9 percent Hispanic, and
have a mean age between 33 and 34-years old. The two groups were not significantly different on
any of these variables. Moreover, they do not differ significantly on the average highest grade
completed and the proportion of high school graduates. The only significant demographic
differences between the treatment and control groups appear when examining living situation and
relationship to the labor market. Program participants are significantly more likely than rejected
referrals to live in a private residence without support (Χ2=5.470, p=0.019) and are significantly
less likely to be classified as disabled/unemployed not seeking (Χ2=9.386, p=0.002).
According to Table 14, criminal characteristics do not appear to be significantly different
between the treatment and comparison groups. The percentage of program participants with at
least one violent charge on their record is slightly higher than the percentage of rejected referrals
with a history of violence at 49.4% and 45.2% respectively, but that difference is non-significant
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(Χ2=0.347, p=0.556). The treatment group also appears to have a higher proportion of defendants
with a prior drug violation (60.2% versus 54.7% of the control group), but that is also not
significant (Χ2=0.612, p=0.434). Finally, neither group is significantly more likely to have been
incarcerated prior to court involvement, as 65.5% of participants and 63.1% of rejected referrals
have been jailed at least once prior to mental health court involvement (Χ2=0.119, p=0.730).
Table 13. Referral Demographics (N=202)
Characteristic
Female
Age
White
Hispanic
Highest Grade Completed
High School Graduate
Unemployed Not Seeking/Disabled
Living in Private Residence Without Support
History of Violence
History of Drug Violations
Prior Incarceration
Psychosis Diagnosis
Bipolar Disorder Diagnosis
Depression Diagnosis
Anxiety Disorder Diagnosis
Severity
Anti-Social Personality Disorder Diagnosis
Borderline Personality Disorder Diagnosis
Substance Abuse Diagnosis
Prior Hospitalization
History of Therapeutic Services
Days from Charges to Referral
Days in Orientation

All Program
Referrals
46.0
33.52
93.8
7.8
12.19
80.3
61.1
73.2
48.5
56.5
65.3
24.0
38.8
24.5
38.8
2.35
10.5
9.0
45.4
11.0
62.1
145.63
31.94

Figure 1 shows the average number of charges per month in the 36 months prior to the
offense that brought the defendant to the courts attention. A series of independent-samples t-tests
at each time point shows that there appear to be no significant dissimilarities in offense frequency
across both groups. Figure 2 shows the average number of jail days per month in the 36 months
prior to mental health court charges. The participant and non-participant trajectories crisscross
multiple times, and the only significant difference is during the time period 36 months prior to the
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mental health court offense when the participant group served fewer average days in jail (t=-2.083,
p=0.040). Overall, it appears that both groups are very similar in offense and incarceration
histories.
Table 14. Pre-test Demographics Comparing Program Participants with Rejected Referrals
Characteristic
Program Participants
Rejected Referrals
(N=95)
(N=107)
Female
47.4
45.7
Age
33.25
33.81
White
93.1
93.8
Hispanic
6.9
8.2
Highest Grade Completed
12.23
12.12
High School Graduate
80.5
80.2
Unemployed Not Seeking/Disabled
50.6
72.6
Living in Private Residence Without Support 81.6
66.3
History of Violence
49.4
45.2
History of Drug Violations
60.2
54.7
Prior Incarceration
65.5
63.1
Psychosis Diagnosis
31.8
18.4
Bipolar Disorder Diagnosis
56.5
24.3
Depression Diagnosis
9.4
36.9
Anxiety Disorder Diagnosis
29.4
46.6
Severity
2.41
2.34
Anti-Social Personality Disorder Diagnosis
5.0
14.7
Borderline Personality Disorder Diagnosis
8.9
8.6
Substance Abuse Diagnosis
36.6
53.1
Prior Hospitalization
9.1
12.7
History of Therapeutic Services
59.7
64.5
Days from Charges to Referral
131.34
160.05
Days in Orientation
42.11
23.07
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***

p-value
0.815
0.721
0.845
0.730
0.655
0.966
0.002***
0.019*
0.556
0.434
0.730
0.035*
0.000***
0.000***
0.016*
0.637
0.035*
0.952
0.027*
0.492
0.564
0.323
0.003**

According to Table 14, the treatment and control groups do differ significantly on a number
of mental health measurements. Nearly one-third of program participants are diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, which is significantly higher
than the 18.4% of non-participants that have the same mental illness (Χ2=4.469, p=0.035). The
proportion of participants with a primary diagnosis of bipolar disorder was significantly larger
(Χ2=20.327, p=0.000), more than doubling that of the percentage of rejected referrals with the
same diagnosis. In contrast, those in the control group where significantly more likely to have a
depression diagnosis (Χ2=19.030, p=0.000) or an anxiety diagnosis (Χ2=5.794, p=0.016). Despite
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these differences, the average severity of mental illness in each group—typically rated as mild,
moderate, or severe—was non-significant (t=0.472, p=0.637). All things considered, this pattern
of findings is not that surprising. Recall that to be eligible for the mental health court, an offender
must have schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar disorder. Diagnoses of depression
or anxiety are not sufficient to be selected for the program.
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Figure 1: Average Charges per Month Prior to Mental Health Court
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Figure 2: Average Jail Days per Month Prior to Mental Health Court
Charges
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Beyond Axis I diagnoses, there appear to be significant differences between participants
and rejected referrals on other mental health measures. By an almost 3-to-1 ratio, the control group
has a higher proportion of subjects with anti-social personality disorder than the treatment group.
Almost 15% of non-participants are diagnosed as having ASPD as compared with only 5% of
participants, a difference that is statistically significant (Χ2=4.462, p=0.035). In addition, the
control group also has a significantly higher proportion of subjects with a substance abuse or
substance dependence diagnosis as the proportion of non-participants with a substance-related
disorder is 53.1% which is significantly higher than the 36.6% of participants (Χ2=4.879, p=0.027).
As both anti-social personality disorder and substance abuse are viewed as significant risk factors
for future offending, it is important to consider these pre-test differences in any post-treatment
analyses.
Finally, there appears to be mixed differences when examining treatment histories on the
state or local level. While neither group is more likely to have a history of state hospitalization
(Χ2=0.471, p=0.492) nor a pre-existing relationship with the local community mental health
treatment provider (Χ2=0.332, p=0.564), there appears to be some evidence that the comparison
group actually used therapeutic services more often in the three years prior to being screened for
the court. Figure 3 charts the average therapeutic services per month in the 36 months prior to the
mental health court offense, and while both groups cross repeatedly in the first year of analysis,
they diverge 23 months prior to court consideration and then remain on separate trajectories.
Participants use less average monthly services at every time point during the next two years, with
those differences being significant specifically at 16 months prior (t=-2.171, p=0.033), 15 months
prior (t=-2.053, p=.044), 10 month prior (t=-2.038, p=0.045), and 6 months prior (t=-2.099,
p=0.039) to specialty court charges. In short, despite similar proportions of the treatment and
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control group having used therapeutic services in the past, it appears that non-participants have a
greater level of involvement with community mental health providers in the two years leading up
to the mental health court offense.
Based upon this series of comparisons, there appears to be some key differences between
these groups, but those distinctions are primarily along demographic and clinical lines. Looking
at the demographic variables, mental health court participants appear to be at a more stable level
of functional living than rejected referrals as a significantly higher proportion of participants live
in a private residence without support and a significantly lower percentage is unemployed not
seeking or disabled. Living independently and not being permanently outside of the labor force
may point at a higher potential for symptom stabilization and reestablishing functional recovery,
thus indicating that program participants may already be more susceptible to reestablishing prosocial behavioral patterns.
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Figure 3: Average Therapeutic Services per Month Prior to Mental Health
Court Charges
In addition, there are significant clinical differences between the treatment and comparison
groups. While the severity of diagnoses is the same between both groups, those diagnoses
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themselves are distinct. The treatment group of program participants have significantly higher
proportions of psychosis and bipolar disorder. In contrast, the comparison group of rejected
referrals includes higher percentages of individuals with depression diagnoses, anxiety disorders,
anti-social personality disorder, and substance-related disorders. While the variation in Axis I
disorders (i.e., psychosis, bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety) is attributable to court-specific
selection criteria, the dissimilarities in the presence of anti-social personality disorder and
substance use disorders may be problematic as both diagnoses are commonly seen as criminogenic
risk factors. Just as the significant contrasts in demographic characteristics pointed to an increased
potential for program participants to reestablish pro-social functioning, having a higher rate of
asocial clinical risk factors may hint at a higher potential for anti-social tendencies. In short, the
higher proportion of anti-social personalities and substance abuse/dependence in the rejected
referral group may indicate a preexisting inability to establish pro-social behavioral patterns.
In spite of all of this demographic and clinical variability between groups, there appears to
be no significant difference in criminal histories. In fact, the proportion of program participants
that have a history of violence, a history of drug offenses, and a history of incarceration are all
slightly, but non-significantly, higher than those in the comparison group. Due to the lack of
overwhelming evidence supporting the assumption that one group is more or less criminally prone
that the other, this study can explore criminal justice outcomes comparing program participants
and rejected referrals without using a fixed-effects model. Further analysis will show whether the
aforementioned demographic or clinical differences have a significant effect on outcome
behaviors.
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Mental Health Court Completion
Table 14 shows the proportions of program involvement at each stage. Among the 215
referrals at the end of data collection, 95 (or 44.81%) were accepted into the program, 107 (or
50.47%) were rejected due to any of a number of reasons (see Figure 4), 10 (or 4.72%) self-selected
out of the program by voluntarily opting-out, and 2 were still in orientation awaiting a decision.
Of the 95 that were accepted into the specialty court, and excluding the 25 participants that were
still working their way through the program, 33 (or 47.14%) successfully graduated and had all
charges dropped while 37 (or 52.86%) terminated unsuccessful.
Table 15. Percentages of Program
Involvement
Program
N
%
Status
Accepted
95
44.81
Rejected
107
50.47
Opted-out
10
4.72
Graduated
Current
Participants
Terminated

33
25
37

34.74
26.32
38.95

ChargesJudge
19%

Unknown
4%
Jurisdiction
9%

Diagnosis
48%

Charges-DA
20%

Figure 4: Why Rejected

Figure 5 shows the reasons why participants terminated unsuccessful and Table 16
summarizes the demographic, criminal, and clinical characteristics of both the graduate group and
the group of terminates. For the most part, there are not many significant differences between the
groups other than a few demographic characteristics that are only significant at the p=0.010 level.
According to the data, those that terminate tend to be male, Hispanic, less educated, and are less
likely to live in private residences without institutional support. The termination group also
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includes more subjects with a history of violence and a history of drug charges, although those
differences are not more significant. In contrast, it is interesting to note that, though nonsignificant, the graduation group includes more defendants with a history of prior incarceration.
Clinically, there also appears to be no difference between those that complete the program
successfully and those that do not, although the percentage of terminates with borderline
personality disorder is almost double the percentage of graduates with the same diagnosis.

Incompetent
Absconded 3%
3%
Relocated
11%

Death
3%

New charges
29%

Noncompliance
51%

Figure 5: Why Terminated

When examining how those that completed the program successfully differ from those that
did not, it may also be important to pay attention to disparities in program processing. While there
is no significant difference between groups in the amount of time from charges to first courtroom
observation/program orientation (t=-0.476, p=0.635) and in the amount of time spent in program
orientation while the court workgroup decides to whether accept or reject the referral (t=0.227,
p=0.821), there is a significant differences in of days spent in Phase II of the four-phase sequence.
This difference may have some bearing on participant outcomes as members of the termination
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group spend an average of 212 more days, or over seven months, in Phase II than the graduation
group (t=-2.732, p=0.016).
Table 16. Program Demographics Comparing Graduates with Terminates
Characteristic
Program Graduates
Rejected Terminates
(N=33)
(N=37)
Female
48.5
37.8
Age
32.73
32.32
White
87.9
97.3
Hispanic
0.0
8.1
Highest Grade Completed
12.79
11.92
High School Graduate
87.9
70.3
Unemployed Not Seeking/Disabled
51.5
48.6
Living in Private Residence Without Support 90.9
73.0
History of Violence
48.5
54.1
History of Drug Violations
57.6
62.2
Prior Incarceration
69.7
59.5
Psychosis Diagnosis
30.3
36.1
Bipolar Disorder Diagnosis
63.6
52.8
Depression Diagnosis
3.0
5.6
Anxiety Disorder Diagnosis
18.2
33.3
Severity
2.36
2.52
Anti-Social Personality Disorder Diagnosis
3.0
2.9
Borderline Personality Disorder Diagnosis
6.1
11.4
Substance Abuse Diagnosis
30.3
34.3
Prior Hospitalization
12.1
5.7
History of Therapeutic Services
57.6
65.7
Days from Charges to Referral
136.06
160.81
Days in Orientation
47.21
44.49
Days in Phase I
184.32
182.74
Days in Phase II
161.63
374.36
Days in Phase III
194.35
294.14
Days in Phase IV
175.69
144.67
Total Days in Program
571.87
432.23
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***

p-value
0.369
0.877
0.127
0.095
0.062
0.073
0.811
0.054
0.642
0.696
0.372
0.609
0.361
0.607
0.152
0.455
0.966
0.435
0.726
0.352
0.490
0.635
0.821
0.958
0.016*
0.316
0.446
0.057

Effect on Criminal Recidivism
Overall, the effect of the court on criminal recidivism is mixed. When examining a number
of different events in the 36 months post-discharge from the court, Table 17 reports the proportion
of each group that experiences each event. When identifying the timeframe as “post-discharge”,
this marks the end of the fallout from the offense or offenses that brought the defendant to the
attention of the court. For mental health court graduates, this begins the day of program completion
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when all requirements have been met and all charges are dismissed. For program participants that
terminated unsuccessful, this begins the day they are released from the jail sentence that was
imposed in the wake of program termination. For those that did not complete the program but
were not sentenced to jail time, the period post-discharge begins the day they were officially
rejected from the program. Finally, for those in the control group of rejected referrals, postdischarge begins the day they completed the jail sentence associated with this offense or series of
offenses. If, for some reason, there is no jail time imposed as a penalty for breaking the law, the
period post-discharge begins the day they were rejected by the program.
Table 17. Proportion of New Events within 36 Months Post-Discharge for Program Participants
and Rejected Referrals
Event
Program Participants
Rejected Referrals p-value
New Non-Traffic Violation
40.0
40.8
0.919
New Incarceration
35.7
59.2
0.002***
New Hospitalization
7.8
6.3
0.742
New Therapeutic Service
63.1
67.7
0.581
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***

Research Hypothesis 1 states, “The proportion of program participants committing a new
non-traffic offense in the 36 months post-involvement will be significantly smaller than the
proportion of rejected referrals committing the same type of new offense." Based upon the
information in Table 17, the proportion of program participants that end up offending during the
three years post-discharge is nearly equal to the proportion of non-participants, at 40.0% and
40.8% respectively (Χ2=0.010, p=0.919). Given that the proportion of new violators within each
group is not statically distinct, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Research Hypothesis 2 asserts that, “The average number of charges per month will be
significantly lower for program participants than rejected referrals at every month in the 36 months
post-involvement.” In an initial attempt to disaggregate out any differences as a function of time,
charges for the participant group only were averaged for each of the three years preceding program
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affiliation and each of the three years post-involvement (see Table 18). While each annual postprogram average is smaller than its corresponding pre-program time period, a series of dependentsamples t-tests found that there was only a significant decrease when comparing the average of the
twelve months immediately preceding participation with the average number of charges in the first
year post-discharge (t=-3.806, p=0.000). This short-term within-group reduction in offending
appears consistent with previous research (Hiday et al. 2013; Trupin and Richards 2003).
Table 18. Within-Group Differences on Annual Averages for Participants Pre- and Post-Program
Event
Pre-Program
Post-Program
p-value
Charges: 1-12 Months
0.2323
0.0804
0.000***
Charges: 13-24 Months
0.1545
0.0853
0.255
Charges: 25-36 Months
0.1141
0.0401
0.070
Jail Days: 1-12 Months
1.4314
0.7003
0.245
Jail Days: 13-24 Months
1.1150
0.6726
0.512
Jail Days: 25-36 Months
1.5800
0.5741
0.213
Therapeutic Services: 1-12 Months
1.2422
1.1281
0.741
Therapeutic Services: 13-24 Months 1.2674
1.4960
0.807
Therapeutic Services: 25-36 Months 0.9539
1.6613
0.378
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***

To examine how the treatment group and comparison group differed post-intervention, the
annual number of offenses for each group was averaged for the first, second, and third year postdischarge (see Table 19). Based upon a series of one-tailed tests, mental health court participants
committed a significantly lower number of average arrests than the comparison group within the
first year (t=-2.155, p=0.016). There appears to be no significant difference in the second year
post-discharge, but average offenses for participants in the third year was significantly lower once
again (t=-1.676, p=0.049). These between-group findings appear to be consistent with other
mental health court evaluations that find a treatment effect on offending (Hiday et al. 2013; Moore
and Hiday 2006).
In a further attempt to tease out any group differences over time, Figure 6 shows the
average number of charges per month in the 36 months post-discharge for both participants and

126

rejected referrals. A series of one-tailed independent-samples t-tests at each time point shows that
the treatment group had a significantly lower number of charges during six different months in
that three-year span. Mental health court participants had significantly lower charges in month 2
(t=-1.912, p=0.025), month 3 (t=-1.712, p=0.048), month 12 (t=-1.751, p=0.048), month 29 (t=2.049, p=0.022), month 34 (t=-2.06, p=0.022), and month 36 (t=-1.704, p=0.048). These findings
hint at a proximal, positive effect on offending in the three months immediately after court
involvement and a potential distal effect almost three years later, although it should be noted that
both the participant and non-participant trajectories do crisscross multiple times in between. Based
upon this mixed evidence, we also fail to accept the research hypothesis, although this is only
because Research Hypothesis 2 claimed a lower average number of charges at every month postdischarge. There are instances of specific time frames or individual months where recidivism is
significantly lower for the treatment group when compared with the group of rejected referrals.
Table 19. Between-Group Differences on Annual Averages Post-Discharge
Event
Program Participants
Rejected Referrals
Charges: 1-12 Months
0.0804
0.1452
Charges: 13-24 Months
0.0853
0.0978
Charges: 25-36 Months
0.0401
0.0913
Jail Days: 1-12 Months
0.7003
2.1335
Jail Days: 13-24 Months
0.6726
2.6042
Jail Days: 25-36 Months
0.5741
1.4632
Therapeutic Services: 1-12 Months
1.1281
2.4298
Therapeutic Services: 13-24 Months 1.4960
1.9539
Therapeutic Services: 25-36 Months 1.6613
1.4887
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***

p-value
0.016*
0.376
0.049*
0.002**
0.004**
0.075
0.068
0.334
0.434

Research Hypothesis 3 states, “Program participation will have a significant negative effect
on the estimated hazard ratio of reoffending.” The Cox regression on reoffending revealed no
significant treatment effect (see Table 20). In the first model, which omitted program participation
as a predictor variable, the only variables that had a significant estimated hazard ratio of
reoffending was a history of drug violations (z=2.36, p=0.018) and a history of incarceration
(z=2.27, p=0.023). With an estimated hazard ratio of 2.05, someone with a prior drug offense is
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105% more likely to reoffend.

Interestingly, a history of drug violations was statistically

significant even after including a diagnosis of substance dependence/abuse. With an estimated
hazard ratio of 1.90, a prior jail stay predicts that a subject 90% more likely to reoffend. Once
program participation was factored into the Cox regression in the second model, both variables
remained statistically significant (e.g., a history of drug offenses z=2.28, p=0.022; a history of
incarceration z=2.25, p=0.025). Program participation, on the other hand, had no significant effect
on its own (z=0.53, p=0.599) and the entire model actually dips outside of statistical significance
(Χ2=20.92, p=0.051). Even more troubling than the lack of an effect is the direction of the
estimated hazard ratio of reoffending. With a hazard ratio of 1.15, mental health court participants
appear to be 15% more likely to reoffend over the three-year period post-involvement. Again, we
fail to accept the research hypothesis.
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Figure 6: Average Charges per Month Post-Mental Health Court Discharge
Figure 7 illustrates the differences in survival probability of offending when comparing
rejected referrals with program participants. There appears to be a very large difference between
the survival probabilities of both groups early on, although that difference decreases over time as
the two trajectories being to converge and eventually even crisscross multiple times. While we
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failed to find clear support for all three research hypotheses, the evidence attempting to estimate a
treatment effect on reoffending hints at a significant short-term reduction in criminal behavior
immediately post-court involvement, although this effect appears to be complicated and requires
some interpretation.
Table 20. Cox Regression on Hazard Rate of Reoffending within 36 Months Post-Discharge for Program
Participants and Rejected Referrals
Model I (N=156)
Model 2 (N=156)
Variable
Hazard
95% CI
Hazard
95% CI
Ratio
Ratio
(N=66
(N=66
failures)
failures)
Male (reference: female)
0.83
.50-1.39
0.83
.49-1.39
Age
0.99
.96-1.02
0.99
.97-1.02
White (reference: not white)
0.63
.26-1.55
0.64
.26-1.56
Highest grade completed
0.89
.75-1.07
0.89
.75-1.07
Unemployed not seeking/Disabled (reference:
1.39
.79-2.46
1.43
.80-2.56
employed/seeking)
Private residence w/o support (reference: other)
1.15
.62-2.13
1.12
.60-2.11
History of violence (reference: no history)
1.35
.80-2.29
1.34
.79-2.27
History of drug offenses (reference: no history)
2.05
1.13-3.72*
2.01
1.10-3.66*
History of incarceration (reference: no history)
1.90
1.09-3.31*
1.89
1.08-3.29*
Anti-social personality disorder (reference: no
1.39
.59-3.28
1.42
.60-3.39
diagnosis)
Substance dependence/abuse (reference: no
1.29
.77-2.19
1.32
.77-2.25
diagnosis)
MHC Participation (reference: non-participants)
1.15
.68-1.95
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
Model 1: 2(11, N=156) = 20.64, p=0.037; Model 2: 2(12, N=156) = 20.92, p=0.051

Figure 7: Survival Probabilty of Reoffending
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Effect on Incarceration
Separate from the varied evidence surrounding the court’s impact on reoffending, there
appears to be strong evidence that the court does have the intended reduction effect on
reincarceration. Research Hypothesis 4 claims, “The proportion of program participants that are
reincarcerated for a new crime will be significantly smaller than the proportion of rejected
referrals.” The percent of program participants (37.5%) that end up serving a new jail sentence in
the 36 months post-discharge is significantly lower than the percent of non-participants (59.2%;
see Table 17; Χ2=9.214, p=0.002). Furthermore, when compared with the group of rejected
referrals, the number of average jail days for mental health court participants was significantly
lower in the first year (see Table 19; t=-2.918, p=0.002) and second year post-discharge (t=-2.676,
p=0.004). Based upon these findings, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the research
hypothesis.
Research Hypothesis 5 asserts that, “The average number of jail days per month will be
significantly lower for program participants than rejected referrals at every month in the 36 months
post-involvement.” Figure 8 chronicles the average number of jail days per month in the 36
months post-mental health court discharge. In the second month post-court involvement, the
participant group has a higher number of average monthly jail days, but that group average
immediately drops below the control group average in month 3 and remains there for the next three
years. In fact, according to a series of one-tailed independent-samples t-tests at each time point,
the disparity in jail days becomes statistically significant in month 10 (t=-3.070, p=0.000) and
stays significant for the next year until month 22 (t=-1.961, p=0.052). After that, the difference in

130

monthly jail days remains, although the discrepancy is only significant once more in month 35 (t=1.701, p=0.048). These findings are consistent with other mental health court evaluations that
found that participants served significantly fewer average jail days when compared with a control
group (Cosden et al. 2005; Frailing 2010). While we cannot accept the research hypothesis
because it specified a lower average number of jail days at every month post-discharge, there is a
large body of evidence that specific time frames or individual months see significantly lower
averages in the program participation group over the comparison group.
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Figure 8: Average Jail Days per Month Post-Mental Health Court
Discharge
Research Hypothesis 6 stipulates that, “Program participation will have a significant
negative effect on the estimated hazard ratio of reincarceration.” Table 21 presents the results of
a Cox regression on the hazard rate of reincarceration within the first 36 months post-discharge.
When mental health court participation is not included in the regression, the only variable that
even approaches statistical significance is age (z=-1.92, p=0.055). Once the model is expanded to
include program participation, age becomes significant (z=-2.06, p=0.039) and there is evidence
for a treatment effect (estimated hazard ratio=0.58, z=-2.10, p=0.036). In the expanded Model 2,
a subject in the treatment group is 42% less likely than a member of the comparison group to be
incarcerated within 36 months. Figure 9 shows the visual plot of the differences in survival
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probability of reincarceration across the treatment and comparison groups and at every point the
treatment group has a higher probability of survival. Based upon the Cox regression, we accept
the research hypothesis.
Table 21. Cox Regression on Hazard Rate of Reincarceration within 36 Months Post-Discharge for
Program Participants and Rejected Referrals
Model I (N=154)
Model 2 (N=154)
Variable
Hazard
95% CI
Hazard
95% CI
Ratio
Ratio
(N=83
(N=83
failures)
failures)
Male (reference: female)
1.11
.69-1.77
1.14
.71-1.82
Age
0.97
.95-1.00*
0.97
.95-1.00*
White (reference: not white)
1.20
.50-2.90
1.27
.53-3.08
Highest grade completed
0.98
.84-1.14
1.00
.85-1.16
Unemployed not seeking/Disabled (reference:
1.64
.97-2.80
1.50
.88-2.55
employed or seeking)
Private residence w/o support (reference: other)
0.93
.54-1.59
0.98
.58-1.65
History of violence (reference: no history)
1.02
.63-1.65
1.03
.63-1.67
History of drug offenses (reference: no history)
1.09
.65-1.83
1.12
.67-1.89
History of incarceration (reference: no history)
1.38
.86-2.22
1.46
.90-2.36
Anti-social personality disorder (reference: no
1.67
.81-3.46
1.57
.77-3.20
diagnosis)
Substance dependence/abuse (reference: no
1.41
.88-2.26
1.30
.80-2.12
diagnosis)
MHC Participation (reference: non-participants)
0.58
.35-.96*
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
Model 1: 2(11, N=154) = 19.64, p=0.050; Model 2: 2(12, N=154) = 24.30, p=0.018

When examining the impact that program participation has on reincarceration, we accepted
two research hypotheses and technically failed to accept a third. A more in-depth analysis of the
comparisons tied to that failed research hypothesis actually shows a significant treatment effect at
specific times. In other words, if that failed hypothesis were restated in a different way, there
would be enough evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative hypothesis. By every
quantitative measure used in this study, program participation has a significant negative effect at
some point on reincarceration.
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Figure 9: Survival Probabilty of Reincarceration

Effect on Hospitalization
Similar to the mixed findings for reoffending, the impact of the specialty court on future
use of mental health services is also unclear. The lone hypothesis tied to hospitalization (Research
Hypothesis 7) states that “The proportion of program participants that are hospitalized in the 36
months post-involvement will be significantly smaller than the proportion of rejected referrals that
will be hospitalized during the same time period.” Based upon studies that found a reduction effect
in hospitalization post-enrollment (Henrickx et al. 2005; Keator et al. 2013; O’Keefe 2006), this
study assumed that participation would cause a similar reduction post-involvement. In reality,
7.8% of participants and 6.3% of non-participants experienced an acute in-patient crisis episode
or a long-term hospitalization in the three years after interacting with the court, and that difference
was not significant (see Table 17). Based upon this information, we fail to accept the research
hypothesis and conclude that participation in the mental health court has no effect on future
hospitalization.
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Effect on Use of Therapeutic Services
The court’s effect on the long-term use of therapeutic services is similar. Despite other
evaluations finding evidence to the contrary (Van Vleet et al. 2008), by every measure in this study
there appears to be no significant difference between program participants and rejected referrals
on maintaining contact with the community mental health provider during the three-year period
post-discharge. According to Research Hypothesis 8, “The proportion of program participants that
utilize therapeutic services in the 36 months post-involvement will be significantly larger than the
proportion of rejected referrals that utilize therapeutic services during the same time period.” In
that three-year time period, over 63% of mental health court enrollees and nearly 68% of the
comparison group used at least one mental health service at some point (see Table 17). In addition,
there was no significant difference between the treatment and comparison groups in the number of
average therapeutic services utilized in the first, second, and third year post-discharge (see Table
19). In fact, in the first year post-involvement, program participants averaged less than half as
many treatment services (1.13) as the rejected referrals (2.43), although that difference is nonsignificant (t=-1.506, p=0.068). In all, there is no empirical support for the research hypothesis.
A further analysis of program participant within-group change pre- and post-program
involvement using the annual average use of services found a non-significant effect at every time
point (see Table 18). In a reversal of expectation, program participants actually average fewer
services in the twelve months post-discharge than in the year preceding enrollment mental health
court. Program participants ended up averaging more usage in the second and third year postdischarge than in the equivalent pre-test periods, but these patterns are still not significant.
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Figure 10 goes into more depth by presenting the average therapeutic services per month
utilized by both groups over that period of time in order to address the claim in Research
Hypothesis 9 that “The average number of therapeutic services per month will be significantly
higher for program participants than rejected referrals at every month in the 36 months postinvolvement.” Despite the control group using more services in every month during the first year
and a half, a series of independent-samples t-tests indicated that there were no significant
differences at any given time point. After month 18, the group trajectories start to fluctuate in
terms of who used more average services and there continued to be no significant group-based
differences. Once again, we fail to accept the research hypothesis.
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Figure 10: Average Therapeutic Services per Month Post-Mental Health
Court Discharge

The final research hypothesis (Research Hypothesis 10) asserts that, “Program
participation will have a significant positive effect on the estimated hazard ratio of use of
therapeutic services.”

A third Cox regression was conducted on the hazard rate of using

therapeutic services in the three years post-specialty court involvement. According to the findings
reported in Table 22, when specialty court participation is omitted, the only variables that have a
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significant estimated hazard ratio of future treatment is a history of hospitalization (hazard
ratio=2.00, z=2.00, p=0.045) and a history of therapeutic service use (hazard ratio=2.36, z=3.21,
p=0.001). This stands to reason as a history of crisis episodes and pre-existing treatment
relationship with the community mental health service provider would absolutely encourage
continued use of services. Once specialty court participation is included, a history of therapeutic
service use remains significant (z=3.17, p=0.002), while a history of hospitalization drops out of
significance (z=1.92, p=0.055). Participation in the mental health court itself has no significant
effect (z=0.74, p=0.460). Despite being non-significant, the estimated hazard ratio of participation
is positive though, meaning that it is going in the expected direction. For a visual representation
of how mixed these results may be, see Figure 11 for the survival probability of utilizing treatment
services by treatment versus comparison group affiliation. In the end, we fail to accept the research
hypothesis.
Table 22. Cox Regression on Hazard Rate of Using Therapeutic Services within 36 Months Post-Discharge
for Program Participants and Rejected Referrals
Model I (N=123)
Model 2 (N=123)
Variable
Hazard
95% CI
Hazard
95% CI
Ratio
Ratio
(N=82
(N=82
failures)
failures)
Male (reference: female)
0.75
.47-1.18
0.74
.47-1.18
Age
0.99
.97-1.02
0.99
.97-1.02
White (reference: not white)
0.90
.41-1.99
0.89
.41-1.97
Highest grade completed
1.10
.95-1.27
1.09
.94-1.26
Unemployed not seeking/Disabled (reference:
1.29
.75-2.20
1.35
.78-2.35
employed or seeking)
Private residence w/o support (reference: other)
0.72
.44-1.21
0.71
.43-1.18
History of violence (reference: no history)
1.04
.65-1.66
1.04
.65-1.67
History of drug offenses (reference: no history)
0.94
.58-1.51
0.93
.58-1.50
History of incarceration (reference: no history)
0.77
.47-1.25
0.78
.48-1.26
History of hospitalization (reference: no history)
2.00
1.01-3.96*
1.96
.99-3.88
History of therapeutic services (reference: no
2.36
1.40-4.00*** 2.34
1.38-3.95**
history)
MHC Participation (reference: non-participants)
1.20
.74-1.92
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***
Model 1: 2(11, N=123) = 22.74, p=0.019; Model 2: 2(12, N=123) = 23.29, p=0.025
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Based upon all of the available evidence, program participation does not have any of the
theorized long-term effects on use of mental health services. This study failed to accept all four
research hypotheses tied to crisis episodes and treatment maintenance. Findings indicate that
rejected referrals actually use treatment services more during the first eighteen months postdischarge, although that difference is also non-significant. Clearly, these results require further
examination and a reformulated research strategy.

Figure 11: Survival Probabilty of Using Treatment Services
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION

Treatment Effects on Criminal Measures
According to a recent meta-analysis assessing the overall impact of mental health courts,
such specialty courts have a small to moderate effect on reducing recidivism and a non-significant
effect on clinical outcomes for program participants with serious mental illness (Cross 2011).
Based upon the results of the current study, this trend appears to be accurate. We could only accept
two of the ten research hypotheses, although two more found partial evidence. Of the six that were
outright rejected, all of the hypotheses about mental health treatment outcomes found no evidence
of a treatment effect. Overall, there appears to be a reliable and significant long-term treatment
effect on incarceration, but the impact on reoffending is short-lived and inconsistent, and the
impact on treatment outcomes is non-existent.
In examining the inconsistent effect that the court has on reoffending, the only evidence
that lends positive support for the intervention is the fact that program participants significantly
average fewer annual offenses in the first year post-discharge when compared to both themselves
pre-treatment (see Table 18) and the rejected referral comparison group post-discharge (see Table
19). This effect appears to be most significant during the first few months when program
participants averaged fewer monthly offenses than the control group (see Figure 6). More
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precisely, mental health court participants had significantly fewer average monthly offenses
specifically in the second and third month of that first year. During the second year post-program
involvement, there is no statistically significant reduction in either the annual or monthly average
charges. But, in the third year post-discharge, program participants once again see a significantly
lower number of average annual charges, with significantly fewer monthly offenses on-and-off in
the last seven months of data collection. While any claims to a consistent treatment effect might
be misplaced, there appears to be something of a “bookending effect” when compared with
rejected referrals where program participants see a period of greater pro-social functioning
immediately after court involvement and then again over two years later.
When evaluating the impact that the court has on incarceration, there is consistent evidence
of a treatment effect in every assessment that was conducted. A significantly smaller percentage
of program participants were reincarcerated in the 36 months post-involvement (see Table 17).
The same group of participants saw significantly fewer annual average jail days in the first and
second year post-discharge (see Table 19), with a significant difference specifically from months
ten through twenty-two (see Figure 8). And program participation was significantly associated
with a 42% reduction in the likelihood of reincarceration (see Table 21), with a survival probability
of reincarceration that was reliably higher for participants in the three years post-discharge (see
Figure 9). All things considered, while the ability to avoid new charges did not have a reliable
relationship with program participation in the time post-discharge, the ability to stay out of jail
appears to be significantly associated with enrolling the in the mental health program.
This trend is important for a number of reasons. The first is that there was no initial
difference between the treatment and comparison groups on prior incarceration (see Table 13). In
fact, the proportion of program participants who had been incarcerated prior to referral to the
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mental health court was actually higher (although nonsignificant).

While the incarceration

trajectories of both groups ebbed and flowed in the three years prior to coming to the attention of
the court (see Figure 2), there was no statistically significant trend that implicated one group over
the other as more criminally prone. Even if the disparity in average jail days in the 36 months
post-discharge is more indicative of an increase in incarceration for the rejected referrals than a
decrease in incarceration for program participants, that still hints at a significant shielding effect.
Based upon all pre- and post-test evidence, having been accepted into the program, regardless of
whether one graduates or not, significantly decreases the likelihood of future incarceration.
The second reason that the results related to incarceration are meaningful is that they may
imply something about the type of offense that most program participants might be committing
post-program involvement. While there was not a statistically significant trend in terms of rejected
referrals being more likely to engage in a post-discharge non-traffic violation (see Table 17), the
fact that the comparison group ends up spending more time incarcerated may imply something
about the seriousness of their offense-types that cannot be captured by offense averages alone.
While there is no empirical evidence in the current study to support such a claim, it does makes
some intuitive sense as prior mental health court evaluations have shown that new offenses are
significantly less severe post-mental health court participation both in pre-test/post-test designs
(Moore and Hiday 2006) and in control group comparisons (Moore and Hiday 2006; Trupin and
Richards 2003). While it was beyond the scope of the current study, future examinations using
this dataset should explore the possibility that while the average number of monthly charges may
be comparable between groups, these charges may not be qualitatively the same. The difference
in jail time may be in indicator of this imbalance in severity of illegal activity, but without
substantive evidence it is purely speculation at this point.
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The third and final reason that this treatment effect is important is economic. Incarceration
is expensive. In 2012, incarceration in the local Cache County Jail cost $68.33 per inmate per day
(Macavinta 2013d). For inmates with serious mental illness, that cost typically goes up (Ferguson
et al. 2008). If this program is particularly adept at reducing reincarceration, it will save the county
and the state a substantial amount of money. As noted in Table 19, the average rejected referral
spent 2.6042 days in jail per month during the second year post-involvement, while the average
program participant spent a significantly fewer 0.6726 days behind bars during the same period.
At the baseline cost of $68.33 per day, the average rejected referral is costing taxpayers $177.95
per month while the average program participant only costs $45.96. This leads to a savings of
$131.99 per month per offender. Multiplied out over a full year, that is an annual savings of
$1,583.88 per person. Given that the program accepts nearly 45 percent of applicants, finding
support for this treatment effect hints at a significant reduction in incarceration costs.
When considering the treatment effects of program participation on criminal measures,
there are still some confounders to consider. Despite the lack of significant difference in criminal
histories during pre-testing, there are still demographic differences between those that are accepted
into the program and those that are not that may be important. As program participants are both
less likely to be outside of the workforce and are more likely to live in a private residence without
institutional support (as opposed to a private residence with support, a 24-hour care facility, a state
hospital, or the local jail), one could argue that they are more capable of pro-social functioning
and autonomy.
Outside of these demographic disparities, there appear to be significant clinical differences
that may also be important. Rejected referrals have significantly higher rates of substance-related
diagnoses and anti-social personality disorder. Both of these diagnoses are generally viewed as
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criminogenic risk factors that predict an ongoing pattern of anti-social behavior (see Virdi and
Trestman 2015; White 2015). The fact that rejected referrals are incarcerated at higher rates and
serve more jail time than the treatment group may be influenced by the higher proportion of these
more potentially criminogenic diagnoses. Moran and Hodgins (2004) found that 75 percent of
persons with both schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder have a criminal history, and
both together increase the likelihood of a substance-related disorder. In a sample of mental health
court participants, Burns et al. (2013) found that substance-related diagnoses significantly
predicted the percent of program participants that reoffended and the mean number of post-exit
jail days. Other mental health court evaluations that considered the role of substance abuse found
that it also significantly affects the number of jail days during the first eighteen months in the
program (Steadman et al. 2011); whether participants terminate unsuccessfully (Burns et al. 2013;
Rossman et al. 2012); and whether program graduates are rearrested in the first year postcompletion (Dirk-Linhorst and Linhorst 2012). Unfortunately, the impact of antisocial personality
disorder on program involvement has not been expressly examined in prior evaluations. In the
current study, while both potentially run a heightened risk of confounding the relationship between
participation and reincarceration, neither was statistically significant in the Cox regression on
hazard rate of reincarceration (see Table 22).
Another important consideration about substance dependence/abuse is that separate from
the mental health court, Utah’s First District also runs a drug-themed specialty court. It is possible
that some of the referrals to the mental health court are rejected because local community treatment
specialists believe that the source of ongoing offending is not due primarily to mental illness, but
may be due to ongoing substance dependence/abuse. There is the potential that at least a few
rejected referrals have gone on to participate in the First District Drug Court after being denied by
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the mental health court. Unfortunately, this information was not as readily available during data
collection and so could not be explored empirically.

Treatment Effects on Mental Health Measures
Besides limiting criminal recidivism, one of the other primary goals of a mental health
court is increasing the number of therapeutic linkages. On one hand, a reduction in hospitalization
theoretically points to a greater ability to self-manage a pervasive mental illness, so much so that
crisis episodes end up diminishing as a function of program participation. On the other hand, a
post-treatment increase in the use of therapeutic services would seem to indicate how one is able
to manage a serious mental illness so well. Ideally, participants would maintain an ongoing
relationship with the community treatment provider. If that is not possible, an alternative goal
would be a periodic embracing of treatment whenever necessary in order to potentially avoid a
sudden and unexpected crisis episode. At this point, the results of this study would appear to
support this alternative model of periodic treatment when necessary, as there is no evidence to
support either the reduction in hospitalization or the ongoing use of maintenance therapeutic
services.
The results of the examination of future hospitalization were inconsistent with initial
expectations. The research hypothesis that program affiliation would actually lead to a lower
percentage of participants who are hospitalized in the three years after involvement ended up being
wrong (see Table 17). In fact, a greater (but non-significant) proportion of program participants
than rejected referrals experience a crisis episode requiring hospitalization in the three years postdischarge. While the lack of statistical significance supports the idea that any difference that we
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think we see is actually due to random chance, the results are consistent with anomalous nonsignificant findings in other mental health court evaluations (see Cross 2011). One limitation to
consider with the current study is the particularly small sample size of hospitalizations postdischarge (N=10), which restricts the ability to provide statistical validity.
Evaluating the treatment effect of program affiliation on use of treatment services is
problematic in a different way. According to the Cox regression on hazard rates of utilizing
treatment services, the primary predictor of a continued use of such services is a pre-existing
history of treatment (see Table 22). Based upon the complete regression model, an individual is
134% more likely to engage in a therapeutic service at Bear River Mental Health Services during
the three-year period post-discharge if s/he went to BRMHS at least once prior to referral to the
court. No other variable, including participation in mental health court, appears to have an impact
on use of treatment services.
In fact, as mentioned earlier in the results chapter, the comparison group of rejected
referrals interacted significantly more with the community treatment provider in the months
leading up to mental health court charges (see Figure 3). Despite a non-significant difference in
the proportions of the participant and comparison group who used therapeutic services in the past
(see Table 13), it appears that the rejected referrals that did use the service provider did so with a
higher level of frequency. The post-involvement trajectories also point to the comparison group
maintaining a higher (albeit non-significant) number of average services, especially in the first 18
months (see Figure 10). Within this, there may be an argument that participants and rejected
referrals alike may engage in a periodic utilization of treatment whenever necessary in order to
potentially avoid a sudden and unexpected crisis episode
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Given that participants will have been subject to an ongoing series of court-mandated
therapeutic services during the entire duration of their program affiliation, and given that nonparticipants have either just been released from jail or rejected from the program, it stands to reason
that both groups are at different points in relation to a crisis episode. While 38.95 percent of
participants is coming off of the negative experience of a termination that potentially placed them
in jail, there is still 34.74 percent of participants that are experiencing the positive effects of
graduating successfully (see Table 15). In contrast, every single person in the non-participant
comparison group is coming off of a negative experience, whether it is rejection from the program
or incarceration for the pending crime. The differences that we see in treatment trajectories may
be due to the differences in environmental stress across both groups.
Finally, program participation has no significant bearing on the long-term use of services.
In general, the most important thing appears to be a pre-existing relationship with the community
treatment provider. It is possible though that environmental stress may drive one back toward
utilizing therapeutic services in order to preempt the more traumatic experience of hospitalization.
In this vein, the most positive effect of mental health court participation may be in how it attempts
to teach internal coping strategies that do not necessitate the use of community services. According
to the official literature of Bear River Mental Health, the final phase of mental health court
participation, Phase IV, stresses functional fulfillment and community integration (Kirkman
2013). In this final stage, defendants are prompted to become more active in community-based
activities like education, in a vocation, or an appropriate recreational activity.

Moreover,

participants are encouraged to adopt leadership roles as peer mentors in the program itself. Once
graduation is complete, there may be no immediate need to employ therapeutic services in order
to maintain the momentum of functional fulfillment.
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Limitations
The current study was limited in four key ways. The first set of limitations is tied to having
only limited access to institutional data and the second group of limitations is tied to having no
access to self-reported information. The third set of limitations centers on the decision not to
specifically explore the treatment mechanisms that may be causing changes in outcome variables
and the final area of limitation is related to bias.
As data collection consisted entirely of agency file reviews, the agency contacts available
will strongly dictated what reports could be assembled. As this study was working with the First
District Court itself, data collection was limited to court documents detailing criminal histories
and sentences in the state of Utah. There was no access to any national databases chronicling
criminal behaviors outside of Utah borders. In addition, the information about incarceration and
jail days was limited to the local jail in Cache County. While there may have been some
documentation in the district court records about inmate stays in the Utah State penitentiaries in
Draper or Gunnison, there was no guarantee that court records will include this material. As the
First District Court primarily collaborates with the local facility, the more reliable reports about
incarceration frequency and duration came from the Cache County jail itself.
As is the case when attempting to monitor physical health, compiling records from just a
single hospital or health facility was incredibly problematic when attempting to create an accurate
treatment history. Accurate histories of state hospitalizations for the current study were also
limited by whatever documentation is available or by the firsthand knowledge of the current court
personnel.

As Bear River Mental Health Services is the only repository of mental health
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information available, another potential limitation was the absence of total knowledge about the
mental health history of each subject.
In addition, information available about the sample population was heavily dictated by
discretionary decisions made by court workgroup actors outside of the researcher’s influence. An
example of this limitation was the aforementioned inclusion of documentation about state
penitentiary stays, which is dependent upon the court reporter including it in his or her procedural
notes. Another example of this limitation was how the referral population is constructed; there
was no official documentation of how referrals come to the court’s attention other than anecdotal
accounts of past potential participants who may have been recommended by a defense attorney,
the Office of the Cache County District Attorney, Bear River Mental Health, or the Jail Division
of the Cache County Sheriff’s Office. As there appears to be no single document chronicling
program recommendations, there was no way of knowing where the majority of referrals were
coming from and no way of exploring whether these referrals were indeed capturing the target
population. In short, the first body of limitations of the present research was that measures of
criminal charges were limited only to Utah, and further measures about jail stays and incarceration
days were limited only to Cache County. Moreover, measures of mental health histories were
limited to what information is available at Bear River Mental Health Services, and all information
about the referral process was entirely inaccessible. While each of these represents an important
limitation, such is the nature of program evaluation.
Finally, yet another limitation tied to a lack of total information involves the First District
drug court. As mentioned earlier, there is a drug-themed specialty court that runs parallel to the
mental health court that may be treating a portion of the rejected referrals that have been screened
as ineligible for the mental health court. While none of the file reviews that provided information
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about why rejected referrals were not accepted into the program included any documentation about
transferring mental health referrals to the drug specialty court, this does remain a possibility.
According to Figure 4, four percent of rejected referrals were denied enrollment due to an unknown
reason. It is possible that that four percent was transferred over and the court clerk failed to note
the change. It is also possible that many of the other individuals that were rejected for other
reasons, including diagnostic ineligibility or specific charges, were encouraged to observe or enroll
in the drug court instead.
This is potentially a major limitation as an individual enrolled in a drug court is subject to
a similar level of court-ordered community treatment (see Council of State Governments 2005).
In this regard, that rejected referral may also be receiving ongoing therapeutic aid from Bear River
Mental Health Services, in which case, s/he is experiencing something very similar to mental
health court participation. Unfortunately, there is simply no way to know how strong a possibility
that is at this point. If another process evaluation is requested and more data is to be collected,
than this information will need to be known.
The second set of research limitations is also the natural result of collecting data only
through formal file reviews. Because of this data collection design, researchers in the current study
had no personal contact with program referrals. As such, the information gathered could not
provide any insight into the participant experience and had no measures of psychological progress.
Many mental health court studies have used structured interviewing and self-administered
questionnaires to gauge client perceptions of courtroom proceedings. Thanks to this research
design, these studies have been able to articulate and quantify the impact that the mental health
court design has had on topics like admission experience, perceptions of coercion, courtroom
equity, procedural justice, judicial encouragement, and overall client satisfaction (Boothroyd et al.
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2003; Boulden et al. 2011; Callahan et al. 2013; Canada and Watson 2013; Frailing 2010;
Kopelovich et al. 2013; Liedtke et al. 2012; O’Keefe 2006; Poythress et al. 2002; Pratt et al. 2013;
Trupin and Richards 2003; Trupin, et al. 2001). In addition, a related body of studies have used
similar survey techniques to assess changes in psychological processes like psychiatric ratings,
global functioning, quality of life, symptom intensity, recovery assessments, and treatment
motivation (Behnken 2010; Bess Associates 2004; Boothroyd et al. 2005; Callahan et al. 2013;
Cosden et al. 2003; Cosden et al. 2005; Kopelovich et al. 2013; Pratt et al. 2013; Trupin and
Richards 2003). While both of these sets of measures provide essential insight into the participant
experience, these rich descriptions were unavailable in the current study design.
The third group of study limitations is tied to a lack of examination of the actual treatment
mechanisms that lead to pro-social change. As previously mentioned, the philosophy of therapeutic
jurisprudence dictates that a mental health court consider pro-therapeutic outcomes in judicial
decision-making (Wexler 2000). But, outside of facilitating ongoing status hearings in order to
incentivize program compliance, the problem-solving court exists external to the individualized
treatment schedule. Traditionally, the community treatment provider (e.g., Bear River Mental
Health Services) dictates what services are available and who should receive those services based
upon specific needs (Almquist and Dodd 2009). While the court supplies the legal motivation to
maintain an ongoing relationship with that provider, it also assumes that the recommended
therapeutic services will provide the best rehabilitative experience possible. The current study
has no assessment of those treatment services themselves.
Bear River Mental Health Services has instituted a very specific four-phase system that is
meant to transition a participant from one series of goals to the next (Kirkman 2013). Outside of
looking at how many days the group of graduates and the group of terminated participants spent
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in each phase, the current study included no assessment of the phases themselves. In order to know
what is working for program participants, it would be important to know what specific treatment
schedule goes into each phase and how much treatment participants receive. At present, treatment
histories were primarily used to estimate the number of therapeutic services utilized pre- and postmental health court involvement. In the future, it would be more informative to explore what
specific services if any (i.e., group therapy, individual therapy, life-skills training) were utilized
prior to establishing contact with the court, what specific treatments were used during affiliation
with the court, and what service usages endured post-court involvement. In short, this evaluation
may provide some estimation of a treatment effect but it provides no insight into what therapeutic
mechanisms cause that effect to take place.
The final study limitation is related entirely to the unknown threat posed by potential bias.
While there was no direct difference in criminal histories between the treatment and comparison
groups, there were still significant differences in other variables that may have an indirect effect
on behavioral outcomes (e.g., the relationship to the workforce, residential autonomy, the presence
of a substance-related diagnosis, anti-social personality disorder). While the demographic and
clinical dissimilarities did not affect the likelihood of future offending and incarceration as
estimated by Cox regression (see Tables 20 and 21), the presence of such differences hints at a
possible threat to internal validity. In short, the fact that the group of program participants and the
group of rejected referrals are different on some variables implies that they are probably different
on others. The inability to know for certain how different these groups may be introduces potential
bias. While statistical techniques such as regression allow researchers to control for some of these
differences, it is impossible to know for certain that bias is not present. As such, the inability to
know is a research limitation
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Future Research
Beyond conducting the current research project in order to fulfill the requirements for a
doctorate, this evaluation was intended to serve as a vehicle for a larger series of goals. Two goals
were institutional in nature while the other two were specifically tied to assessment. The first
institutional goal was to organize disparate pieces of information about the court into a cohesive
data collection format.

The second institutional goal was to validate these data collection

techniques locally so that they might be adopted in other mental health court systems throughout
the state of Utah. The first goal has obviously been met as the analyses conducted as a part of this
study could not have been performed otherwise. The second goal has yet to be realized, but may
be possible at a later point depending upon the direction that this project takes in the future.
The first assessment-related objective was to conduct an impact assessment gauging the
court’s efficacy at diverting offenders suffering from mental illness away from criminal behaviors
and toward treatment-based activities. And the second assessment-related aim, and the final
research goal overall, was to empirically inform the greater community of mental health
practitioners, researchers, and policy makers. Similar to the previous pair of objectives, the first
goal has been met to a certain degree while the second is still lingering as a function of future
research.
This impact assessment is really the first of many potential studies exploring this specific
mental health court. In general, Utah’s First District specialty court needed baseline measures for
important information like acceptance rates, graduation rates, and clientele demographics because
they were all entirely unknown. The court also needed to know how effectively it affected program
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goals like reductions in reoffending and increases in use of therapeutic services. The design of the
current study was intended to start this process by providing some very basic information about
whether the court has any kind of effect on recidivism and use of treatment services.
This analysis found that, when compared with those referrals that were rejected, program
participants engage in a significantly lower level of criminal activity in the first few months postdischarge, along with a significantly lower level of incarceration in the following year. In fact, by
every measure tested in this study, the court appears to have a significant, diminishing effect on
reincarcertion overall.

This information is absolutely necessary in order for the court to

demonstrate its utility to policy makers. In addition, this analysis was done in such a specific way
as an attempt to overcome the issues of bias that affect some of the previous mental health court
evaluations, thus providing a valid contribution to the research community. Unfortunately, the
findings of this study do not include information that will help to inform mental health practitioners
about best evidence-based practices. The court and its workgroup will now be reliant upon future
research in order to start teasing out what is working and what is not.
Building upon what has been learned throughout the process of managing the current
project, there are two areas that need future attention. The first issue is that future examinations
need more precise measures of mental health change, as just tracking “use of services” over time
has proven insufficient. The second issue is that prospective studies should focus on discovering
what specific aspects of the program are affective at achieving the two-pronged institutional goals
of less crime and improved mental health. At this point, there is no gauge of mental health
improvement other than court compliance, an absence of new charges, and transitioning
successfully through the program phases. In addition, there is no information about what works
in this local program and what does not. The current study approached program assessment from
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a criminal justice perspective, where outcome behaviors post-involvement are used as the measure
for program effectiveness. This limited approach may be part of the reason why there is mixed
evidence for a treatment effect on recidivism and incarceration and absolutely no evidence for an
enduring influence on use of treatment services post-discharges. Now that it has been established
that the court does work at reducing recidivism in one way or another, the primary research
question is why.
In order to address the first issue concerning measuring improvements in mental health, we
recommend incorporating one or more of the self-assessment inventories used in preceding
specialty court evaluations to measure mental health progress over time. Bess Associates (2004)
and Cosden et al. (2003, 2005) used both the Addiction Severity Index and the Lehman Quality of
Life scale to measure post-test differences between an experimental group and a control group.
Boothroyd et al. (2005) used the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale to compare the minimization of
symptoms for two groups across two different times. Callahan et al. (2013), Kopelovich et al.
(2013), and Pratt et al (2013) all used the Colorado Symptom Index and the Recovery Assessment
Index as measures of change.

And multiple studies have used the Global Assessment of

Functioning index (Behnken 2010; Bess Associates 2004; Cosden et al. 2003; Cosden et al. 2005;
Trupin and Richards 2003) to quantify within-groups and between-groups changes in social,
occupational, and psychological.

Clearly, there is no dearth of viable indices or scales for

measuring mental health change. In reality, the primary issue is introducing such a measurement
tool into any ongoing data collection project that can access program participants directly at
multiple points in time.
In order to address the second issue of what aspects of the court are most effective at
reducing recidivism, there is are quantitative solutions and qualitative solutions. The quantitative
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approach would demand revisiting the data already cataloged and (1) first shifting the specific time
period under investigation in order to assess differences between program participants and rejected
referrals, and (2) recoding monthly therapeutic services to include frequency measures of specific
treatments such as the number of group therapy meetings, the number of individual therapy
sessions, and number of life-skills classes, and then focusing on the differences between those that
graduate successfully and those that terminate unsuccessful.
Despite other mental health court evaluations finding an effect when measuring treatment
outcomes post-discharge (Ferguson et al. 2008; Frailing 2010; Van Vleet et al. 2008), focusing on
the three years post-involvement in the current study provided little insight into the use of
therapeutic services. As a result, future research will adopt the more prevalent pre-test/post-test
design that measures service usage post-enrollment (Boothroyd et al. 2003; Cosden et al. 2003;
Cosden et al. 2005; Eckberg et al. 2006; Henrickx et al. 2005; Keator et al. 2013; O'Keefe 2006;
Trupin et al. 2001; Trupin and Richards 2003) in an effort to assess changes in service use that
arise entirely as a function of mental health court participation.
Recoding monthly therapeutic services to be more specific about what treatments are
provided when will have a number of positive benefits. On one hand, it will provide a detailed
examination of what therapeutic mechanisms may or may not actually work locally within this
specific program to promote program adherence, successful program completion, reduce
recidivism, and reduce future incarceration. In addition, it may help inform the larger treatment
community about what may or may not work globally, and thus fill a significant void in mental
health court research related to the lack of evaluation research that focuses on evidence-based best
practices (Castellano and Anderson 2013).
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While the current study found no significant demographic, criminal, or clinical differences
between graduates and terminates other than time spent in the second phase of the program (see
Table 15), that lack of any systematic difference may not be a negative thing. If the characteristics
of the participants alone are not important, than the differences in outcomes may be due to how
those characteristics interact with key elements of the program itself. Rossman et al. (2012) found
that enrollees who were incarcerated at referral had a significantly greater likelihood of
terminating. Redlich et al. (2010) looked at the impact of judicial supervision and the number of
bench warrants during enrollment to see how variability in judicial behaviors affects participant
outcomes. Redlich et al. (2012) has recently called for the mental health court evaluation
community to look at the impact of time spent in diversion prior to court acceptance in order to
see how that may affect program outcomes. While examining any of these processing factors is
important on its own, even more intriguing is the thought of testing how each of these variables
may interact with specific individual characteristics to influence who graduates and who
terminates. In short, a few minor alterations to pre-existing quantitative information can facilitate
a series of new research questions on the impact of judicial processing.
Other quantitative measures of program effectiveness involve incorporating scales of
participant satisfaction. Given that an underlying premise of mental health courts is the legal
philosophy of “therapeutic jurisprudence”, or the use of the legal system as a therapeutic aid
(Wexler and Winick 1996), process analyses might want to focus on effectively that philosophy is
born out (Redlich and Han 2014). Other studies have looked at perceptions of procedural justice
(Canada and Watson 2013; O’Keefe 2006; Poythress et al. 2002), perceptions of coercion
(O’Keefe 2006; Poythress et al. 2002), client satisfaction (Liedtke et al. 2011), and admission
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experiences (Callahan et al. 2013; Kopelovich et al. 2013; Pratt et al. 2013) in an attempt to
quantify the client experience.
The qualitative solution to assessing what works and what does not work involves the use
of courtroom observation and semi-structure interviewing. Of the fifty-two prior evaluations
identified in this study, only seven directly observed the court itself (Boothroyd et al. 2003;
Frailing 2010; Kopelovich et al. 2013; Ray et al. 2011; Rossman et al. 2012; Trupin and Richards
2003), only four interviewed service providers (Boulden et al. 2008; Rossman et al. 2012; Trupin
and Richards 2003; Van Vleet et al. 2008), and only two conducted interviews with actual
participants in the program (Camarena 2008; Canada and Watson 2013). Given that some of the
success of the court hinges on the subjective experience of the clients, interviewing would provide
a layer of depth that cannot be captured otherwise. All of these potential avenues of future research
could not only benefit the local stakeholders but also inform the large community of practitioners
and researchers.

Conclusion
Even though this study was only able to accept two out of ten research hypotheses, there is
still cause to be this optimistic. When compared with a sample of rejected referrals, there is strong
evidence that the court reduces reincarceration significantly in the long-term and mixed evidence
of a reduction effect on offending in the short-term. While this study found no evidence of a
treatment effect on the use of mental health service outcomes post-discharge, that does not
necessarily mean that there is not a treatment effect on mental health itself.
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Utah’s First Judicial District mental health court started at the end of 2008 and has been
operating ever since. Barring holidays, the court meets every Wednesday afternoon to screen new
referrals and check in on current participants. All of this is done in an effort to help offenders with
serious mental illness pay their debt to society while also learning to manage their mental illness.
In a personal interview, on October 1, 2013, Judge Allen said that he often uses diabetes as an
analogy for mental illness in court when addressing new program participants14. He argued that
both are illnesses that need do not want to have but do, that need to be managed instead of ignored,
and that can be exacerbated by stress and other negative environmental influences. He claimed
that he and the rest of the court workgroup are doing everything that they can to make people’s
lives better by using the law to force them to get the treatment that they need. He believed that
they were doing good works, and he trusted all of this without any tangible quantitative evidence.
When evaluating the impact that the court has on incarceration, there is consistent evidence
of a treatment effect in every assessment that was conducted. A significantly smaller percentage
of program participants were reincarcerated in the 36 months post-involvement (see Table 17).
The same group of participants saw significantly fewer annual average jail days in the first and
second year post-discharge (see Table 19), with a significant difference specifically from months
ten through twenty-two (see Figure 8). And program participation was significantly associated
with a 42% reduction in the likelihood of reincarceration (see Table 21), with a survival probability
of reincarceration that was reliably higher for participants in the three years post-discharge (see
Figure 9). Enrolling in the mental health court appears to be significantly associated with staying
out of jail.

14

Judge Kevin K. Allen, personal interview, October 1, 213, Utah State University, Logan, UT.
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In contrast to the overwhelming evidence of a diminishing influence on incarceration, the
treatment effect on recidivism is more mixed. Program participation causes a significant reduction
in offending during the first year post-involvement (see Tables 18 and 19), specifically during the
second and third month post-discharge, after which there appears to be little difference in the rate
of reoffending between the treatment and comparison groups (see Figure 6). While program
participation does not yield the same reliable, long-term impact on reoffending that it does on
reincarceration that does not mean that the program is not successful. Reframing the significant
short-term effects as an accomplishment requires a slight reinterpretation of how success is
defined.
Borrowing from Judge Allen's earlier analogy, it is widely accepted that while Type I
diabetes has no cure there are various techniques for managing it effectively. Proactive lifestyle
routines like regular exercise and healthy eating habits can act as a form of maintenance that helps
regulate blood sugar and prevent a negative physical episode. But sometimes those techniques are
not enough and something else is needed to shock the sugar levels back into a stable range. In
those instances, diabetics use insulin injections to bring symptoms under control and reset their
blood sugar levels.
It is possible that mental health court is more comparable to an insulin shot than a diet plan
for some participants. Mental illness flares up due to environmental stress or an inability to
maintain the proactive routine that keeps it under control, and in individual does something that
attracts police attention. As a result of court-mandated treatment, mental health court acts as a
shot in the arm that helps to reset the mental health equivalent to blood sugar levels and that shot
helps stabilize things in the short run. To test this possibility more thoroughly, future research will

158

endeavor to specifically study participants during treatment in order to get at the therapeutic
mechanisms that are causing change.
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